[1] First Principles, p. 162. It may be as well to remark that Relation is scarcely an adequate description of the nature of thought as a whole. We shall see when we come to the theory of logic, that the term is applicable—and then somewhat imperfectly—only to the second phase of thought, the categories of reflection, which are the favourite categories of science and popular metaphysics.
[2] Arist. Metaph. i. 2. 26.
[3] Treatise of Human Nature (Understanding), iii. 7 and ii. 6.
[4] Ibid. iii. 14.
[5] Treatise of Human Nature (Understanding iv. 4.)
[6] Treatise of Human Nature (Morals), iii. i.
[7] Kant, Prolegomena to Metaph. Introduction and Crit. of Practical Reason (on the Claim of Pure Reason, Werke, viii. 167).