3. The first course open to us which naturally occurs to mind is that we should look upon our service as part of the combined Allied service, of which the British Grand Fleet is the main body, and all other Allied naval forces disposed throughout the world, as necessary branches thereof.
This conception views our battleship fleet as a support or reserve of the Allied main body (the British Grand Fleet) and would lead to utilizing our other forces to fill in weak spots and to strengthen Allied lines, both offensively and defensively, wherever necessary.
Such a course might be considered as a disintegration of our fleet, and it is only natural, therefore, that hesitation and caution should be felt in its adoption.
4. I have felt, however, that it was possible to accomplish our mission without in any way involving the so-called disintegration of our fleet as a whole.
In the first instance I have assumed that our aim would be to project, or prepare to project, our maximum force against the enemy offensively.
5. An estimate of the situation shows clearly that the enemy is depending for success upon breaking down the Allies' lines of communications by virtue of the submarine campaign.
A necessary part of such a plan is to divert strength from the main fleet and from anti-submarine operations by such means as coastal raids, threats of landing operations, air raids, and attacks on hospital ships, which last necessitates destroyer escort for such vessels.
The submarine campaign itself, while it is of necessity concentrated primarily on the most vital lines of communications, is nevertheless carried out in such a manner as to lead the Allies to disperse, and not concentrate, their inadequate anti-submarine Forces.
The Allies are, of course, forced to contemplate at all times, and hence provide against, the possibility of another main fleet action.
6. A study of the submarine situation, the number of submarines available to the enemy, and the necessary lines of the Allies' communications, for both Army and Navy as well as civil needs, shows clearly that the enemy must direct his main effort in certain restricted areas.