Can England? She has saved us the trouble of a speculation on this subject by a prompt acknowledgment of the existing government.
Can Austria or Prussia complain of it, as breaking the line of legitimate succession, while acknowledging Michael on the throne of Portugal? Or can Russia, while not only acknowledging Michael, but having her own throne at this moment filled with the younger brother of the family? These are, both, departures from the strict line of legitimate succession adopted by the holy alliance: and if it be sufficient to excuse the departure in these two instances, that the reigning prince is of the same blood with the right heir, the same may be urged for the reigning king of France; for he is a Bourbon in the maternal line. It is not upon the abstract principle of the strict line of legitimate succession that these powers can be expected to unite in a war against France. If they do unite in such a war, it will be to assert the right of a prince to rule despotically, in violation of the social compact which unites him with his people. Is this probable? Let us remember that Alexander of Russia was the chief of the armed negotiators by whom this compact was arranged. That monarch saw the impossibility of maintaining a despotic prince, of the obnoxious house of Bourbon, on the throne of France, in the state of high illumination which then existed among the people. And although the allied armies were in possession of Paris, he would not
permit Louis the XVIII. to enter until he had given to his people the charter which they required. Will the present Emperor of Russia support with his arms the violation of the charter thus sanctioned by his august brother? That it has been most shamefully and most unwisely violated, all Europe admits. That the offender has been removed with astonishing moderation and humanity, is equally admitted. That the revolution is not a war upon monarchy is apparent by the fact that a monarch now occupies the throne, and substantially under the charter to which Russia herself gave her sanction in 1814. With what decency, then, could Russia interfere? But, waving the decorum of such an interference, (which perhaps would not be insurmountable,) let us attend to the motives by which princes are more generally governed; the practicability of the enterprize, and the value of its precarious success, compared with the certain costs and hazards of the attempt.
The question is every day becoming more complicated to them: and circumstances which, at first, seem calculated to provoke this attempt, immediately assume an appearance well fitted to discourage it. Thus the contagion is spreading: the Netherlands have risen and demanded a charter from their king. This is a new alarm to the neighboring monarchies. But the king of the Netherlands is a sensible and honest man, and has, we are told, already called the States General, with a view to the redress of the grievances of his subjects. This monarch has followed, in the main, the policy of England so closely as to leave but little doubt that he will be willing to adopt the British form of government; and that he will, also, follow her example in the immediate recognition of that of France. Similar governments will probably soon be instituted both in Spain and Portugal; and they will be recognized by England, France, and the Netherlands.
Now, although England was willing in 1792 to unite in a war against that wild democracy in France, which threatened to subvert, by force, monarchy in every form, throughout the world, and to give the fraternal embrace to every nation upon earth, willing or unwilling, does it follow that she will look with composure at a war on the limited monarchies in her neighborhood, which she has thought proper to recognize, and that war, too, headed by Russia? Jealous as she is, and with good reason, of the alarming strides of the great autocrat, and interfering, as she certainly did, with his distant enterprise upon Turkey, will she be content to see the kingdoms in her immediate neighborhood reduced to Russian dependencies, by those armies of occupation with which the success of Russia must be followed? Will Russia rise against the resistance of England to such an enterprise, when she is believed to have mitigated her designs on Turkey in consequence of English mediation? This is scarcely credible. Or if she should, will Austria and Prussia, notwithstanding their alleged servility to her views, follow her in such an enterprise? Those powers will unquestionably consult their own safety, and will weigh the consequences, on both sides, before they take such a step. There is a wide difference between their situation and that of Russia, and what may be politic for Russia, might be very impolitic for them. The subjects of Russia are yet in polar darkness: those of Austria and Prussia are in a very different condition. Look at the internal state of their own dominions. The spirit of liberty has gone abroad among their people, and even in Prussia is so strong, that so far back as 1814 the king found it necessary to promise his subjects an amelioration of their political condition, to induce them to follow his standard against France. In Austria liberty is awake, not only in her Universities, but among the body of her people. Neither of these
powers could send an army against France, without raising and maintaining another at home to keep down the discontents of their own people. Those people are no longer the automatons they were in 1814. They have discovered that they are men as their monarchs are, deriving from the God of nature equal rights, and with a clear right to participate in the government of their choice. Is it credible that they would bear the repeated conscriptions to which such a war would subject them, for the purpose of carrying on a crusade against the liberties of others abroad, and thus riveting, more closely, their own chains at home?
If, in spite of all these discouragements, those powers were mad or fatuitous enough to meditate such an enterprise, have they any reason to believe that it could succeed? Must they not see, on the contrary, that it would be utterly hopeless? Have they forgotten that when France stood alone, with all Europe combined against her, they found her invincible; that she swept their embattled hosts from every field, and led her victorious legions into their own capitals? One of these monarchs is reported already to have said that "he has had enough of French wars." Well may he say so; and well may Austria respond "Amen." They have not forgotten that Napoleon twice "struck their crowns into the hazard," and that it was by his gift that they now wear them. And although Napoleon be no more, they well know the gigantic power of France when armed in such a cause, and how readily a war upon her liberties will raise up some other Napoleon, probably from among the heroes of the Polytechnic school, once more to sweep like a whirlwind over their dominions, and to bring them again to his feet. If France, single-handed, was able to do this, while every power in Europe frowned upon her, what will she not be able to accomplish when cheered by the countenance, and perhaps supported by the arms of England?
Amid so many discouragements, is it conceivable that these powers will brave the consequences of an enterprise so full of despair? No one believes that their decision will be governed by any other motive than their own interest. Their own safety will be their supreme law. But will not this very consideration conduct them to the conclusion that it is their wisest course to keep the peace with France, and endeavor to preserve peace at home? Can they fail to perceive that the irresistible course of events must constrain them ultimately to make terms with their subjects; and that it is far wiser to make them at once, with as good a grace as remains to them, and to place their governments at least on the basis of the British constitution, of whose stability they have had such signal proof? Must they not see that it is far wiser thus to act, than to peril the consequences of that wild and desolating uproar throughout Europe, which an invasion of France would unquestionably produce?
That they will take the course that is wisest, because it is the wisest, may be problematical. But it is scarcely to be presumed that these sovereigns are so utterly bereft of reason as to provoke and precipitate their own ruin by a measure so hopeless. If they do attempt it, it can only be because Heaven, resolved upon their destruction, has first made them mad.
What course they will take is yet problematical. But supposing them to have the use of their reason, we have fair grounds of hope, that although the astounding character of the revolution, and of the progress of the same principles in the neighboring kingdoms may make them pause for a while, their own common sense will at length conduct them all to the conclusion, that there is no other course left for them but to recognize the existing government of France, and to direct their attention, exclusively, to their affairs at home.