In 1529 the Voïvode Stephen, being on his death-bed, called to him his son Bogdan, who was likely to succeed him, and his principal nobles: he addressed them at length on the political situation of the country, representing the probability of its being soon attacked by the Turks, and the insufficiency of its means to make any effectual resistance against their power. He dwelt on the ferocious character of the reigning Sultan Suleÿman I., and recommended to them in the strongest manner, rather to seek his clemency by the voluntary offer of a tribute, than expose themselves to his vengeance in resisting his attempts to obtain it.
After Stephen’s death, Bogdan neglected some years his father’s advice, till at last he saw the necessity of following it; and he sent, in 1536, ambassadors to Constantinople to offer the tribute. The Sultan then entered into written engagements with him, by which the same privileges as those of Wallachia were granted to Moldavia; but in which the tribute was merely called a Peshkicsh, or present.
Moldavia was governed on the same plan as the sister province, and frequently shared the same fate in war; sometimes ravaged by the Turks, at other times successful in resisting them. Towards the close of the 16th century, after its successful co-operation with Wallachia, Sigismund of Transylvania seized it, deposed the Voïvode Aaron, his friend and ally, and appointed a man of his own choice, whom he bound to pay him tribute. But in 1597, a Polish army invaded the province, and rescued it from the hands of Sigismund. In 1602 the Poles restored it to the Turks, against whose power the Moldavians never after struggled with any permanent success. Their frequent and fruitless efforts to regain independency, exhausted their means and patriotic ardour; and by degrees they became accustomed to the Turkish yoke. The appointment of the Voïvodes was left to the pleasure of the Sultans, although the formality of the election continued to take place a long time after; but the tribute was no longer called a present, and its amount was increased at almost every new appointment.
As far, however, as the end of the 17th century, intervening political motives still induced the Porte to show some deference to the privileges of the two principalities; but at the early part of the 18th century, the Ottoman Court became less constrained in its policy, and in assuming the right of punishing by death the Wallachian princes, laid the foundations of that system by which both have been governed to the present moment. The event which proved so fatal to the respective constitutions of those states, will show at the same time how far their public spirit must have been subdued, and how rapid appears to have been its decline.
During the reign of Sultan Ahmet, the Porte had, in 1695, declared war against the Emperor; and the Voïvode Constantine Brancovano Bessarabba of Wallachia was directed to form an army, and to march into the Austrian states, in order to second the operations of the Grand Vizier who was to commence hostilities from the frontiers of Servia. The Voïvode partly obeyed; but, either from a secret hatred to the Turks, or from being bribed into the Emperor’s cause, probably from both these motives, he abstained from taking any active part in the campaign, and by that circumstance alone, favoured the operations of the Austrians. At the conclusion of the peace of Carlowitz, the Emperor Leopold rewarded the Voïvode’s services by conferring on him the title of Prince of the Roman Empire, together with the gift of some landed estates in Transylvania. These circumstances could not remain hidden from the knowledge of the Ottoman court, who, however, found it necessary to use dissimulation; and some years elapsed without any notice being taken of them.
In 1710, Bessarabba was drawn into a secret correspondence with the Czar Peter the great, the object of which was to obtain his co-operation in that sovereign’s projected war against the Turks. The Voïvode promised a contingent of thirty thousand men, and an ample supply of provisions and other necessaries for the Russian army.
The purport of this correspondence became known to the Porte, and the death of Bessarabba was immediately determined upon; but at the same time it was deemed adviseable to use stratagem instead of open force, and it was resolved that he should be drawn into a snare by the Prince of Moldavia. Nicholas Marrocordato then governed that province, but he was thought unfit for the execution of the plan; the Porte therefore recalled him, and appointed to the principality Demetrius Cantimir, whose fidelity had been frequently tried both in peace and war. Cantimir set out from Constantinople for Moldavia, having instructions and positive orders to seize Bessarabba under the colour of friendship, alliance, or any pretence which he might think proper, and send him alive or dead to Constantinople.[[12]]
But Cantimir, who, it seems, had neither the ambition nor the desire of being made Voïvode of Moldavia, having twice before procured that principality to his younger brother Antiochus, accepted it with the express condition that he should not be called upon to pay any tribute, or to make any of the presents customary at the new nominations. But when he reached Moldavia the Grand Vezier wrote to him by the Sultan’s order, not only to send immediately the usual tribute and presents, but also to prepare provisions for a numerous Turkish army, to throw a bridge over the Danube for their passage, and to join the Turks in person with Moldavian troops, besides other intolerable burthens.[[13]] Cantimir says, that perceiving now how little faith was to be expected from the infidels, and esteeming it far better to suffer for the Christian cause, he resolved to detach himself from the Turkish interest, and sent a faithful messenger to the Czar, with an offer of his services and principality.
With these favourable prospects in Wallachia and in Moldavia, the Czar advanced towards the Ottoman frontiers. In 1711, he arrived with all his forces at Yassi, where he remained some days in expectation of the contingent and provisions promised by the Voïvode of Wallachia. But it seems that Bessarabba, as the rupture between the Sultan and the Czar drew near, alarmed at the great preparations of the Turks, and the approach of their army, composed of two hundred and twenty thousand men, thought it prudent to take no part in the war, and the subsequent disasters of the Russians are in a great measure attributed to the failure of his former promises to the Czar, who had placed too great a reliance in them. The events of this war are too well known to need any further explanation here. When peace was restored, and the Voïvodate of Moldavia had remained vacant by Cantimir’s defection, Nicholas Marrocordato was again appointed to it. Bessarabba remained unmolested, but not without the fear of early vengeance. Eager to regain the favour of the Ottoman government, and to obtain the assurance of oblivion on the past, he sent large supplies of money, and considerable presents to the Turkish ministers, and to the public treasures; he repeated them so often, as to convince the court that he possessed immense wealth, and the Grand Vezier, Ally-Pashah, who was his personal enemy, obtained from the Sultan a formal order for his recall, and for the seizure of his treasures. The Vezier then formed the plan of enforcing this order, and it was carried into execution in the following manner:—
In 1714, at the beginning of April, being the week of the Passion, when the attention of the Wallachians and their occupations were entirely devoted to the long ceremonies of the Greek church, a Capigee-Bashi[[14]], of the Sultan, arrived at Bukorest with a suite of a hundred men; he sent word to the Voïvode that he was on his way to Hotim upon very pressing business of the state, and that he should only have time to pay him a visit on the next morning, after which he intended to take his departure. Accordingly, he went the next day to the palace, and, on entering the closet of the Voïvode, who stood up to receive him, he placed a black handkerchief on his shoulder, conformably to the then usual method of announcing depositions to persons high in office in Turkey. The Voïvode was confounded by the unexpected compliment, but the moment he recovered from his first emotions, he burst into a long strain of invectives against the Sultan and the Turks, for treating him with so much ingratitude after the many services he had rendered to the Porte. The Capigee, however, placed a guard about his person, and proceeded to the divan chamber, where he read a Ferman, which contained the decree of Bessarabba’s deposition, declared him a traitor, and ordered him to Constantinople with all his family. After the Ferman had been published, the Capigee secured the public treasure, and all the Voïvode’s private property. The frightened inhabitants of Bukorest remained tranquil spectators of all these acts of violence, and made no effort to release the Voïvode from his imprisonment. With a nation more awakened to its own dignity, and to the value of independence, an event of this nature would not, perhaps, have taken place without the support of an army, and the shedding of blood; and, indeed, the circumstances of this very occurrence would hardly appear credible, if they were not almost fresh in the memory of the present generation.