And now Halleck dispersed the great army he had gathered. He sent Buell and his troops toward Chattanooga, and Pope to Missouri; while Grant with a fragment was to remain in command in Western Tennessee and Northern Mississippi. Halleck himself had intended doubtless to pursue his march southward to the Gulf of Mexico, hoping to free the Mississippi as he went, for Farragut had already opened the mouth of that river. This was a magnificent programme, but the energy of the Rebel government had materially disarranged it. Jefferson Davis became furiously angry with Beauregard for his defeats at Shiloh and Corinth, and removed him from command, putting Bragg in his place. At the same time conscription enormously swelled the Rebel ranks. McClellan's movements in Virginia did not seem to secure Washington. He, moreover, was soon removed and Halleck was called from the West to take his place. This left Grant in command in Tennessee. Buell as ordered, hurried toward Chattanooga. But Bragg was there before him, and fortified. Not only that, but he gathered such an army as was a menace to Kentucky and Ohio. Buell retreated, and more troops had to be taken from Grant's army to support him. This depletion of his forces made it impossible for Grant to continue the southward march. But his stern tenacity of purpose held him where he was, keeping an unyielding grip, though against great odds, on all that had thus far been gained.
On June 9th, Sherman set out for Grand Junction, an important railroad centre and strategic point, fifty-two miles west of Memphis. He took his own division and Hurlbut's, and on the 13th occupied Grand Junction. The enemy were at Tupelo, Miss., forty-nine miles below Corinth. Sherman remained at or near Grand Junction for some weeks, engaged in repairing and protecting the railroads and in similar work. His experience there was one long wrangle with the planters, who were trying to cultivate the soil, and were constantly complaining of the damage done by the moving armies.
Halleck reached Washington early in July, and on the 15th of that month Grant directed Sherman to proceed to Memphis and take command of that important place. Memphis was in a bad plight. Nearly all the men had left the city to enter the Rebel army or to avoid the Union troops, and the place had fallen into the hands of a horde of speculators. Sherman undertook to establish order and govern the place as a military post. His instructions were few; he was to act upon his own discretion. He assumed command at Memphis on July 21st, and immediately in his vigorous way set about the construction of defenses and the evolution of law and order from the prevailing anarchy. Wherever the head of the family had joined the Rebel army, the family was compelled to go South. All buildings belonging to Rebels were at once seized and rented. The mayor and other civil officers were allowed to continue their functions. No oath of allegiance was enacted from the residents who remained in the city, Sherman regarding the fact of their remaining as a profession of loyalty; but if they aided the Rebel cause in any way, they were treated as spies. Trade in cotton, except on contracts to be paid at the end of the war, was entirely prohibited. The slave question then caused not a little trouble. The Government had not yet fully decided to free them. But Sherman kept careful account of all the work done for him by negroes, so that the Government might pay for their services at the end of the war, if it so decided. Guerrillas he suppressed remorselessly, hunting them down like so many wild beasts. And he enforced the lex talionis. If a loyal family was harassed by Rebels, he visited wrath upon the nearest secessionists. If the property of a loyal man was destroyed, he destroyed an equal amount of enemy's property. For every steamboat attacked by guerrillas, he drove ten secessionist families into exile. These stern measures, which he justified by the laws of war, soon restored order to Memphis.
A capital idea of the situation in that part of the country in the summer of 1862, may be obtained from the following characteristic letter, which Sherman wrote to his brother John under date of Memphis, August 13th:
"My Dear Brother:—I have not written to you for so long that I suppose you think I have dropped the correspondence. For six weeks I was marching along the road from Corinth to Memphis, mending roads, building bridges and all sorts of work. At last I got here and found the city contributing gold, arms, powder, salt and everything the enemy wanted. It was a smart trick on their part, thus to give up Memphis, that the desire of gain to our Northern merchants should supply them with the things needed in war. I stopped this at once, and declared gold, silver, Treasury notes and salt as much contraband of war as powder. I have one man under sentence of death for smuggling arms across the lines, and hope Mr. Lincoln will approve it. But the mercenary spirit of our people is too much, and my orders are reversed and I am ordered to encourage the trade in cotton, and all orders prohibiting gold, silver and notes to be paid for it are annulled by orders from Washington.
"Grant promptly ratified my order, and all military men here saw at once that gold spent for cotton went to the purchase of arms and munitions of war. But what are the lives of our soldiers to the profits of the merchants?
"After a whole year of bungling the country has at last discovered that we want more men. All knew it last fall as well as now; but it was not popular. Now 13,000,000 (the General evidently intended only 1,300,000) men are required when 700,000 was deemed absurd before. It will take time to work up these raw recruits and they will reach us in October, when we should be in Jackson, Meridian and Vicksburg. Still I must not growl. I have purposely put back and have no right to criticise, save that I am glad the papers have at last found out we are at war and have a formidable enemy to combat.
"Of course I approve the Confiscation Act, and would be willing to revolutionize the Government so as to amend that article of the Constitution which forbids the forfeiture of land to the heirs. My full belief is we must colonize the country de novo, beginning with Kentucky and Tennessee, and should remove four million of our people at once south of the Ohio River, taking the farms and plantations of the Rebels. I deplore the war as much as ever, but if the thing has to be done, let the means be adequate. Don't expect to overrun such a country or subdue such a people in one, two or five years. It is the task of half a century.
"Although our army is thus far South, it cannot stir from our garrisons. Our men are killed or captured within sight of our lines. I have two divisions here—mine and Hurlbut's—about 13,000 men; am building a strong fort, and think this is to be one of the depots and bases of operations for future movements.
"The loss of Halleck is almost fatal. We have no one to replace him. Instead of having one head, we have five or six, all independent of each other. I expect our enemies will mass their troops and fall upon our detachments before new reinforcements come. I cannot learn that there are any large bodies of men near us here. There are detachments at Holly Springs near Senatobia, the present termini of the railroads from the South; and all the people of the country are armed as guerrillas. Curtis is at Helena, eighty miles south, and Grant at Corinth. Bragg's army from Tripoli has moved to Chattanooga and proposes to march on Nashville, Lexington and Cincinnati. They will have about 75,000 men. Buell is near Huntsville with about 30,000, and I suppose detachments of the new levies can be put in Kentucky from Ohio and Indiana in time. The weather is very hot, and Bragg cannot move his forces very fast; but I fear he will give trouble. My own opinion is, we ought not to venture too much into the interior until the river is safely in our possession, when we could land at any point and strike inland. To attempt to hold all the South would demand an army too large even to think of. We must colonize and settle as we go South, for in Missouri there is as much strife as ever. Enemies must be killed or transported to some other country.
"Your affectionate brother,
"W. T. Sherman."
Near the end of August, Sherman wrote to Grant as follows:
"The guerrillas have destroyed several bridges over Wolf Creek; one at Raleigh, on the road by which I had prescribed trade and travel to and from the city. I have a strong guard at the lower bridge over Wolf River, by which we can reach the country to the north of that stream; but, as the Confederates have burned their own bridges, I will hold them to my order, and allow no trade over any other road than the one prescribed, using the lower or Randolph road for our own convenience. I am still satisfied there is no large force of Rebels anywhere in the neighborhood. All the navy gunboats are below, except the St. Louis, which lies off the city. When Commodore Davis passes down from Cairo, I will try to see him, and get him to exchange the St. Louis for a fleeter boat, not iron-clad; one that can move up and down the river. Of course, in spite of all our efforts, smuggling is carried on. We occasionally make hauls of clothing, gold-lace, buttons, etc., but I am satisfied that salt and arms are got to the interior somehow. I have addressed the Board of Trade a letter on this point, which will enable us to control it better.
"You may have been troubled at hearing reports of drunkenness here. There was some after pay-day, but generally all is as quiet and orderly as possible. I traverse the city every day and night, and assert that Memphis is and has been as orderly a city as St. Louis, Cincinnati, or New York.
"Before the city authorities undertook to license saloons there was as much whisky here as now, and it would take all my command as custom-house inspectors to break open all the parcels and packages containing liquor. I can destroy all groggeries and shops where soldiers get liquor, just as we would in St. Louis.
"The newspapers are accusing me of cruelty to the sick; as base a charge as was ever made. I would not let the Sanitary Committee carry off a boat-load of sick, because I have no right to. We have good hospitals here, and plenty of them. Our regimental hospitals are in the camps of the men, and the sick do much better there than in the general hospitals; so say my division surgeon and the regimental surgeons. The civilian doctors would, if permitted, take away our entire command. General Curtis sends his sick up here, but usually no nurses; and it is not right that nurses should be taken from my command for his sick. I think that when we are endeavoring to raise soldiers and to instruct them, it is bad policy to keep them at hospitals as attendants and nurses."