Scenes and Adventures in Affghanistan

by William Taylor

We debouched on the plain in front of the fort about eight o'clock in the morning, and advanced upon it in three columns—the Cavalry on the right, the Artillery in the centre, and the Infantry on the left. The Commander-in-Chief determined to reconnoitre the place in force, and make the enemy show their strength. On approaching the orchards and walled gardens before described, we found them occupied by the enemy, and the 1st Brigade having been immediately thrown into them, drove the Affghans out of the enclosures in capital style, and forced them to take shelter behind the defences, with a comparatively trifling loss on our side. Our guns were now brought to bear upon the fortress, which had kept up a sharp fire on us from the moment of our appearance, but owing to our having left our heavy battering train behind us at Candahar we did but little or no damage. About eleven o'clock we drew off, and pitched our camp out of range of the fire of the foot. On our skirmishers retiring from the gardens they were immediately occupied by the enemy, who commenced cheering our retreating parties, in the conviction that they had obtained a victory. Under this impression they instantly sent off expresses to Cabul, to announce the fact, and state that if the whole of the surrounding country could be raised, they had little doubt of being able to cut us off to a man. The garrison spent the night in rejoicings, and blue lights were constantly sent up as signals to their friends on the neighbouring hills.

Next morning the Shah's camp was threatened on the left by large bodies of horse and foot who were driven off by the Cavalry and some of his Highness's troops; whilst another force, consisting chiefly of horse, under the command of one of Dost Mahommed's sons; and at a short distance from him a Ghiljie Chief, with about fifteen hundred Cavalry, who had hung upon our flank all the way from Khelat-i-Ghiljie, menaced us to the right. This determined the Commander-in-Chief to expedite matters, and the engineers having made a careful inspection of the fortress, he resolved on carrying it by storm. The whole of the 22nd was consumed in making the necessary preparations, the field hospital being got ready while strong detachments of Cavalry scoured the country around, in order to keep the enemy from our lines.

In order to give my readers a correct idea of the strength of the fortifications, and the difficulties overcome by the intelligence and courage of the officers and men of the British Army, I cannot do better than to copy the official reports made by the principal Engineer officers on the subject. They contain a full detail of the operations up to the moment when the citadel fell into our possession.

Memorandum of the Engineers' operations before Ghuznee, in July, 1839, by Captain George Thompson, Bengal Engineers, Chief Engineer Army of the Indus.

The accounts of the Fortress of Ghuznee, received from those who had seen it, were such as to induce his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to leave in Candahar the very small battering train then with the Army, there being a scarcity of transport cattle. The place was described as very weak, and completely commanded from a range of hills to the north.

When we came before it on the morning of the 21st of July we were very much surprised to find a rampart, in good repair, built on a scarped mound about thirty-five feet high, flanked by numerous towers, and surrounded by a faussebraye and wet ditch. The irregular figure of the "enceinte" gave a good flanking fire, whilst the height of the citadel covered the interior from the commanding fire of the hills to the north, rendering it nugatory. In addition to this, the towers, at the angles, had been enlarged, screen walls had been built before the gates, the ditch cleared out and filled with water, stated to be unfordable, and an outwork built on the right bank of the river so as to command the bed of it.

The garrison was variously stated from three to four thousand strong, including five hundred Cavalry, and from subsequent information we found that it had not been overrated.

On the approach of the army, a fire of artillery was opened from the body of the place, and of musketry from the neighbouring gardens. A detachment of Infantry cleared the latter, and the former was silenced for a short time by shrapnells from the Horse Artillery, but the fire from the new outwork on the bank of the river was in no way checked. A nearer view of the works was, however, obtained from the gardens which had been cleared. This was not at all satisfactory. The works were evidently much stronger than we had been led to expect, and such as our army could not venture to attack in a regular manner. We had no battering train, and to besiege Ghuznee in form, a much larger one would be required than the army ever possessed. The great command of the parapets from sixty to seventy feet, with the wet ditch, were insurmountable obstacles to an attack, either by mining or escalading.

It therefore became necessary to examine closely the whole contour of the place, to discover if any other mode of attack could be adopted. The engineers, with an escort, went round the works, approaching as near as they could find cover. The garrison were on the alert, and kept up a hot and well regulated fire upon the officers whenever they were obliged to show themselves. However, by keeping the Infantry beyond musket range, and the Cavalry at a still greater distance, only one man was killed, and another wounded; the former being hit by men sent out of the place to drive off the reconnoitring party.

The fortifications were found equally strong, all round, the only tangible point observed being the Cabul gateway, which offered the following advantages for a coup-de-main. The road to the Gate was clear, the bridge over the ditch unbroken, there were good positions for the Artillery within three hundred yards of the walls on both sides of the road, and we had information that the Gateway was not built up, a reinforcement from Cabul being expected.