The History of Cuba, vol. 2

by Willis Fletcher Johnson

It was the largest and best equipped force that had been seen on the Atlantic in many years; for the Spanish shipbuilders had been busy during the past years of unrest and threatening war clouds and had turned out vessels far superior in construction to those of Britain. The French were not over hopeful; even light-hearted Marie Antoinette was conscious of the importance of the enterprise and the great risk it involved; for she wrote in a private letter: "Everything depends on the present moment. Our fleets being united, we have a great superiority. They are in the Channel; and I cannot think without a shudder that, from one moment to the next, our destiny will be decided." The French staked their hope upon the reputation of the Spanish as fighters on sea. Montmorin said: "I hope the Spanish marine will fight well; but I should like it better if the British, frightened at their number, would retreat to their own harbors without fighting." King Carlos alone was optimistic; he imagined a rapid invasion, a prompt victory and the humiliation of Britain, which he had so long wished for.

The unexpected was to happen for both French and Spaniards. The fleet appeared at Plymouth on the sixteenth of August, but, without even an attempt at attacking the town, for some unexplained reason was idle for two whole days. Then a storm came up and drove it westward. When the weather became more favorable, the vessels returned and the British retired before them. There was no action to speak of; there was nothing lost and nothing gained, and realizing the futility of the undertaking, the chiefs decided to abandon it. The French returned to Brest, and the Spanish to Cadiz. To the onlooking world the actions of the expedition appeared nothing less than quixotic. The reasons for this incomprehensible performance gradually became known; the expedition had sailed under many chiefs, but it lacked the one chief, whose will and word was to prevail and insure unity of purpose. Unable to agree upon any one plan of action, they decided upon no action whatever. The Spanish admiral, who had been fired with the spirit of Florida Blanca and been eager to display the famous military prowess of his nation in a big fight with the enemy, was so furious, that he vowed on his honor after this experience rather to serve against France than Britain. Marie Antoinette wrote to her mother: "The doing of nothing at all will have cost us a great deal of money."

But while a legitimate engagement between the French and Spanish vessels on the one and the British on the other side was for the time being avoided, the three countries did not disdain to stoop to smaller means to inflict damage upon the commerce and the navigation of one another. Nor did they hesitate to attack the vessels of neutral countries, if they suspected them of lending aid to the belligerent they were opposing; and as this spirit began to spread, it led to a state of anarchy upon the seas, which recalled the golden age of piracy. British privateers and other vessels cruised about the ocean in quest of booty and attacked and robbed indiscriminately whatever ships they suspected; and very frequently this suspicion was only a pretext. Dutch commerce and navigation especially suffered from these depredations, and as French and Spanish vessels began to vie with the British in these violations of neutrality, the council chambers of the European powers, from Lisbon to Petrograd and from Naples to Christiania began to ring with vociferous protests against these disgraceful conditions. When Spain issued an order that all ships found by her vessels to be carrying provisions and to be bound for Mediterranean ports, should be brought into the harbor of Cadiz and their cargoes sold to the highest bidder, even Britain was alarmed and indignant.

That was the moment which brought into prominence Sir George Rodney, the British commander, whose naval exploits soon were to worry the Spanish colonies, as did once those of British freebooters. Rodney sailed with his squadron on the twenty-ninth of December, 1779, and by the eighth of January had captured seven warships and fifteen merchantmen. At Cape St. Vincent, where he arrived on the sixteenth, he destroyed a part of the Spanish squadron under command of D. Languara. In the spring of the same year he had several encounters with the French fleet, under command of Admiral Guichen, with results so favorable for him that Britain soon resounded with his praise. His progress had so far been almost unobstructed, but in the summer it was temporarily checked, when the Spanish squadron, commanded by D. Solano, joined that of the French. However, the curious disparity of French and Spanish temperament once more manifested itself in a manner which disastrously affected their work. Unable to agree on important questions of action, their cooperation threatened to come to naught. In the mean time an epidemic of fever broke out in both fleets and D. Solano returned with his ships to Havana, while Admiral Guichen sailed for France.

The new governor, who had succeeded Navarro in the administration of Cuba, was Lieutenant-General D. Juan Manuel de Cagigal. Alcazar calls his governorship a provisional one; Blanchet asserts that he received his appointment in reward for the valuable services he had rendered during the recent conquest of Pensacola, he having been the first to enter through the breach which the Spanish had made in the fortifications. Cagigal was a native of Cuba; he entered upon his office on the twenty-ninth of May, 1781, and remained until December of the same year. He contributed largely to the efficiency of the expedition which was fitted out under the command of D. Solano, the General of the Spanish fleet, consisting of twelve vessels with one thousand men on board, and was to join the French fleet at Guarico. The object of the expedition was to capture the island of Providence and eventually take other island possessions of the British in the contiguous seas. According to Alcazar, Providence was taken, but the defeat of the French squadron by Rodney made the position of Cagigal critical and attention had to be concentrated upon the defense of Havana.

According to Blanchet this joint expedition of the French and Spanish forces, which had for its ultimate object the capture of Jamaica, had elected for its chief D. José de Galvez, giving him for the duration of the campaign authority over the Captain-General of Cuba and the president of Santo Domingo. By order of Galvez, Cagigal had set out from Havana in April, 1782, with forty-eight transports and two thousand men to possess himself of the British island of Bahama, and in particular of Providence. During his absence D. José Dahan exercised the authority of the governor. Cagigal was not aware that a week before his sailing Admiral Rodney had defeated the French squadron of Count de Grasse, which he was to join in the attack on Jamaica. However, Providence was taken and a sufficient garrison left there to make the conquest secure. Blanchet indulges in some criticism of Cagigal that he had left Havana, and taken all the troops with him at such a critical time. For when he reached Matanzas after a heavy gale which had dispersed his ships, he found the authorities no little alarmed since a British fleet had been sighted.

Cagigal immediately hurried to the capital, fortified the approaches, employing one thousand negroes in the work, and formed an intrenched camp. He armed the militia, which was reenforced by many civilians, eager to fight the enemy, and when on the fifth of August el Morro gave notice of the presence of the British, everybody was prepared for the defence. Sir George Rodney, now Admiral, had calculated upon taking Havana by surprise. He brought with him a squadron composed of twenty-six ships of the line, and carrying a large number of troops. When he arrived and began to reconnoiter, he perceived the formidable preparations that had been made for the defence of the place, and deciding that it was imprudent to attack Havana by land, planned to approach it from Jarico. In the meantime Cagigal had received reenforcements which seemed to assure the safety of the capital. Daring as was the gallant Britisher, he was not inclined to waste his material in an enterprise so doubtful of success, and to the great relief of the Cubans he sailed away.

In his administration Cagigal did not prove as efficient as in his military operations. He was a born soldier. He had followed the military profession in Portugal, Oran and at Gibraltar; he had participated in the unfortunate expedition against Argel, had fought in Florida and had been with D. Pedro Caballero at Buenos Aires. He disliked the atmosphere of official bureaus and the complicated machinery of government. This lack of interest in the indispensable functions of his office brought him into serious trouble. He had counselors or asesores attend to matters which did not immediately require his intervention, and as such had employed the Venezuelan D. Francisco Miranda, who eventually became prominent in the history of his own country. When Miranda returned from a commission in Jamaica, he disembarked some contraband in Batabano. The Intendente Urriza, who was informed of the matter, at once sent a complaint to Cagigal, who, either from indifference or indolence, never even stopped to examine the case, but simply resolved to suppress it. He had, however, not taken into account the presence of the functionaries of the royal Hacienda or Treasury, who communicated the incident to the proper authorities in Spain. An urgent order for Cagigal's removal from office was the result; and the Captain-General of Caracas, D. Luis de Unzaga, was sent to take his place as governor of Cuba. Miranda fled. Cagigal was sent to Guarico and later dispatched by D. José de Galvez to Cadiz, where he was for four years a prisoner in Fort Santa Catalina. During the proceedings against him it was found that he was in no way implicated in the smuggling operation of Miranda. He was rehabilitated during the reign of King Carlos IV. and in the war with the French Republic had once more an opportunity to prove his military abilities. He died as Captain General of Valencia.

The strong impulse towards progress which had been given to Cuba in that period of peace when the administrations of Buccarelli and la Torre devoted their main energies to internal improvements and to modest attempts at laying the foundations of Cuban culture, had of course subsided during the recent unrest and the predominance of military interests. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the spark kindled a few years before was not quite dead. A long-felt want had been the absence of any periodical publication that would give the people of Cuba information upon the current political events and also be a medium for advertising purposes. According to some historians the first periodical of this kind, the Gazeta, published under the direction of D. Diego de la Barrera, made its appearance in the year 1780; others give as the date of its foundation the year 1782.

Whatever the date of its publication may have been, the Gazeta de la Habana became a medium through which the people were kept informed of the doings of the various administrative departments. The issue dated April eleventh, 1783, contains some statistics concerning the silver coins with milled edges cut away, which had been recently withdrawn from circulation, which is of interest as it suggests the relative financial rank of the different localities mentioned.