I will not go into an exposure of these useless and false distinctions, which are adopted to help carry out erroneous principles. The only pretence for a subjunctive mood is founded on the fact that be and were were formerly used in a character different from what they are at present. Be was used in the indicative mood, present tense, when doubt or supposition was implied; as, If I be there; if they be wise. Be I a man, and receive such treatment? Were was also used instead of was in the past tense; as, "Were I an American I would fight for liberty. If I were to admit the fact." In this character these words are rapidly becoming obsolete. We now say, "If I am there; am I a man, and receive such abuses? was I an American; if I was to admit," etc.
All the round about, perplexing, and tedious affair of conjugating verbs thro the different modes and tenses will appear in its true character, when we come to give you a few brief examples, according to truth and plain sense. But before doing that it will be necessary to make some remarks on time.
Tense means time. We distinguish time according to certain events which are generally observed. In the use of the verb we express action in reference to periods of time when it is performed.
There are three tenses, or divisions of time; past, present, and future.
Past tense applies to actions which are accomplished; as, I wrote a book; he recited his lesson.
Present tense denotes actions commenced, but not finished, and now in operation; as, he reads his book; we sit on our seats and hear the lecture.
Future tense refers to actions, which are to take place hereafter; as, I am to go from the Institute; we desire to learn grammar correctly.
Every body can mark three plain distinctions of time, past, present, and future. With the past we have been acquainted. It has ceased to be. Its works are ended. The present is a mere line—, nothing as it were—which is constantly passing unchecked from the past to the future. It is a mere division of the past and future. The Hebrew, which is strictly a philosophic language, admits no present; only a past and future. We speak of the present as denoting an action begun and not finished. In the summer, we say the trees grow, and bear fruit. But when the fruit is fallen, and the leaves seared by the frost, we change the expression, and say, it grew and bore fruit.
Of the future we can know nothing definitely. Heaven has hung before all human eyes an impenetrable veil which obscures all future events. No man without prophetic vision bestowed by Him who "sees the end from the beginning," can know what is to be, and no expression can be made, no words employed which will positively declare a future action. We may see a present condition of things, and from it argue what is to be, or take place hereafter; but all that knowledge is drawn from the past and deduced from a review of the present relation and tendencies of things.
I hold the paper near the fire and you say it will burn, and you say truly, for it has a will, or what is the same, an inherent tendency to burn. It is made of combustible matter, like paper which we have seen burn, and hence we argue this has the same tendency to be consumed. But how does your mind arrive at that fact? If you had never seen a substance like it burn, why should you conclude this will? Does the child know it will burn? No; for it has not yet learned the quality of the paper. It is not till the child has been burned that it dreads the fire. Suppose I take some asbestus, of the kind called amianthus, which is a mineral, and is formed of slender flexible fibres like flax; and in eastern countries, especially in Savoy and Corsica, is manufactured into cloth, paper, and lamp wicks. It was used in making winding sheets for the dead, in which the bodies were burned, and the ashes, retained in the incombustible sheet, were gathered into an urn, and revered as the manes of the dead. Suppose I take some of this incombustible paper or cloth, and present to you. You say it will burn. Why do you say thus? Because you have seen other materials which appear like this, consume to ashes. Let us put it into the fire. It will not burn. It has no tendency to burn; no quality which will consume. But this is a new idea to you and hence your mistake. You did not know it would burn, nor could you indicate such a fact. You only told your opinion derived from the present appearance of things, and hence you made an assertion in the indicative mood, present tense, and added to it an infinitive mood, in order to deduce the consequence of this future action—it wills, or has a tendency to burn. But you were mistaken, because ignorant of the nature of things. This amianthus looks like flax, and to a person unacquainted with it, appears to be as truly combustible; but the mineralogist, and all who know its properties, know very well that it will not—wills nothing, has no inclination, or tendency, to burn.