Vermont riflemen in the war for the union, 1861 to 1865 / A history of Company F, First United States sharp shooters

by William Young Warren Ripley

On the twenty-ninth the sharp shooters marched with the corps to Taneytown, some twenty miles distant, and on the next day to within two miles of Emmetsburgh, where they camped for the night. On the morning of July 1st the guns of Reynold's fight at Gettysburgh were plainly heard, and in the late afternoon they started for the point of action, some ten miles distant, making most of the distance at the double quick.

At about sunset they arrived on the field and went into bivouac in the rear of the hill known in the history of the subsequent battle as Little Round Top, and were once more confronting their ancient antagonists. The sharpshooters were now attached to the second brigade, commanded by Gen. J. H. H. Ward, of the first division, under Gen. Birney, the old third division having been consolidated with the first and second after the terrible losses of the corps at Chancellorsville, and in this connection we shall have to follow them through the battle of Gettysburgh. The battle of the 1st of July was over. The First and Eleventh Corps had sustained a serious defeat, and at the close of that day the rolls of these two corps showed the terrible loss of over nine thousand men, and yet the battle had hardly commenced. The situation was not an encouraging one to contemplate; not half the Union army was up, some corps being yet thirty or forty miles distant, while the events of the day showed that the rebel army was well concentrated—but the die was cast, events forced the battle then and there, and thus the rocky ridges of Gettysburgh became of historic interest and will remain so forever.

Troops arrived rapidly during the night and were assigned places, as they arrived, in the chosen line, which was in a direction nearly north and south. The extreme left rested on a rocky height rising some three hundred feet above the level of the surrounding country; some five hundred yards to the north of this hill, called Round Top, rises a similar elevation, although of less height, called Little Round Top; thence north to Cemetery Hill, immediately overlooking the village of Gettysburgh about two miles distant, the Union troops occupied, or were intended to occupy, a rocky ridge overlooking and commanding the plain to the westward. From Cemetery Hill the line was refused and curved backward to the east until the extreme right rested on a wooded eminence called Culp Hill, and fronted to the east, so that the entire line was some three miles, or perhaps a little more, long, and was in shape like a fish hook, the shank lying along the ridge between Round Top and Cemetery Hill, and the point on Culp Hill. Below the bend of the hook, at the base of Cemetery Hill, lay the village of Gettysburgh. Such was the Union position at daylight on the morning of the 2d of July, 1863. Fronting that portion of the federal troops which was faced to the west, and at a distance of about one mile, ran another ridge, parallel to the first, called Seminary Ridge, and which was occupied by the Confederate army. To the north and east of Gettysburgh the ground was open, no ridges or considerable body of wood land existed to cover or screen the movements of the rebel troops. The village of Gettysburgh was occupied by the enemy on the afternoon of the 1st of July after the defeat of the First and Eleventh Corps, and yet remained in their possession. Midway between the two armies ran the Emmetsburgh road, following the crest of a slight elevation between the two lines of battle. The position assigned to the Third Corps was that portion of the line immediately north of Little Round Top where the ridge is less high than at any other portion. Indeed, it sinks away at that point until it is hardly higher than the plain in front, and not as high as the ridge along which runs the Emmetsburgh road. At an early hour on the morning of the 2d, Sickles, believing himself that the latter ridge afforded the better position, and perhaps mistaking Gen. Meade's instructions, passed down into the valley and took up the line of the Emmetsburgh road, his center resting at a point known in the history of the battle as the "peach orchard." From this point his line was prolonged to the right by Humphrey's Division along the road, while Birney's Division, to which Ward's brigade with the sharp shooters was attached, formed the left, which was refused; the angle being at the peach orchard, and the extreme left resting nearly at the base of Round Top, at a point known by the altogether suggestive and appropriate name of the Devil's Den—a name well applied, for a more desolate, ghostly place, or one more suggestive of the home of evil spirits can hardly be imagined. Barren of tree or shrub, and almost destitute of any green thing, it seems cursed of God and abandoned of man.

Pending the deployment of the Third Corps, four companies of the sharp shooters, F, I, D and E, with the Third Maine, a small regiment of only two hundred men, were detached from Ward's brigade and ordered to a point in front and to the right of the peach orchard, where they were directed to advance to a piece of wooded land on the west of the Emmetsburgh road and feel for the enemy at that point. The four companies, deployed as skirmishers, advanced in a northwesterly direction, and at about nine o'clock encountered a strong force of the rebels, consisting of at least one brigade of Longstreet's command, who, with arms stacked, were busily engaged in preparing their breakfast when the rifles of the sharp shooters gave them notice of other employment. They were taken entirely by surprise, and quickly perceiving this fact, the riflemen dashed forward, firing as they pressed on as rapidly as the breech loaders could be made to work. The rebels made but a short stand; taken entirely unprepared and unaware of the insignificant numbers of the oncoming force, they seized their guns from the stack, and, after one or two feeble volleys, retreated in confusion.

The general in command made a gallant personal effort to rally his men, but fell dead from his horse immediately in front of Co. F. The rout of the enemy at this point was now complete, and pressing their advantage to the utmost the sharp shooters drove them back nearly to the main rebel line on Seminary Ridge, capturing many prisoners who were sent to the rear, and a large number of small arms which, however, they were unable to bring away. Having thus cleared the ground nearly to the main rebel line, they took position behind walls, fences, etc., and for the two or three hours following were engaged in sharp shooting with the enemy similarly posted in their front. Their position was now some distance to the right of the peach orchard and in front of the right, or right center, of Humphrey's Division.

At about half-past three in the afternoon Longstreet commenced his attack on Sickles' extreme left near Round Top, the battle soon becoming very severe also at the angle in the peach orchard and involving Humphrey further to the right. The attacking columns had passed to the left of the sharp shooters and the fighting was now in their left and rear. The rebels in their front also became very aggressive and they were gradually pushed back until they became intermingled with the troops of Humphrey's Division posted along the Emmetsburgh road where the struggle soon became close and deadly. The angle at the peach orchard was the key to Sickles' line, and against it Longstreet pushed his best troops in dense masses, and at this point occurred some of the hardest fighting that took place on the whole field; but as the troops whose doings are chronicled in these pages had no part in that struggle, it is enough to say that after a gallant resistance the line was broken at the angle and the shouting rebels, rushing through the gap, took both portions of the line in reverse, while both portions were yet resisting heavy attacks on their fronts. Such a situation could have but one result—both wings were compelled to retire in confusion.

Anticipating this, Meade had ordered heavy supporting columns to be formed behind the crest of the ridge and these were ordered down to the relief of the sorely tried Third Corps. Barnes' Division of the Fifth Corps, the same to which the sharp shooters had been attached for so long a time, and in the ranks of which they had fought in all the battles previous to Fredericksburgh, came gallantly to the rescue, but were unable to withstand the terrible vigor of the Confederate assault, and Caldwell's Division of the Second Corps was also thrown in to check the onset.

These troops fought with the greatest courage but were defeated with the loss of half the men engaged. In the mean time Longstreet, finding the ground between the left of Birney's Division and the base of Round Top unoccupied, pushed a force behind the Union left at that point which succeeded in gaining a position in the rocky ravine between the two Round Tops from which they pushed forward to secure the possession of the lesser elevation, at that moment unguarded. This was the key to the entire Union line, and once in the hands of the rebels would probably decide the battle in their favor. But Warren, another old Fifth Corps friend, quickly discovered the danger and ordered Vincent with his brigade to occupy and defend this important point. The struggle for its possession was terrible, but victory perched upon the Union banners and the hill was made secure. Vincent and Hazlett, both of the Fifth Corps also, were killed here. They had been well known and highly esteemed by many of the officers and men of the sharp shooters, and by none were they more sincerely lamented.

Darkness put an end to the battle of July 2d. Lee had gained considerable ground, for the whole of the line occupied by the Third Corps was now in his possession. There yet remained for him to carry the real line of the federal defenses which was as yet intact. The position taken by Gen. Sickles had been intrinsically false, and was one from which he would have been withdrawn without fighting had time allowed. Lee had gained ground, and that was all, unless the inspiriting effects of even partial success can be counted.

Many thousands of Union soldiers lay dead and wounded on the field, and the Army of the Potomac was the weaker by that number of men, but Lee had lost an equal, or more likely a greater number, so that on the whole the result of the day could not be counted as a substantial gain for the rebels, and when the federals lay down for the night, it was with confidence and assurance that the morrow would bring its reward for the mishaps of the day. The corps commander, Gen. Sickles, had been wounded and Gen. Birney succeeded to the command. Gen. Ward took command of the division, and thus it came about that Col. Berdan was in command of the brigade.