Number of claims filed Number denied Reparation awarded
1907561—$104,700
190837891486154,703
190944061199311,978
191051031463404,976
19115653739329,388

Here, again, it appears as if the maximum load had been reached, so far as the Commission is concerned. Testimony of shippers is emphatic upon this point.[630] One railroad traffic manager stated that the number of overcharge claims against his line,—one of the most important in the country,—was twenty-five per cent. less in 1909 than two years earlier; and that loss and damage claims were reduced approximately one-third. A very large shipper compared his former "claims suspense account," sometimes amounting to $100,000, with $7,500 for 1909. The number of such overcharge claims was 1,008 in 1905. For nine months of 1909 it was 205. And yet these damages paid are but a trifle, as compared with the aggregate of claim settlements made by the roads directly. For the fiscal year to June 30, 1910, such settlements made to shippers directly by steam roads amounted to $21,941,232. How much of this sum was a legitimate allowance for loss or damage incurred in transit, one cannot discover. But it appears likely that an appreciable fraction served as a cover for personal discrimination. Compulsory reference to the government of all such claims would speedily determine the true facts. In the meantime it is a satisfaction to know that a competent tribunal now exists, to which appeal with a minimum of expense may be made by aggrieved shippers. Furthermore, it should also be noted in this connection, that the situation as respects claims has been benefited by a detail of the law of 1906, not heretofore mentioned. The so-called Carmack amendment provided that carriers must issue a through receipt or bill of lading, and thereby become liable for the shipment throughout its entire journey; that is to say, whether upon the initial road or a later connection. The legal principles accepted in England since 1841 are thus adopted. There is no doubt that great improvement in the relation between the roads and the shipping public may be anticipated as a result.

The great improvement in respect of standardization of rates, evidenced primarily through reduction in the number of separate tariffs issued by the railroads, has been elsewhere described[631] in connection with classification. From 193,900 separate schedules in 1906 to less than half that number five years later is a notable achievement,—so notable indeed that it merits repetition in this connection. The course of complaints, of claims and of new rates filed at Washington, affords cumulative evidence of the great improvement in conditions which the new legislation has brought about.

This activity of the Interstate Commerce Commission, it is almost needless to mention, affords no true measure of the benefits resulting from the law. Like every other sound piece of legislation, it was intended to be preventive, not punitive. The number of arrests by the police affords no indication of the effectiveness of a criminal statute. Not the violations of law, but the breaches forestalled, are of real significance. And similarly in this instance, one surely finds the primary benefit of legislation, not in the complaints preferred, but in the fact that, under the improved relationship between the principals concerned, many long-standing causes of irritation and misunderstanding are being removed. The real gain, not to be measured by figures, is to be found in the improved spirit of the intercourse now prevalent between railway officials and their customers. The shipper—especially if he be a small one—having business to transact, may now be sure of courteous treatment and a prompt and probably just outcome. In the old days he was too often made to feel his utter economic dependence. As a high traffic official recently put it: "One reason we do not like this law is because we have to stop and think twice what we are about. We must be ready to explain and show a warrant for every act. An attack of indigestion cannot any longer serve as an excuse for an arbitrary, off-hand ruling." This improved spirit has permeated the whole staff of railway officials who have seen a new light on the public aspect of their calling.[632]

The nature of the complaints before the Interstate Commerce Commission, with its amplified powers under the new law, affords the best indication of the most important feature of its work, namely the settlement of disputes between the railroads and their clients.[633] And it will be apparent that a large number of these only indirectly raise the issue of the actual freight rate. Oftentimes they concern rather the manner of conducting business. An attentive perusal of these decisions of the Commission offers interesting evidence of the range of a carrier's activities. Every little station all over the country between Aaron and Zuwash, and every conceivable commodity, from "mole-traps in crates" to "jewelers' sweepings," is comprehended. The fact that these disputes, often pecuniarily insignificant, could not be amicably adjusted by the good offices of the Commission informally, but necessitated formal hearing and decision, is the strongest possible proof that some competent tribunal of this sort was greatly needed in the interest of industrial peace.

One of the commonest petty complaints is of misrouting of freight. Goods are carried by a roundabout way, or by one not enjoying the lowest through rate. Thus, to be specific, in 1908 six carloads of print-paper were shipped from Little Falls, Minnesota, to Boise, Idaho.[634] Three routes were open, the rates being respectively $1.30, $1.36, and $2.17 per hundred pounds. The Northern Pacific road, in absence of instructions, sent the goods by the third route,—presumably the one most profitable to itself,—the result being a freight rate $1,760.62 greater than it otherwise might have been. Reparation to this amount was granted within three months by order of the Commission.

Another frequent difficulty concerns the supply of suitable cars for the needs of the shipper. Carload rates are always proportionately lower than charges for package shipment.[635] The carriers very properly prescribe a certain minimum lading as a requisite for the grant of these proportionately lower wholesale rates. The shipper at carload rates must, however, pay for the full capacity of the car, whether his shipment fills it or not. No exception can be taken to this practice, unless the carrier is unable or unwilling to supply cars of a suitable size. This sometimes happens. For instance, in 1908 a lumber-man in Oregon, having a shipment of 39,500 pounds to make to a point in Pennsylvania, requested of the Southern Pacific a car of 40,000 pounds capacity.[636] Not having one at hand, a much larger car was furnished, having a minimum capacity of 60,000 pounds. Following the standing rule as to carload rates, the shipper was compelled to pay sixty-two and one-half cents per hundred pounds on the marked capacity of the car, that is to say, on 20,000 pounds more freight than he actually shipped. This made a difference of $128.12 in the freight bill—nearly fifty per cent. in excess of the charge based upon the actual shipment. The Commission issued its order for reparation within five weeks of the filing of the complaint.

A flagrant case of the misapplication of similar rules was recently decided.[637] A retail druggist at Douglas, North Dakota, bought a sheet of plate glass eight feet square at St. Paul for forty-six dollars. Usually such large sheets have to lie flat on the car floor; and, occupying so much space, are properly assessed at a minimum weight of five thousand pounds, regardless of the actual lading. But in this instance the glass was carried upright, screwed to the end of the car, along with a lot of miscellaneous freight. Applying the standard rule made the freight bill for a distance of 587 miles, $9.50 more than the entire cost of the glass at St. Paul. It appears strange that the carrier should have permitted so clear a case to come to a formal hearing at all. Presumably it contested it as much for the protection of its standard rules as for the sake of the actual revenue involved. No exception can be taken to these shipping rules as a whole; but these cases make it evident that their application may be at times too harsh and rigid. The tribunal established by the new law performs a much-needed service to the community in tempering their application in exceptional instances.

Attempts at arbitrary exclusion from participation in through shipments, in order to stifle competition, not infrequently crop out in these decisions. In 1905 the Enterprise line, capitalized at four hundred thousand dollars, put three steamers into commission from Fall River to New York.[638] This independent line was of the utmost importance to the cotton manufacturers, as it was expected that at New York connection could be made with competing rail and water lines to every part of the United States. But all these lines, presumably at the behest of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, which had hitherto enjoyed a monopoly of the business and which, with its enormous tonnage of high-grade freight to be parcelled out among connecting lines at New York, was a formidable factor, promptly declined to join in making any through rates. All their local rates from New York on, were, of course, prohibitory. In one instance, while the through rate accorded to the shipper over the New Haven road was sixteen and five-eighths cents per hundredweight from New York on, the patron of the Enterprise line was charged twenty-five and one-half cents for the same service.

This case recalls a similar one in 1897, when the independent Miami line of steamers from New York tried to break the monopoly held by the steamship lines owned by the railroads out of Galveston, Texas. The roads not only refused to pro-rate, but actually demanded prepayment of freights from Galveston on, as local rates. The Federal courts tinkered with the subject for a while, until the Circuit Court of Appeals, while recognizing a probable violation of law, affirmed that suit could be legally instituted only by the United States.[639] Meantime, of course, the company was forced out of that business; and rates have steadily risen ever since. In this later instance of the Enterprise line, the Commission promptly ordered an extension of the same privileges to the independent line that were enjoyed by its powerful rival.[640]