I wish to emphasize the fact that, in laying such a barrage, it was not our object to make an absolute barrier to the passage of submarines. To have done this we should have needed such a great number of mines that the operation would have been impossible. Nor would such an absolute barrier have been necessary to success; a field that could be depended upon to destroy one-fourth or one-fifth of the submarines that attempted the passage would have represented complete success. No enemy could stand such losses as these; and the moral of no crew could have lasted long under such conditions.
Another circumstance which made the barrage a feasible enterprise was that by the last of the year 1917 it was realized that the submarine had ceased to be a decisive factor in the war. It still remained a serious embarrassment, and every measure which could possibly thwart it should be adopted. But the writings of German officers which have been published since the war make it apparent that they themselves realized early in 1918 that they would have to place their hopes of victory on something else besides the submarine. The convoy system and the other methods of fighting under-water craft which I have already described had caused a great decrease in sinkings. In April of 1917 the losses were nearly 900,000 tons; in November of the same year they were less than 300,000 tons.[7] Meanwhile, the construction of merchant shipping, largely a result of the tremendous expansion of American shipbuilding facilities, was increasing at a tremendous rate. A diagram of these, the two essential factors in the submarine campaign, disclosed such a rapidly rising curve of new shipping, and such a rapidly falling curve of sinkings, that the time could be easily foreseen when the net amount of Allied shipping, after the submarines had done their worst, would show a promising increase. But, as stated above, the submarines were still a distinct menace; they were still causing serious losses; and it was therefore very important that we should leave no stone unturned toward demonstrating beyond a shadow of doubt that warfare as conducted by these craft could be entirely put down. The more successfully we demonstrated this fact and the more energetically we prosecuted every form of opposition, the earlier would the enemy's general moral break down and victory be assured. In war, where human lives as well as national interests are at stake, no thought whatever can be given to expense. It is impossible to place a value on human life. Therefore, on November 2, 1917, the so-called "Northern Barrage" project was officially adopted by both the American and the British Governments. When I say that the proposed mine-field was as long as the distance from Washington to New York, some idea of its magnitude may be obtained. Nothing like it had ever been attempted before. The combined operations involved a mass of detail which the lay mind can hardly comprehend. The cost—$40,000,000—is perhaps not an astonishing figure in the statistics of this war, but it gives some conception of the size of the undertaking.
II
During the two years preceding the war Captain Reginald R. Belknap commanded the mine-laying squadron of the Atlantic fleet. Although his force was small, consisting principally of two antiquated warships, the Baltimore and the San Francisco, Captain Belknap had performed his duties conscientiously and ably, and his little squadron therefore gave us an excellent foundation on which to build. Before the European War the business of mine-laying had been unpopular in the American navy as well as in the British; such an occupation, as Sir Eric Geddes once said, had been regarded as something like that of "rat catching"; as hostilities went on, however, and the mine developed great value as an anti-submarine weapon, this branch of the service began to receive more respectful attention. Captain Belknap's work not only provided the nucleus out of which the great American mine force was developed, but he was chiefly responsible for organizing this force. The "active front" of our mine-laying squadron was found in the North Sea; but the sources of supply lay in a dozen shipyards and several hundred manufacturing plants in the United States.
We began this work with practically nothing; we had to obtain ships and transform them into mine-layers; to enlist and to train their crews; to manufacture at least 100,000 mines; to create bases both in the United States and Scotland; to transport all of our supplies more than 3,000 miles of wintry sea, part of the course lying in the submarine zone; and we had to do all this before the real business of planting could begin. The fact that the Navy made contracts for 100,000 of these new mines before it had had the opportunity of thoroughly testing the design under service conditions shows the great faith of the Navy Department in this new invention. More than 500 contractors and sub-contractors, located in places as far west as the Mississippi River, undertook the work of filling this huge order. Wire-rope mills, steel factories, foundries, machine shops, electrical works, and even candy makers, engaged in this great operation; all had their troubles with labour unions, with the railroads, and with the weather—that was the terrible winter of 1917-18; but in a few months trainloads of mine cases—great globes of steel—and other essential parts began to arrive at Norfolk, Virginia. This port was the place where the mine parts were loaded on ships and sent abroad. The plant which was ultimately constructed at this point was able to handle 1,000 mines a day; the industry was not a popular one in the neighbourhood, particularly after the Halifax explosion had proved the destructive powers of the materials in which it dealt. In a few months this establishment had handled 25,000,000 pounds of TNT. The explosive was melted in steel kettles until it reached about the density of hasty pudding; with the aid of automatic devices it was then poured into the mine cases, 300 pounds to a case, and thence moved on a mechanical conveyor to the end of the pier. Twenty-four cargo vessels, for the most part taken from the Great Lakes, carried these cargoes to the western coast of Scotland. Beginning in February, 1918, two or three of these ships sailed every eight days from Norfolk, armed against submarines and manned by naval crews. The fact that these vessels were slow made them an easy prey for the under-water enemy; one indeed was sunk, with the loss of forty-one men; regrettable as was this mishap, it represented the only serious loss of the whole expedition.
The other vital points were Newport, Rhode Island, where the six mine-layers were assembled; and Fort William and Kyle of Lochalsh on the western coast of Scotland, which were the disembarking points for the ships transporting the explosives. Captain Belknap's men were very proud of their mine-layers, and in many details they represented an improvement over anything which had been hitherto employed in such a service. At this point I wish to express my very great appreciation of the loyal and devoted services rendered by Captain Belknap. An organizer of rare ability, this officer deserves well of the nation for the conspicuous part which he played in the development of the North Sea Mine Barrage from start to finish. Originally, these mine-layers had been coastwise vessels; two of them were the Bunker Hill and the Massachusetts, which for years had been "outside line" boats, running from New York to Boston; all had dropped the names which had served them in civil life and were rechristened for the most part with names which eloquently testified to their American origin—Canonicus, Shawmut, Quinnebaug, Housatonic, Saranac, Roanoke, Aroostook, and Canandaigua. These changes in names were entirely suitable, for by the time our forces had completed their alterations the ships bore few resemblances to their former state. The cabins and saloons had been gutted, leaving the hulls little more than empty shells; three decks for carrying mines had been installed; on all these decks little railroad tracks had been built on which the mines could be rolled along the lower decks to the elevators and along the upper mine deck to the stern and dropped into the sea. Particularly novel details, something entirely new in mine-layers, were the elevators, the purpose of which was to bring the mines rapidly from the lower decks to the launching track. So rapidly did the work progress, and so well were the crews trained, that in May, 1918, the first of these ten ships weighed anchor and started for their destination in Scotland. Already our navy had selected as bases the ports of Inverness and Invergordon, on Moray Firth, harbours which were reasonably near the waters in which the mines were to be laid. From Invergordon the Highland Railway crosses Scotland to Lochalsh, and from Inverness the Caledonian Canal runs to Fort William. These two transportation lines—the Highland Railway and the Caledonian Canal—served as connecting links in our communications. If we wish a complete picture of our operation, we must call to mind first the hundreds of factories in all parts of our country, working day and night, making the numerous parts of these instruments of destruction and their attendant mechanisms; then hundreds of freight cars carrying them to the assembling plant at Norfolk, Virginia; then another small army of workmen at this point mixing their pasty explosive, heating it to a boiling point, and pouring the concoction into the spherical steel cases; then other groups of men moving the partially prepared mines to the docks and loading them on the cargo ships; then these ships quietly putting to sea, and, after a voyage of ten days or two weeks, as quietly slipping into the Scottish towns of Fort William and Kyle; then trains of freight cars and canal boats taking the cargoes across Scotland to Inverness and Invergordon, where the mines were completed and placed in the immense storehouses at the bases and loaded on the mine-layers as the necessity arose. Thus, when the whole organization was once established on a working basis, we had uninterrupted communications and a continuous flow of mines from the American factories to the stormy waters of the North Sea.
The towns in which our officers and men found themselves in late May, 1918, are among the most famous in Scottish history and legend. Almost every foot of land is associated with memories of Macbeth, Mary Queen of Scots, Cromwell, and the Pretender. "The national anthem woke me," says Captain Belknap, describing his first morning at his new Scottish base. "I arose and looked out. What a glorious sight! Green slopes in all freshness, radiant with broom and yellow gorse; the rocky shore mirrored in the Firth, which stretched, smooth and cool, wide away to the east and south; and, in the distance, snow-capped Ben Wyvis. Lying off the entrance to Munlochy Bay, we had a view along the sloping shores into the interior of Black Isle, of noted fertility. Farther out were Avoch, a whitewashed fishing village, and the ancient town of Fortrose, with its ruined twelfth-century cathedral. Across the Firth lay Culloden House, where Bonnie Prince Charlie slept before the battle. Substantial, but softened in outline by the morning haze, the Royal Burgh of Inverness covered the banks and heights along the Ness River, gleaming in the bright sunshine. And how peaceful everywhere! The Canandaigua and the Sonoma lay near by, the Canonicus farther out, but no movement, no signal, no beat of the engine, no throbbing pumps." The reception which the natives gave our men was as delightful as the natural beauty of the location. For miles around the Scots turned out to make things pleasant for their Yankee guests. The American naval forces stationed at the mining bases in those two towns numbered about 3,000 officers and men, and the task of providing relaxations, in the heart of the Highlands, far removed from theatres and moving-picture houses, would have been a serious one had it not been for the cordial co-operation of the people. The spirit manifested during our entire stay was evidenced on the Fourth of July, when all the shops and business places closed in honour of American Independence Day and the whole community for miles around joined our sailors in the celebration. The officers spent such periods of relaxation as were permitted them on the excellent golf links and tennis courts in the adjoining country; dances were provided for the men, almost every evening, the Scottish lassies showing great adaptability in learning the American steps. Amateur theatricals, in which both the men from the warships and the Scottish girls took part, cheered many a crew after its return from the mine-fields. Baseball was introduced for the first time into the country of William Wallace and Robert Burns. Great crowds gathered to witness the matches between the several ships; the Scots quickly learned the fine points and really developed into "fans," while the small boys of Inverness and Invergordon were soon playing the game with as much enthusiasm and cleverness as our own youngsters at home. In general, the behaviour of our men was excellent and made the most favourable impression.
These two mine-assembly bases at Inverness and Invergordon will ever remain a monumental tribute to the loyal and energetic devotion to duty of Captain Orin G. Murfin, U.S. Navy, who designed and built them; originally the bases were intended to handle 12,000 mines, but in reality Captain Murfin successfully handled as many as 20,000 at one time. It was here also that each secret firing device was assembled and installed, very largely by reserve personnel. As many as 1,200 mines were assembled in one day, which speaks very eloquently for the foresight with which Captain Murfin planned his bases.
III
But of course baseball and dancing were not the serious business in hand; these Americans had come this long distance to do their part in laying the mighty barrage which was to add one more serious obstacle to the illegal German submarine campaign. Though the operation was a joint one of the American and British navies, our part was much the larger. The proposal was to construct this explosive impediment from the Orkney Islands to the coast of Norway, in the vicinity of Udsire Light, a distance of about 230 nautical miles. Of this great area about 150 miles, extending from the Orkneys to 3 degrees east longitude, was the American field, and the eastern section, which extended fifty nautical miles to Norway, was taken over by the British. Since an operation of this magnitude required the supervision of an officer of high rank, Rear-Admiral Joseph Strauss, who had extended experience in the ordnance field of the navy, came over in March, 1918, and took command. The British commander was Rear-Admiral Clinton-Baker, R.N.