The History of Cuba, vol. 1

by Willis Fletcher Johnson

There was a period of hesitancy and uncertainty, and then the storm broke. On January 10th, 1586, Sir Francis Drake landed in Hispaniola and occupied the City of Santo Domingo, the nominal capital of all the Spanish West Indies. Some of the judges of the Supreme Court at that place escaped and fled to Cuba, where they arrived a week later with the startling news. Luzan, as already related, was then at Bayamo, and it was there that he received the news. He was startled and alarmed, but appears not to have been panic stricken. Indeed he acted with coolness and judgment and in a manner which must be regarded as going far toward redeeming his reputation from the reproaches which he had formerly incurred. Discreetly assuming that Drake's attack upon Cuba, whenever it was made, would be not at Bayamo but at the Capital and metropolis itself, his first thought was for Havana. Immediately upon receiving the news from Santo Domingo he dispatched horsemen across country from Bayamo to Havana to bear the tidings to Quiñones, bidding them also to spread the news through all the country as they went and to command all towns to marshal all available men and send them on to Havana for the reinforcement of that place. As soon as possible he also sent two vessels from Bayamo to Havana laden with men and supplies. Ignoring their former quarrels in the face of the common danger he wrote to Quiñones outlining his plans for a defense of the Island and urging that an appeal should be sent to Mexico for aid, from which country it could be procured much more quickly than from Spain. Then he hastened to Santiago and from that port sent two vessels to Spain to tell the King what had happened at Santo Domingo and what was being done to avert, if possible, a like calamity at Havana.

The Governor's appeals to the various municipalities were not without effect. The people of Cuba seemed to be aroused by the imminence of danger to a better degree of public spirit than they had ever before manifested. Bayamo, Sancti Spiritus, Puerto Principe, and even poor little Trinidad, the smallest and weakest town of the Island, contributed men and arms to their full ability, and when at the beginning of May these levies were mustered in Havana they numbered more than 225 efficient men, tolerably well armed. Luzan himself remained at Bayamo, in the absence of orders or even permission to return to Havana, professing readiness and eagerness to serve the King there or elsewhere, wherever he could be of most use. At Havana Quiñones was in command, loyally supported by the Town Council, the royal officials and the entire community. Even the austere and censorious Rojas, the Royal Treasurer, who had been the bitter critic and opponent of Quiñones, forgot his animosity and hastened to offer his services in any capacity in which they might be utilized. It is related that Rojas, despite his years, his wealth and his social dignity, worked as a common laborer with pick-axe and shovel in digging trenches and throwing up breastworks for the fortification of the town, thus setting an example which left no other citizen any excuse for shirking duty and indeed went far toward inspiring the whole community with patriotic fervor. A proclamation was also issued by the Mayor, Pedro de la Vega, addressed to all citizens who, because of debts, quarrels, crimes, or other causes, had sought sanctuary in the church or gone into hiding in the jungle, asking them to come forward and aid in the defense of Havana, and promising them immunity from arrest or prosecution and a period of a fortnight's grace in which to return to their asylums or their hiding places after the need of their services was ended. This extraordinary call was responded to by scores of fugitives.

There was no neglect, either, in preparation for the defense of the suburbs of Havana. Chorrera was generally regarded not only as a possible but as a very probable landing point for the invaders, from which a march could be made by land against Havana. It was not practicable to fortify the place strongly enough to prevent the landing of any considerable force, but a small camp was established there, occupied by a company of horsemen, who were to keep watch day and night for the approach of the enemy, and upon his first appearance were to ride post-haste to Havana with the news. The first horseman was to set out the moment the enemy was sighted in the distance. A second was to follow as soon as the fleet was near enough for the number of vessels and their approximate strength and men and guns to be determined. A third would set out the moment the enemy's intention, either of landing there or of proceeding on to Havana, was ascertained. A fourth would wait until the enemy was actually landing and his numbers could be determined, and would then hasten after the others with the news.

Nearer the city there were several other possible landing places at inlets of the coast and some of these were fortified with earth-works and artillery. Chief among these was the inlet of San Lazaro, where in addition to earth works an enclosed fort of timber, stone and earth was constructed with several cannons mounted on a platform. At the entrance to the harbor of Havana itself the strongest preparations were made. At Punta a dozen guns were in readiness to make that the chief point of defense outside of La Fuerza itself. Much attention was given to all roads leading into the city for several miles around; particularly toward the west from which direction the attack was chiefly expected. Some of the roads were blocked altogether, others were mined and provided with pitfalls. Still others were screened and hidden with trees and brushwood so as to serve as secret means of passage for the Spaniards in advancing against or retreating from the enemy, and these were so mined that after having served their purpose to the Spaniards they could be readily destroyed. Elsewhere trees, underbrush and jungle were cleared away so that there would be no cover nor concealment for the invading force. Trenches and earth-works were constructed between La Fuerza and Punta, and the former fortress was provisioned and prepared for a siege. Special parapets of timber, stone and earth were constructed upon the top of the fort, and numerous houses and other buildings near it were destroyed in order that there might be no shelter for an attacking force.

Nor was the possibility of an attack from the eastward overlooked. On the Morro headland at the important entrance a battery of three guns was placed, well protected by breast-works of timber, stone and earth, and the coast from Morro to Matanzas was continually patrolled by horsemen on the lookout for the coming of strange vessels, and under orders similar to those which had been given to the watchmen at Chorrera. As for the harbor itself, a great chain was stretched across its entrance buoyed with logs and fastened with a huge padlock at the foot of the Morro headland.

Finally the few swift sailing vessels which could be mustered into the service were kept cruising off the shore to espy the approaching squadron. They were not sufficiently strong to give battle, but they could give warning to the city. Also they could bear to Spain or to Mexico tidings of what occurred. Thus one vessel lay in the estuary of the Puercos River, ready to flee to Mexico, while another cruised around Ycacos Point, to hasten to Spain to tell if Havana should fall into the hands of the foe.

Meanwhile in Havana itself all possible forces were mustered for defense. The volunteers from the other towns were drilled into an efficient state of discipline. Such was their zeal that they gladly served without pay while a considerable number of them in addition provided their own rations at their own cost. For the necessary expenses of their maintenance Rojas, the Royal Treasurer, used what royal funds were in hand regardless of the purpose for which they had been designed, and when these were insufficient he collected taxes without authority, on the principle that the safety of the city and Island was the supreme law. At the beginning of April some welcome aid arrived from Mexico, which even Quiñones was now glad to have. The Viceroy sent four vessels, bearing about 300 fighting men, with six months' supplies of food and with pay for eight months in advance. These increased the force under Quiñones to more than 900 well-trained soldiers. During the month of April Luzan arrived from Bayamo with nearly 100 more men, thus increasing the garrison of Havana to about 1,000. This was a force which the Captain-General confidently believed would be able to resist and to repulse any force which Drake might be able to land.

Luzan had meantime, in February, received from Spain orders to resume the governorship of the Island with full power, to return to Havana, and to consider his term of office indefinitely prolonged. He had been appointed in 1579 for a term of four years and had assumed office in 1580, so that his original term was by this time long since expired. Reckoning the four years from his actual assumption of office in the summer of 1580 his term had ended in 1584. If his return to Havana was not altogether agreeable to Quiñones, and it is quite probable that it was not, at least a semblance of harmony was preserved between them, and there was certainly efficient if not cordial co-operation. To this auspicious state of affairs the Royal Treasurer contributed in no small degree.

In fact, in the face of the great peril which confronted it, all Cuba arose to the occasion with a unity of public spirit never before known in its history, and wholly admirable. All the officials, civil and military, insular and royal, were in accord, and all classes of the population, Spaniards, Indians and negro slaves were loyal and devoted in their support. In these circumstances it is of fascinating interest to speculate upon what might have happened had Drake made the expected descent upon Havana. It is well within the limit not only of possibility but of probability that he would have been decisively defeated. It is even possible that in the conflict with more than a thousand well-armed, well trained and resolute Spaniards, than whom there were then no braver or better fighting men in all the world, he would himself have been captured or slain. And such a disposition of Francis Drake in the summer of 1586, only two years before the descent of the Invincible Armada upon the shores of England, might well have changed the history of the world.

But this was not to be. Some say that Drake did not intend to attack Havana at that time, preferring to raid Carthagena, as he did. Some say that by means of spies he ascertained the strength of Havana's defenses and deemed it, therefore, prudent not to meddle with that place. Some say that there was an interposition of Providence to dissuade him from what might have been a disastrous fiasco. We have also, as we shall presently see, the testimony of some Spanish fugitives, which is entirely plausible, though not certainly correct. Conjecture is inconclusive. Only the fact remains that Drake passed by and left Cuba unassailed.