By 10 o'clock, however, this entire division was virtually hors du combat. A deep gap in our front line was made, the Rebels had nearly pierced through, and were only held back by McArthur's Brigade and the rest of W. H. L. Wallace's Division, which hurried over to its assistance.
For the present, let us leave them there. They held the line from this time until four.
We left Sherman's Brigade maintaining a confused fight, Hildebrand's about gone, Buckland's and McDowell's holding their ground more tenaciously. The firing aroused McClernand's Division. At first they supposed it to be a mere skirmish; perhaps even only the irregular discharge of muskets by guards and pickets, to clean out their guns—a practice which, to the disgrace of our discipline be it said, was well nigh universal—and rendered it almost impossible at any time to know whether firing meant anything at all, beyond ordinary disorder of our own soldiers. But the continued rattle of musketry soon undeceived them, and almost as soon the advance of the Rebels, pouring after Hildebrand, was upon them.
The division, it will be remembered, lay a short distance in the rear, and with one brigade stretching out to the left of Sherman's line. Properly speaking, merely from the location of the camp, McClernand did not belong to the front line at all. Two-thirds of his division were entirely behind Sherman. But as the latter fell back, McClernand had to bear the shock of battle.
His division was composed as follows: First Brigade, Colonel Hare commanding, Eighth and Eighteenth Illinois, Eleventh and Thirteenth Iowa; Second Brigade, Colonel C. C. Marsh commanding, Eleventh, Twentieth, Forty-eighth and Forty-fifth Illinois, Colonels Ransom, Marsh, Haynie and Smith (the latter is the "lead mine regiment"); Third Brigade, Colonel Raith commanding, Seventeenth, Twenty-ninth and Forty-ninth Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonels Wood, Farrell and Pease, and Forty-third Illinois, Colonel Marsh. Besides this fine show of experienced troops, they had Schwartz's, Dresser's, McAllister's and Waterhouse's Batteries.
As already stated, McClernand was first called into action shortly after the surprise of Sherman's left Brigade (Hildebrand's)—about 7 in the morning—by having to move up his left brigade to support Sherman's retreating left, and preserve the line. Then, as Sherman's other brigades fell back, McClernand's moved up and engaged the enemy in support. Gradually the resistance in Buckland's Brigade and what was still left to its right of Hildebrand's, became more confused and irresolute. The line wavered, the men fell back in squads and companies, they failed to rally promptly at the call of their officers. As they retreated, the woods behind them became thinner, and there was less protection from the storm of grape that swept as if on blasts of a hurricane among the trees. Lieutenant-Colonel Canfield, commanding the Seventy-second Ohio, was mortally wounded and borne dying from the field. Colonel Sullivan, of the Forty-eighth Ohio, was wounded, but continued at the head of his men. Company officers fell and were carried away from their men.
At one of our wavering retreats, the Rebels, by a sudden dash forward, had taken part of Waterhouse's Battery, which McClernand had sent them over. Behr's Battery, too, was taken, and Taylor's Chicago Light Artillery was so terribly pounded as to be forced to retire with heavy loss. As the troops gave way, they came out from the open woods into old fields, completely raked by the enemy's fire. For them all was lost, and away went Buckland's and Hildebrand's Brigades, Ohioans and Illinoisans together, to the rear and right, in such order as they might.
McDowell's Brigade had fallen back less slowly than its two companions of the same division, but it was now left entirely alone. It had formed our extreme right, and, of course, had no support there; its supporting brigades on the left had gone; through the space they had occupied the Rebels were pouring; they were in imminent danger of being entirely cut off, and back they fell, too, still farther to the right and rear, among the ravines that border Snake Creek.
And here, so far as Sunday's fight is concerned, the greater part of Sherman's Division passes out of view. The General himself was indefatigable in collecting and reorganizing his men, and a straggling contest was doubtless kept up along portions of his new lines, but with little weight in inclining the scales of battle. The General bore with him one token of the danger to which he had exposed himself, a musket-ball through the hand. It was the common expression of all that his escape so lightly was wonderful. Whatever may be his faults or neglects, none can accuse him of a lack of gallantry and energy when the attack was made on his raw division that memorable Sunday morning.
To return to McClernand's Division: I have spoken of his sending up first, his left, and then his centre brigade, to support Sherman, shortly after the surprise. As Sherman fell back, McClernand was compelled to bring in his brigades again to protect his left against the onset of the Rebels, who, seeing how he had weakened himself there, and inspired by their recent success over Prentiss, hurled themselves against him with tremendous force. To avoid bringing back these troops, a couple of new regiments, the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Iowa, were brought up, but taking utterly raw troops on the field, under heavy fire, was too severe a trial for them, and they gave way in confusion. To meet the attack, then the whole division made a change of front, and faced along the Corinth road. Here the batteries were placed in position, and till 10 o'clock the Rebels were foiled in every attempt to gain the road.