Colonel Henry Ludington: A Memoir

by Willis Fletcher Johnson

N. B. the maj. is Gone home on furlow

Henry Ludinton.

Fac-simile of Col. Henry Ludington’s signature.

This report is unquestionably authentic, although the “P. S.” has no address, date nor signature, and is on a separate sheet of paper from the letter and the “N. B.” But it is in Henry Ludington’s handwriting, precisely the same as the signed letter, and is on precisely the same kind of paper. Doubtless, then, the “P. S.” was hurriedly written after the letter, the British attack having occurred between the two writings, and was enclosed with the letter without taking time to sign it in any way. The MSS. were in the possession of the late Douglas Putnam, of Harmar, Ohio, a great-grandson of General Putnam, and were left by him to his daughter, Mrs. Francke H. Bosworth, of New York. It is interesting to observe that it was with his old chief, Tryon, that Ludington had on this occasion to deal again. He estimates the number of the British three times as high as does the other and less authoritative chronicler, and is probably more nearly correct. It may be assumed that the former statement that he had “about five hundred militia” was much exaggerated. His own official report of the day before shows his entire force at Wright’s Mills to have comprised “One Colonel, 1 Lt. Colonel, 5 Captains, 10 Leutennants, no Ensign, no Chaplain, 1 Adjutant, 1 Quartermaster, 1 Surgeon, no Surgeons mate, 19 Sergeants, 9 Drummers and Fifers, 182 present fit for duty, 19 sick present, 3 Sick Absent, 19 on command, 10 on Furlough, Total 233.” With such a mere handful, he certainly acquitted himself most creditably against the vastly superior force of Tryon.

Putnam was at Peekskill for the express purpose of guarding the passage up the river. He had there about 600 regulars and a much larger number of militia. Governor George Clinton was at Fort Montgomery, and his brother James Clinton at Fort Clinton, with combined forces variously reported at from 600 to 1200 men, mostly militia. Putnam had scout boats along the river, and an elaborate system of scouts on land. Yet, says General De Peyster, “the British Clinton … took advantage of a fog, transferred his troops over to the western side of the river, to Stony Point, made a wonderful march across or rather around the Dunderberg Mountain, and carried Forts Clinton and Montgomery by assault, performing the most brilliant British operation during the seven years’ war.” George Clinton suffered heavy losses in troops, and narrowly escaped capture; the State capital, Kingston, was exposed to the enemy’s advance; and Putnam retired to the mountains, sending word to Gates that he must prepare for the worst as he could not prevent the enemy from advancing up the river to the aid of Burgoyne. “The enemy can go to Albany with great expedition and without any opposition.” In the presence of this disaster two things were uncommonly fortunate for the American cause. One was that Gates was not alone in the north, but had Arnold, Schuyler, and Morgan with him to brace him up. The other was that the British did not attempt to go on up to Albany. After garrisoning Fort Montgomery, Sir Henry Clinton returned to New York. On October 15, he sent an expedition, under General Vaughan, up to Kingston, and the next day burned that village, the State government having previously fled to Poughkeepsie. Other ravages, of looting and burning, were committed along the river, to the disgrace of the British arms. But there was some consolation to the stricken patriots in the news that the very day after the burning of Kingston, Burgoyne, beaten by Arnold, Schuyler, and Morgan, surrendered to Gates with all his army.

During the winter of 1777-78 Colonel Ludington was chiefly busied with other features of his public duties, and appeared little in the field. He was a valuable adviser to the State government on military affairs, and, realizing from experience the great difficulty of maintaining a satisfactory militia service in time of actual warfare, urged the formation of another regiment of regulars. On December 18, Governor Clinton referred to this project in a letter to General Putnam. He urged the necessity of strengthening the defenses of the Hudson River, and said that he expected the Committee of Safety at Poughkeepsie in a few days. He would then lay before them the proposal for a new regiment of regulars and added, “I should be glad to have Colo. Ludington’s Plan.” That winter, the winter of Valley Forge, was a hard one in which to raise recruits of any kind, especially in view of the fact that the troops had received no pay for their services for a long time past. Colonel Ludington felt this keenly, and on being asked by Clinton to furnish a certain number of men from his regiment for the new regiment of regulars, he wrote very frankly on the subject:

Honoured Sir, I am under the Disagrable Nesesity of acqainting you, that I find it to Be out of my power to Comply with your Orders in Regard of Raising the Coto (Quota) of men aloted me to Raise out of my Regiment, and that for Sundry Reasons. In the first place, the money Raised in the other Regments By their asesments amounts to one Hundread pounds Bounty to Each Soldier By Reason of the Exempts Being able and among whom are a number of Quakers. But it is not the Case in my Regment, For, By the Best Computation we Can make, we Cannot Raise more than 30 Dolars a man, though I would not Be understood that we have gone through with the asesments and that for this Reason: the act for asesing the Exempts Expresly says that the officers who aseses the Exempts Shall Be Freeholders, and I have not Such an officer in my Regiment. We have met Sundry times in order to try to Raise the men and I yoused my Best Endevours that they Should Be Raised, But I have not an officer that will asist the Exempts. The officers tell me they posatively will not Call their Companies out until they get pay for their Past Servises in order to avoid Service; on that account I have had their pay roles maid up in time and Signed By the general, and Have weighted on the pay master for the money Everry few Days, and yesterday for the Last time, and He then told He had no prospect in geting the money in Sum months. That Being the Case I am Sory I must Tell your Honour that I know not what further measures to take until I have Sum further instructions in Regard of the matter. It is my opinion that we Shall never Raise the men, unles the State asists us in Raising a part of the Bounty and the Soldiers gets their wages for their past Servises. Sir, a few lines from your Honour in Regard of the above, By way of instructions, will mutch oblige your Humble Servant,

Henry Ludinton.