The History of Cuba, vol. 2

by Willis Fletcher Johnson

On December 2, 1823, President Monroe delivered his epochal Doctrine:

"In the wars of European powers in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the Allied Powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America.... We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies and dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

This message had the desired effect. The Holy Alliance wisely kept its hands off from affairs in the southern Americas, including Cuba. But the United States naturally sought to cultivate closer relations with its neighbor. There were indeed practical reasons why it should do so; even for its own peace and comfort. For pirates preyed on United States shipping. A blockade was proposed to catch the offenders, but it did not find favor with the powers at the United States capital. Landing in Cuba, and reprisals on persons and property, were suggested, but it was considered unwise for the United States thus to take steps which would be opposed if any other power should assume a like attitude.

The United States government feared a secret transfer of Cuba by Spain and that such action would be taken before Washington could become cognizant of it. It therefore sought to be allowed to station consuls at Havana, and in Porto Rico, who were, of course, practically to be the eyes of the United States government, to detect any incipient plot to rid Spain of Cuba. This idea did not find favor at the Spanish court and a polite letter of demurrer was sent, stating that such a proposition was untenable at the time, owing to the turbulent condition of affairs on the island, but that later, when Cuba became more peaceful, it would be considered. The real reason for Spain's refusal doubtless was that she was still smarting from the United States's recognition of the independence of other South American countries, and she did not feel justified in allowing anyone who she felt would be a spy to have an official position on the island, particularly when that person came from a country which, having attained its own liberty, naturally had sympathy with those who had theirs yet to gain.

The state of affairs at this time was epigrammatically described by The London Courier, when it said: "Cuba is the Turkey of trans-Atlantic politics, tottering to its fall, and kept from falling only by the struggles of those who contend for the right of catching her in her descent."

Spain, always badly in need of money, made in 1838 a proposal to England to offer Cuba as security for a loan, which undoubtedly would have meant that England would eventually have to take Cuba in payment for the debt. The United States Minister at Madrid, hearing of the project, made it so clear that such a course would not be tolerated by his country, that the idea was abandoned. A few years later President Van Buren again expressed the American pro-slavery policy toward Cuban independence:

"The Government has always looked with the deepest interest upon the fate of these islands, but particularly of Cuba. Its geographical position, which places it almost in sight of our southern shores, and, as it were, gives it the command of the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indian seas, its safe and capacious harbors, its rich productions, the exchange of which for our surplus agricultural products and manufactures constitutes one of the most extensive and valuable branches of our foreign trade, render it of the utmost importance to the United States that no change should take place in its condition which might injuriously affect our political and commercial standing in that quarter. Other considerations connected with a certain class of our population made it to the interest of the southern section of the Union that no attempt should be made in that island to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence, the first effect of which would be the sudden emancipation of a numerous slave population, which result could not but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent shores of the United States."

The United States had a selfish interest in keeping Cuba in a state of peace and prosperity. In 1842 it was found that Spain could not pay the interest upon her debt to the United States. It was suggested that she make it a charge upon the revenues of Cuba, and the next year it was arranged that the entire claim be settled by a sum paid to the United States annually by the Captain-General of Cuba. Naturally if there were constant revolutions and uprisings in Cuba, these revenues would not be forthcoming. On the other hand, taxation for the purpose of settling Spain's debt to America was not looked on with favor among Cuban patriots.

From the foregoing it will be seen that while the United States did not urge annexation,—since it was against her avowed policy to do so—she would not have been unwilling to accept Cuba, had that country knocked at her door and offered herself as a free gift. It will be equally clear that the United States had no intention that Cuba should be transferred by Spain to any other country than herself, and that she stood ready to combat such a project by force of arms if necessary. It will also be seen that some of her statesmen would have smiled upon the idea of Cuba as an independent nation, if they had for a moment believed that Cuba could maintain her independence, and that surreptitiously the United States might have lent her aid to this end, if it could have been done without embroiling herself with Spain. However, there was a division of opinion in Washington as to the effects on the Southern States of any change of condition in Cuba.