I regret that I have not been able to describe the work of all of our officers and men; to do this, however, would demand more than a single volume. One of the disappointing aspects of destroyer work was that many of the finest performances were those that were the least spectacular. The fact that an attack upon a submarine did not result in a sinking hardly robbed it of its importance; many of the finest exploits of our forces did not destroy the enemy, but they will always hold a place in our naval annals for the daring and skill with which they were conducted. In this class belong the achievements of the Sterrett, under Lieutenant-Commander Farquhar; of the Benham, under Lieutenant-Commander D. Lyons; of the O'Brien, under Lieutenant-Commander C. A. Blakeley; of the Parker, under Lieutenant-Commander H. Powell; of the Jacob Jones, under Lieutenant-Commander D. W. Bagley; of the Wadsworth, under Lieutenant-Commander Taussig, and afterward I. F. Dortch; of the Drayton, under Lieutenant-Commander D. L. Howard; of the McDougal, under Commander A. L. Fairfield; and of the Nicholson, under Commander F. D. Berrien. The senior destroyer commander at Queenstown was Commander David C. Hanrahan of the Cushing, a fine character and one of the most experienced officers of his rank in the Navy. He was a tower of strength at all times, and I shall have occasion to mention him later in connection with certain important duties. The Chief-of-Staff at Queenstown, Captain J. R. P. Pringle, was especially commended by Admiral Bayly for his "tact, energy, and ability." The American naval forces at Queenstown were under my immediate command. Necessarily, however, I had to spend the greater part of my time at the London headquarters, or at the Naval Council in Paris, and it was therefore necessary that I should be represented at Queenstown by a man of marked ability. Captain Pringle proved equal to every emergency. He was responsible for the administration, supplies, and maintenance of the Queenstown forces, and the state of readiness and efficiency in which they were constantly maintained was the strongest possible evidence of his ability. To him was chiefly due also the fact that our men co-operated so harmoniously and successfully with the British.
As an example of the impression which our work made I can do no better than to quote the message sent by Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly to the Queenstown forces on May 4, 1918:
"On the anniversary of the arrival of the first United States men-of-war at Queenstown, I wish to express my deep gratitude to the United States officers and ratings for the skill, energy, and unfailing good-nature which they have all consistently shown and which qualities have so materially assisted in the war by enabling ships of the Allied Powers to cross the ocean in comparative freedom.
"To command you is an honour, to work with you is a pleasure, to know you is to know the best traits of the Anglo-Saxon race."
CHAPTER V
DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION
I
My chief purpose in writing this book is to describe the activities during the World War of the United States naval forces operating in Europe. Yet it is my intention also to make clear the several ways in which the war against the submarine was won; and in order to do this it will be necessary occasionally to depart from the main subject and to describe certain naval operations of our allies. The most important agency in frustrating the submarine was the convoy system. An examination of the tonnage losses in 1917 and in 1918, however, discloses that this did not entirely prevent the loss of merchant ships. From April, 1917, to November, 1918, the monthly losses dropped from 875,000 to 101,168 tons. This decrease in sinkings enabled the Allies to preserve their communications and so win the war; however, it is evident that these losses, while not necessarily fatal to the Allied cause, still offered a serious impediment to success. It was therefore necessary to supplement the convoy system in all possible ways. Every submarine that could be destroyed, whatever the method of destruction, represented just that much gain to the Allied cause. Every submarine that was sent to the bottom amounted in 1917 to a saving of many thousands of tons per year of the merchant shipping that would have been sunk by the U-boat if left unhindered to pursue its course. Besides escorting merchant ships, therefore, the Allied navies developed several methods of hunting individual submarines; and these methods not only sank a considerable number of U-boats, but played an important part in breaking down the German submarine moral. For the greater part of the war the utmost secrecy was observed regarding these expedients; it was not until the early part of 1918, indeed, that the public heard anything of the special service vessels that came to be known as the "mystery" or "Q-ships"—although these had been operating for nearly three years. It is true that the public knew that there was something in the wind, for there were announcements that certain naval officers had received the Victoria Cross, but as there was no citation explaining why these coveted rewards were given, they were known as "mystery V.C.'s."