From: Commander U.S. Naval Forces operating in European Waters.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: General report concerning military situation.
1. I feel that there is little to add to my recent cable despatches which, in view of the importance of the time element, have been made full and detailed.
2. To sum up my despatches briefly, I would repeat that I consider that the military situation is very grave indeed on account of the success of the enemy submarine campaign.
If the shipping losses continue as they have during the past four months, it is submitted that the Allies will be forced to dire straits indeed, if they will not actually be forced into an unsatisfactory peace.
The present rate of destruction is very much greater than the rate of building, and the shortage of tonnage is already so great that the efficiency of the naval forces is already reduced by lack of oil. Orders have just been given to use three-fifths speed, except in cases of emergency. This simply means that the enemy is winning the war.
3. My reasons for being so insistent in my cable despatches have been because of my conviction that measures of co-operation which we may take will be inefficient if they are not put into operation immediately, that is, within a month.
There is every reason to believe that the maximum enemy submarine effort will occur between now and the first of November, reaching its height probably during the latter part of July, if not earlier.
4. There is certainly no sovereign solution for the submarine menace except through well-established methods of warfare based upon fundamental military principles.
5. It is submitted that the cardinal military principle of concentration of effort is at present being pursued by the enemy and not by the Allies.
6. We are dispersing our forces while the enemy is concentrating his. The enemy's submarine mission is and must continue to be the destruction of merchant shipping. The limitations of submarines and the distances over which they must operate prevent them from attacking our naval forces, that is, anti-submarine craft. They cannot afford to engage anti-submarine craft with guns; they must use torpedoes. If they should do so to any considerable extent their limited supply would greatly reduce their period of operation away from base, and the number of merchantmen they could destroy. Their object is to avoid contact with anti-submarine craft. This they can almost always do, as the submarine can see the surface craft at many times the distance the surface craft can see a periscope, particularly one less than two inches in diameter.