Many admirable features of this report deserve mention, did space permit. The clear exposition of the distinction between stocks and bonds, and especially the discussion of inter-corporate financing, occupied a prominent place. The document promised to play a large part in the determination of governmental policy in future. It well merited the most careful perusal by legislators, financiers and economists. In the nature of things so conservative a document could never hope for a popular reception. But many of its financial platitudes were probably in need of reiteration for the good, both of the carriers and the public.
The Hepburn Act of 1906, despite the agitation over its enactment in Congress, "came in like a lion and went out like a lamb," imitating thereby the month of March in which its crucial changes were effected. In the end it proved to be a much less drastic measure than the railroads feared. This Mann-Elkins law, four years later, on the other hand, introduced by the presidential bill as a merely supplementary piece of legislation,[709] "rounding out the Roosevelt policies," emerged from Congress really radical in character. Every change made was "progressive"; and yet there was little public interest manifested on either side. No publicity campaign was carried on by the carriers. No extended discussion took place in the press. There were several reasons for this contrast. It is partly true, as one writer has suggested, that "the marrow had already been extracted from railroad regulation as a political issue; and that it had become merely a bone of contention in a factional strife." Moreover, the fundamental principle of effective governmental regulation had been indisputably affirmed in 1906. The Act of 1910 had for its purpose a firmer intrenchment of the position already occupied. Debate centred largely upon uninteresting technical questions. The broader issues were relegated to second place. Even the carriers on their part were extremely reserved in stating their position. It was conceded on all sides that the less public opinion in general was aroused, the lighter would be the sentence passed upon the prisoners at bar. It is difficult to determine in how far the marked advance made in this statute was due to contemporary happenings, like the general advances of freight rates, the Illinois Central scandals and the like; or to a deep-seated conviction on the part of the progressive element in Congress. But that the law, as a whole, was a surprise in the end even to its proponents is beyond doubt.
A word may be added concerning the omissions in the Mann-Elkins law. The most important was the elimination of the administration plan for authorizing agreements between carriers as to rates, subject to supervision by the Commission. The Republican platform had definitely promised relief of this sort to the railroads. The Democratic party had somewhat equivocally promised an amendment of the law prohibiting pooling "to make it unlawful, unless approved by the Commission." The plan, however, met with persistent opposition on all sides, largely on the ground that it conflicted with the Sherman Anti-Trust law. Other details which fell by the way concerned proposals to extend jurisdiction over water carriers on inland waterways.[710] Whether the Commission might exercise any control over those which formed parties to a through line still remained an open question.[711] And then at the last there was the omission of Congress to deal with the question of fixing minimum rates or differentials between rates. This was responsible, as will shortly appear, for much of the difficulty encountered in the application of the long and short haul clause to the transcontinental rate problem.
FOOTNOTES:
[688] Characterized somewhat heatedly by Senator La Follette in his Autobiography (American Magazine, 1912, p. 189), as "in all the history of railroad legislation, the rankest, boldest betrayal of public interest ever proposed in any legislative body."
[689] The best references are the following:—F. H. Dixon, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. XXIII, 1910, pp. 593-633; reprinted in the Railway Age Gazette, vol. XLIX, p. 688 et seq.; American Political Science Review, vol. IV, 1910, pp. 537-554. Our other sources are the files of the Annual Reports of I. C. C.; the Congressional Record, Railway Age Gazette, and daily press reports.
[691] Concrete instance in 17 I. C. C. Rep., p. 317. Also p. [510], supra, and [587], infra.
[692] The suspension of increased rates on Maine potatoes in October, 1912, long enough to permit the entire season's crop to be marketed on the old tariffs is a case in point.