The dominating feature of Governor Ramsey’s territorial governorship was the extinguishment of the Indian title of occupancy to all the lands of the Sioux in Minnesota, except the small reservations. No time was lost by interested parties in impressing on Mr. Ramsey the importance of increasing the area of settlement in his territory. Land speculators and lumbermen desired an enlargement of their spheres of operation. The Indian traders, who in previous years would have opposed a treaty of cession, were at this time, under changed circumstances, eager. The hunting of wild animals for their pelts had greatly reduced their numbers, so that the trade had dwindled. The prospect of profits in land speculation appeared likely to exceed those of Indian trading. The traders also were of opinion that it was about time for a substantial liquidation of Indian debts due them. The half-breeds and squaw men had, as we shall see, a strong desire for a treaty. Moved by what seemed a general demand, Governor Ramsey recommended to the first territorial legislature that they memorialize Congress to provide for a treaty of cession with the Sioux. That body promptly complied. The commissioner of Indian affairs had meantime been interested to such a degree that he arranged for a treaty, and to pay the expenses out of funds already at his disposal. He appointed as commissioners to conduct the negotiation Governor Ramsey, being already superintendent ex-officio of Indian affairs in his territory, and the Hon. John Chambers of Iowa, and furnished them a body of instructions, which served more than the immediate purpose. He restricted their expenditure for presents to $6000. The Sioux were summoned by runners to come in to council in October. The commissioner of Indian affairs was precipitate. The traders were not quite ready, and there were prominent citizens in St. Paul who feared that a big cession of Indian lands west of the river might give Mendota a dangerous precedence. But few of the Sioux came in, and they were unwilling to treat. The effort aborted. Its success might have secured for Governor Ramsey political rewards for which he had to wait. The Indian appropriation bill of 1850, carrying $15,000 for the expenses of treating, was not approved till September 30. The season was too late for the assemblage of the Indians, widely scattered on their fall hunts. Then ensued a contention, lasting many months, over the appointment of a colleague to Governor Ramsey for the negotiation of the treaty. At one time it appeared that a trading interest adverse to the American Fur Company had virtually succeeded in securing the appointment of a gentleman from Indiana, on whom it could depend. To dispose of this and other aspirants, an amendment was tacked on to the proper paragraph of the Indian appropriation bill of the session, providing that commissioners making Indian treaties should thereafter be selected from officials of the Indian Bureau, to serve without extra compensation. The contemplated treaty with the Sioux involving a cession of many millions of acres and large disbursements for a long time, the commissioner of Indian affairs, the Hon. Luke Lea of Mississippi, resolved to act in person.

The Minnesota Sioux comprised four of the seven tribes of the nation, and were themselves geographically divided into “upper” and “lower” Sioux. The two upper tribes were the Sissetons and Wahpétons. The former had their villages on lakes Big Stone and Traverse, the latter on the upper reaches of the Minnesota River, with some sandwiching of bands. The lower Sioux were the Medawakantons and the Wah-pé-ku-tes: the villages of the former were strung along the west bank of the Mississippi from Winona to Fort Snelling and on up the Minnesota to Belle Plaine. The Wah-pé-ku-tes dwelt on the headwaters of the Cannon River, in what Nicollet called his “Undine region.” As they were averse, like all barbarians, to having their numbers counted, the Indian Bureau up to the time when all became “annuity Indians” could only guess at the population. Eight thousand was the general estimate at the middle of the century. Each tribe was subdivided into bands of unequal numbers, each under its own chief. The bands of each tribe recognized one of the older and most capable chiefs as their head chief. Wabashaw was head chief of the Medawakantons. The instructions of 1849, already mentioned, charged the commissioners to make but one treaty, advised them to promise no money payments, and forbade them to provide for debts due by Indians to the traders. The reader can surmise why no Indians came to treat.

The new commissioner of Indian affairs did not of course have to instruct himself, and he appears to have relaxed the conditions imposed by his predecessor. At any rate, he soon found out that if he wished to make a treaty it would be necessary for him to pay some money, and to arrange for the payment of traders’ claims. Because of a diversity of these claims against the upper and the lower Sioux it was desired that separate treaties be made. This was conceded. Because the upper tribes were thought to be less opposed to a treaty and a cession, it was decided to begin with them; and those Indians were summoned to council on July 1 at Traverse des Sioux. The commissioners and their party found on their arrival none but those there resident. It was not till the 18th that enough of the upper bands had come in to warrant negotiation. Meantime the disinclination of the Indians had been mitigated by the rations of pork, beef, and flour dispensed by the commissary, and presents to reluctant chiefs. On July 23 the treaty was signed in duplicate. As the chiefs left the table they were “pulled by the blanket” and steered to another, where they touched the pen to a third document, which later became notorious under the name of “the traders’ paper.” The upper Sioux by this treaty sold to the United States all their lands in Minnesota for $1,665,000, except a reservation twenty miles wide straddling the Minnesota River, from Lake Traverse down to the Yellow Medicine River. The principal consideration was an annual payment of $68,000 for fifty years, of which $40,000 was to be cash. The United States also engaged to expend $30,000 for schools, mills, blacksmith shops, and like beneficial purposes, to remove the Indians to their new homes, and to provide them with subsistence for one year. A residue of $210,000 was to be paid to the chiefs in such manner as they should thereafter in open council request, to enable them “to settle their affairs and comply with their present engagements”; in plain English, to pay the claims of the traders. The traders’ paper amounted to an assignment in blank of this whole sum. The schedule of claims was not attached to the paper till the next day. On the question whether the chiefs who signed knew what they were doing, the evidence is conflicting. On August 5 a second treaty, ceding the same lands, was signed at Mendota. The reservation for the lower bands was also on the Minnesota River, extending from the upper reserve down to the neighborhood of New Ulm. Each of the two tribes agreed to pay traders’ claims to the amount of $90,000. The lower Sioux were encouraged to conclude the bargain by a promise that $30,000 out of a $50,000 “education” fund provided for in the treaty of 1837 and never paid, but allowed to accumulate, should be distributed, so soon as the treaty should be signed. The money was paid, and within a week it was in the hands of St. Paul merchants and whiskey sellers; $10,000 or thereabout went for horses. The commissioners congratulated themselves and the country on this magnificent purchase of a region larger than New York, at a cost of the “sum paid in hand.” The annual payments promised would, they figured, be equaled by the interest from the lands.

The treaties awaited the action of the Senate. Before that body convened in the December following, representations were made to the authorities at Washington that a “stupendous fraud” had been practiced on the Sioux. The upper Sioux, inspired by a trader attached to an interest adverse to the American Fur Company, which had not obtained recognition for its claims, were much excited. In December twenty-one chiefs resorted to St. Paul, where they represented to Agent McLean and Governor Ramsey that their signatures to the traders’ paper were obtained by fraud and deceit. They declared that their bands owed no such sums of money, but were willing to pay what sums a fair examination of the claims might prove to be just. The agent promised to report their protest and demands to his superiors, which he did. Governor Ramsey had only to assure the chiefs that as treaty commissioner he had nothing to do with traders’ claims. The money would be paid to their chiefs and braves, and it was for them to dispose of it as they thought proper. When the treaties were laid before the Senate in February, 1852, opposition to ratification at once sprang up, and long delay ensued. It was not any allegations of fraud and deceit which formed the ground of this opposition. It came from Southern senators not willing to extend the area of settlement to the north, on which to build another free state. It was not till June 28 that ratification was voted by a slender majority, and that not till after amendments were made, which opponents believed the Sioux would never agree to. In particular the senators cut out the paragraphs providing for the two reservations, and substituted a provision that the President should select new homes for the Minnesota Sioux outside the ceded territory.

In August Governor Ramsey was authorized to obtain the consent of the Indians to the amendments. This was effected through persons influential among them and without calling general councils of the tribes. The consent of the upper Sioux, however, was not secured till after the execution of a power of attorney to Governor Ramsey, which they were allowed to believe “broke” all former papers, that of the traders in particular. The money appropriated for the immediate payments became available so soon as the Sioux chiefs had signed their ratifications, and Governor Ramsey was designated as disbursing agent and given a credit on the treasury for $593,000. The payments did not begin till November, and then with the lower Sioux. The Wah-pé-ku-te chiefs gave no trouble, but signed their joint receipt for $90,000 of “hand money,” and a power of attorney to Mr. Sibley to receive the money and distribute it to their licensed traders. The seven Medawakanton chiefs would not sign receipts till after they had been encouraged by the distribution of $20,000 in equal sums, deducted from the amount of traders’ claims. Some minor enticements contributed. At “The Traverse,” a fortnight later, “a very evil and turbulent spirit” was manifest. The chiefs demanded the money “for settling their affairs” to be paid to them. They would then decide “in open council” how it should be distributed. Mr. Ramsey was firm, and held them to the terms of the traders’ paper, which he considered an irrevocable contract. The local Sissetons were so riotous that a company of troops had to be summoned from Fort Snelling to keep them in order. After much delay and no little effort he was able to obtain twelve signatures to a receipt for the money to go to traders, but only two of the names were those of old and well-recognized chiefs, and only one that of a signer of the treaty of 1851. The moneys thus secured to the traders, and some moderate gratifications to the half-breeds, were, with the exception of the $90,000 paid the Wah-pé-ku-tes, delivered by Governor Ramsey to one Hugh Tyler, a citizen of Pennsylvania holding powers of attorney. This gentleman distributed according to the schedules of the traders’ papers, retaining by their consent the sum of $55,250, about thirteen and one half per cent., as compensation for his services in securing the ratification of the treaties and for other purposes.

Political enemies of Governor Ramsey, and parties dissatisfied with the distribution of moneys under the treaties, laid formal charges and specifications against him before the Senate at the next session, in 1853. Upon the request of that body the President undertook an investigation and appointed two Democratic commissioners. Their report, covering, with testimony and exhibits, 431 octavo pages, was submitted to the Senate in 1854. It was on the whole moderate and even charitable in tone, but conveyed a censure for allowing the Indians to deceive themselves, for not paying strictly in accordance with the terms of the treaties, for use of oppressive measures in securing the receipts of the chiefs, and for allowing Hugh Tyler a percentage not “necessary for any reasonable or legitimate purpose.” The testimony disclosed that some amount of this money had been used as a “secret service fund” to expedite the business. As to the use of money to influence officials, the principal witness for the defense declared that none had gone or would go into the hands of Governor Ramsey, but that as to other officers, he declined to answer. The labored argument of his lawyers served only to darken counsel, when compared with Governor Ramsey’s clear and frank explanation, filed before the investigation was begun.

The report went to the Senate committee on Indian affairs, a Democratic committee of a Democratic Senate. On February 24, 1854, they reported that after a careful examination of all the testimony the conduct of Governor Ramsey was not only free from blame, but highly commendable and meritorious. Thereupon the committee was discharged from further consideration.

The gist of the matter is, that a treaty of cession was much desired by the people of the territory, and intensely by politicians and speculators. It could not have been long delayed. No treaty could be made with these Indians without the active aid and intervention of the traders and half-breeds. Such aid could be had only by paying for it. The device of allowing Indians to stipulate in treaties for the payment to traders of debts due them from individual Indians, as if they were tribal obligations, had long been practiced. But for the machinations of disgruntled parties desirous of being taken into the happy circle of beneficiaries, the scheme might have been worked as quietly and comfortably as usual. An old interpreter says of these treaties that “they were fair as any Indian treaties.” Having undertaken to see that the traders and half-breeds should not go unrewarded for their indispensable services, Governor Ramsey stood by them to the end. The sums paid them were no robbery of the Indians. But for the fact that the treaties of 1851 were the beginning of troubles to be later treated of, they need not have taken so much of the reader’s time.

A few days after Governor Ramsey took up his residence in St. Paul, another citizen established himself in that city of promise. His ambition was not confined to sharing in the unearned increment of a rapidly growing capital city; he wished also to take a part in public affairs. Henry M. Rice, born in 1816 in Vermont, emigrated to Michigan at the age of nineteen, equipped with an academy education and two years of law studies. He came on to Minnesota in 1839, and was employed presently by the Chouteaus of St. Louis, who took over the business of the American Fur Company, to manage their Winnebago and Chippeway trade from Prairie du Chien. In 1847 he became a partner in the business and removed to Mendota, a place much too strait for two such men as himself and Mr. Sibley. Established in St. Paul, Mr. Rice threw himself into every movement and enterprise projected for the development of the town. He generously shared his gains with the public. His personal qualities were such that he could not help desiring public employment and obtaining great success in it. His manners were so gracious and yet not patronizing, that he made friends with all sorts and conditions of men. He divined with an unerring instinct the motives of men and parties, and knew when and how by appropriate suggestion to let them apparently move themselves towards his desired ends. An early example of Mr. Rice’s influence and success may be found in a contract which he obtained in 1850 for collecting vagrant Winnebagoes and returning them to their reservations. The Winnebagoes were a powerful Wisconsin tribe when the white man came, and long after. The government persuaded them to vacate first their mineral lands and later all their lands in Wisconsin, and move to the so-called “neutral ground” in Iowa. This was a strip of territory some twenty miles wide, starting from the northeast corner of Iowa and running south of west to the Des Moines River. The generous presents and annuities required to effect the sale and removal were the ruin of the Winnebagoes. They became idle, dissolute, mischievous. The white settlers could not endure them, and the Indians themselves tired of their confinement to a narrow area. Accordingly in 1846 a treaty was effected for the exchange of the neutral ground for a reservation of eight hundred thousand acres in Northern Minnesota. A tract lying between the Watab and Long Prairie rivers, west of the Mississippi, was obtained from the Chippeways for this purpose.