The national sense of humour did not fail the transport service when it came to rechristening these ships; the Princess Irene became the Pocahontas, the Rhein the Susquehanna; and there was also an ironic justice in the fact that the Vaterland, which had been built by the Germans partly for the purpose of transporting troops in war, actually fulfilled this mission, though not quite in the way which the Germans had anticipated. Meanwhile, both the American and the British mercantile marines were supplementing this German tonnage. The first troops which we sent to France, in June, 1917, were transported in ships of the United Fruit Company; and when the German blow was struck, in March, 1918, both the United States and Great Britain began collecting from all parts of the world vessels which could be used as troop transports. We called in all available vessels from the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and the Great Lakes; England stripped her trade routes to South America, Australia, and the East, and France and Italy also made their contributions. Of all the American troops sent to France from the beginning of the war, the United States provided transports for 46·25 per cent., Great Britain for 51·25, the remainder being provided by France and Italy. Of those sent between March, 1918, and the armistice, American vessels carried 42·15 per cent., British 55·40 per cent.[8]
Yet there was one element in the safe transportation of troops which was even more fundamental than those which I have named. The basis of all our naval operations was the dreadnoughts and the battle-cruisers of the Grand Fleet. It was this aggregation, as I have already indicated, which made possible the operation of all the surface ships that destroyed the effectiveness of the submarines. Had the Grand Fleet suddenly disappeared beneath the waves, all these offensive craft would have been driven from the seas, the Allies' sea lines of communication would have been cut, and the war would have ended in Germany's favour. From the time the transportation of troops began the United States had a squadron of five dreadnought battleships constantly with the Grand Fleet. The following vessels performed this important duty: the New York, Captain C. F. Hughes, afterward Captain E. L. Beach; the Wyoming, Captain H. A. Wiley, afterward Captain H. H. Christy; the Florida, Captain Thomas Washington, afterward Captain M. M. Taylor; the Delaware, Captain A. H. Scales; the Arkansas, Captain W. H. G. Bullard, afterward Captain L. R. de Steiguer; and the Texas, Captain Victor Blue. These vessels gave this great force an unquestioned preponderance, and made it practically certain that Germany would not attempt another general sea battle. Under Rear-Admiral Hugh Rodman, the American squadron performed excellent service and made the most favourable impression upon the chiefs of the Allied navies. Under the general policy of co-operation established throughout our European naval forces these vessels were quickly made a part of the Grand Fleet in so far as concerned their military operations. This was, of course, wholly essential to efficiency—a point the layman does not always understand—so essential, in fact, that it may be said that, if the Grand Fleet had gone into battle the day after our vessels joined, the latter might have decreased rather than increased the fighting efficiency of the whole; for, though our people and the British spoke the same language, the languages of the ships, that is, their methods of communication by signals, were wholly different. It was therefore our duty to stow our signal flags and books down below, and learn the British signal language. This they did so well that four days after their arrival they went out and manœuvred successfully with the Grand Fleet. In the same way they adopted the British systems of tactics and fire control, and in every other way conformed to the established practices of the British. Too great praise cannot be given the officers and men of our squadron, not only for their efficiency and the cordiality of their co-operation, but for the patience with which they bore the almost continuous restriction to their ships, and the long vigil without the opportunity of a contact with the enemy forces. Just how well our ships succeeded in this essential co-operation was expressed by Admiral Sir David Beatty in the farewell speech which he made to them upon the day of their departure for home. He said in part:
"I want, first of all, to thank you, Admiral Rodman, the captains, officers, and ships' companies of the magnificent squadron, for the wonderful co-operation and the loyalty you have given to me and to my admirals; and the assistance that you have given us in every duty you had to undertake. The support which you have shown is that of true comradeship; and in time of stress, that is worth a very great deal.
"You will return to your own shores; and I hope in the sunshine, which Admiral Rodman tells me always shines there, you won't forget your 'comrades of the mist' and your pleasant associations of the North Sea....
"I thank you again and again for the great part the Sixth Battle Squadron played in bringing about the greatest naval victory in history. I hope you will give this message to your comrades: 'Come back soon. Good-bye and good luck!'"
But these were not the only large battleships which the United States had sent to European waters. Despite all the precautions which I have described, there was still one danger which constantly confronted American troop transports. By June and July, 1918, our troops were crossing the Atlantic in enormous numbers, about 300,000 a month, and were accomplishing most decisive results upon the battlefield. A successful attack upon a convoy, involving the sinking of one or more transports, would have had no important effect upon the war, but it would probably have improved German moral and possibly have injured that of the Americans. There was practically only one way in which such an attack could be made; one or more German battle-cruisers might slip out to sea and assail one of our troop convoys. In order to prepare for such a possibility, the Department sent three of our most powerful dreadnoughts to Berehaven, Ireland—the Nevada, Captain A. T. Long, afterward Captain W. C. Cole; the Oklahoma, Captain M. L. Bristol, afterward Captain C. B. McVay; and the Utah, Captain F. B. Bassett, the whole division under the command of Rear-Admiral Thomas S. Rodgers. This port is located in Bantry Bay, on the extreme southwestern coast. For several months our dreadnoughts lay here, momentarily awaiting the news that a German raider had escaped, ready to start to sea and give battle. But the expected did not happen. The fact that this powerful squadron was ready for the emergency is perhaps the reason why the Germans never attempted the adventure.
II
A reference to the map which accompanies this chapter will help the reader to understand why our transports were able to carry American troops to France so successfully that not a single ingoing ship was ever struck by a torpedo. This diagram makes it evident that there were two areas of the Atlantic through which American shipping could reach its European destination. The line of division was about the forty-ninth parallel of latitude, the French city of Brest representing its most familiar landmark. From this point extending southward, as far as the forty-fifth parallel, which corresponds to the location of the city of Bordeaux, is a great stretch of ocean, about 200 miles wide. It includes the larger part of the Bay of Biscay, which forms that huge indentation with which our school geographies have made us Americans so familiar, and which has always enjoyed a particular fame for its storms, the dangers of its coast, and the sturdy and independent character of the people on its shores. The other distinct area to which the map calls attention extends northerly from the forty-ninth parallel to the fifty-second; it comprises the English Channel, and includes both the French channel ports, the British ports, the southern coast of Ireland, and the entrance to the Irish Sea. The width of this second section is very nearly the same as that of the one to the south, or about 200 miles.
Emery Walper Ltd. sc.