News was immediately sent to Lieutenant-General Sir John Murray, who was before Tarragona, of the arrival of the French army in our neighbourhood.
Our situation was strong, and having the castle, which commanded the road, neither cannon nor cavalry could pass from Tortosa. Marshal Suchet came the next day and had a peep at the fortress, sent some light troops across the mountains to feel us, and halted his army a few miles off.
Lieutenant-General Sir John Murray, as I said before, had nearly 20,000 men, but, unfortunately for him, only 5000 were British and Germans—the rest Spaniards and Sicilians, on whom he could place no dependence in the hour of need—otherwise no general ever had a better opportunity of beating a divided army.
We had stopped Suchet, with his 10,000 men, from advancing on the Valencia side by the capture of the castle of Col de Balaguer: therefore he would only have had to cope with the Barcelona corps of 8000, and the Lerida of 2000 men, so that, after leaving a sufficient number of men to carry on the siege for a day or two, which the rear-admiral even offered to do with the sailors and marines alone, he might have beaten the enemy in detail. I am speaking, supposing he had had 16,000 or 20,000 British or German soldiers; but really with such a set, strong in point of numbers, but wanting the vigour and bottom of English troops, it certainly would have been running a great risk, and he had not the nerve to attempt it.
Great blame was attached to the general for embarking in such a hurry, and leaving his guns and stores behind. The gallant, clever naval chief felt it most severely, fearing lest any blame should be attached to him for not taking on board the stores and artillery: he, therefore, remonstrated very warmly upon the subject, but it was in vain.
The whole may be summed up in a few words. Marshal Suchet retired to Tortosa—the Lerida corps back to their old quarters—the Barcelona retrograded also—the Anglo-Spanish and Sicilian army embarked in a hurry—we blew up the castle of Balaguer that had been taken—the French garrison of Tarragona sallied forth, took all our battering train and stores, which we had been collecting, at a great expense, for months before, into the town, and played checkmate with the guns that had taken Badajos, for it was the same train. In short, all the troops ran away from each other the same day.
No sooner was the army embarked than the commander of the forces, learning that the French corps had retired, requested they might be re-landed the next day, which was complied with, but it was then too late—we had lost our battering guns and stores, and nothing could be done.
Lieutenant-General Lord William Bentinck arrived shortly afterwards, the troops were again embarked, and I was ordered to proceed to Alicant and take on board Sir John and Lady Murray, and convey them to Palermo, he being appointed to the command of the forces there.
I found the Honourable Lady John Murray a most agreeable, clever, sensible, pleasant woman, and Lieutenant-General Sir John Murray a very amiable man in private life, and although much condemned at the time for not fighting Marshal Suchet and taking Tarragona, yet neither those who had the command of the army previous to him, nor General Lord William Bentinck, who took the command of the troops from Sir John Murray, gained more laurels or succeeded much better than he did.
To move and manage a Spanish army in those days was next to an impossibility. They were too proud to be taught, and too ignorant and obstinate to do anything of themselves.