V.
Fact and Theory correspond to Sense on the one hand, and to Ideas on the other, so far as we are conscious of our Ideas: but all facts involve ideas unconsciously; and thus the distinction of Facts and Theories is not tenable, as that of Sense and Ideas is. (i. 2.)
VI.
Sensations and Ideas in our knowledge are like Matter and Form in bodies. Matter cannot exist without Form, nor Form without Matter: yet the two are altogether distinct and opposite. There is no possibility either of separating, or of confounding them. The same is the case with Sensations and Ideas. (i. 2.)
VII.
Ideas are not transformed, but informed Sensations; for without ideas, sensations have no form. (i. 2.)
VIII.
The Sensations are the Objective, the Ideas the Subjective part of every act of perception or knowledge. (i. 2.)
IX.
General Terms denote Ideal Conceptions, as a circle, an orbit, a rose. These are not Images of real things, as was held by the Realists, but Conceptions: yet they are conceptions, not bound together by mere Name, as the Nominalists held, but by an Idea. (i. 2.)