The History of Cuba, vol. 3

by Willis Fletcher Johnson

To make matters worse, disquieting rumors were circulated that in spite of the efforts of Pickett's men to disable the railroad, a large body of Spanish troops was on its way from Matanzas. There seemed to be no doubt as to the truth of these reports; indeed a message reached Lopez late in the afternoon, containing unmistakable confirmation to the effect that couriers had carried the news to Matanzas and that three thousand Spanish troops were on their way to Cardenas. Lopez was now in a triple quandary. He could advance against this huge force, which would of course be joined by those of the Cardenas garrison who had escaped into the country, and give battle against frightful odds. His own forces had been depleted by losses and had failed to be swelled by the enlistment of sympathizing Creoles. He would leave behind him a frightened and almost hostile city, and a port unguarded against the landing of Spanish troops from ships cruising in nearby waters, in the event of which he would be subject to attack from both front and rear, and would be not only in great danger, but almost in certainty of being surrounded. He might remain where he was and entrench himself against the impending attack, but this offered no better possibilities than the former plan, for he had not enough men to defend both the town and the harbor and he was in constant danger of betrayal by Spanish sympathizers, who were of course cognizant of his every move. He had been told that at Mantua large bodies of Creoles stood ready to revolt and join him. Of course, he had no more accurate confirmation of the truth of this rumor than he had had of the verity of the assurances which, before he had set out on his expedition, he had received of the willingness of the inhabitants of Cardenas to join him; and yet this plan last outlined seemed to hold better possibilities than either of the others. He decided, therefore, to adopt it, and while making a show of resistance, he began quietly to assemble his baggage and equipment on board the Creole, and to make ready for the re-embarkation of his men.

Although the forces at the station, and indeed other small bodies of his troops who had not been demoralized by the delights of the table, sought to cover his retreat, and the former did render effective service against the Spaniards, yet his movements did not escape observation, and were hailed with delight and with renewed aggressions by the Spanish troops. The retreat was not easy to effect, and when he had assembled his scattered forces, his movements were halted from time to time by the necessity of erecting temporary barricades, from which to cover the safe return to the Creole. This was finally effected, and at nine in the evening the vessel once more set out to sea. On board her, besides Lopez and his men, were the Spanish governor and the commander of the garrison, and they were retained as hostages until the ship cleared the harbor. This was not accomplished without mishap, for the captain, again hampered by navigating in what to him were uncharted waters, once more grounded the ship, which caused some delay. At length they were on the high seas, and just before they quit the shores of Cuba, they landed the discomfited governor and the garrison chief. What would have happened, had Lopez been in the governor's predicament, indeed what did happen, when Lopez and his men finally fell into the hands of the Spaniards, is another story. But Lopez was too high a type of gentleman to mete out to the Spanish high commanders the fate to which they would too gladly have consigned him.

Lopez has in many quarters been most severely censured for his quick abandonment of his plans and his hasty retreat from Cuba, but in the cold light of reason, we hardly see how he could have pursued any other course. Had his expectation of aid from the Creoles been realized, he might then, as he had planned, have left Cardenas in their hands, and with his little band strengthened by a large body of revolutionary sympathizers he might have advanced against the Spanish army at Matanzas with some hope of success. As it was, he could only make the best of a bad situation, and depart, with the faint hope of better fortune at Mantua, and at least with the nucleus of an organization which later might be more effective in another expedition of greater scope for the freeing of Cuba. Thus, when we review his action, after the passage of many years, he seems to have taken the only sane course that lay open to him. Any other would have meant even greater disaster. Lopez had lost, in this short time, of his Louisiana regiment, twenty killed and wounded, including those basely slaughtered through the Spanish treachery before the Governor's palace; of his Kentucky regiment, forty killed and wounded, including such men of high standing as Captain John A. Logan, Lieutenant James J. Garrett, the Rev. Louis McCann and Sergeant Harry Cruse, besides ten privates; while his Mississippi regiment suffered five or six killed. The Spanish losses were greater than those of the revolutionists and numbered over one hundred.

But an even greater misfortune had overtaken Lopez. When the Creole had grounded, near the entrance to the harbor, while he was making his hasty departure from Cardenas, it had been impossible to float her free without lightening her, and to do this not only were provisions thrown overboard, but large quantities of precious arms and ammunitions, and so his men now found themselves insufficiently armed for any stubborn resistance to Spanish troops, particularly should the odds be heavy. Lopez was still bent on his purpose of making a landing at Mantua, but while his gallant officers in the main supported him, he found himself surrounded by a dissatisfied, angry, mutinous crew, who were for abandoning the whole matter, and steaming for the United States with all possible speed. Lopez addressed them, and tried to stir within them a realization of what such action meant, and how fatal it might be to the cause of Cuban liberty to abandon so easily an expedition so propitiously and even gaily undertaken, but they were deaf to his entreaties. At the suggestion of one of his officers the matter was put to vote, and to his dismay Lopez found that only fifteen stood with him on the Mantua project. He would not consent to abandon it, however, even against such odds, and declared that he would himself make the landing, taking with him the loyal few who were willing to stay with him. This, however, he was prevented from doing by the fact that the majority saw to it that the captain did not approach Mantua, but steered a course which had as its object the port of Key West, Florida.

Evidence soon was not lacking that theirs had been the part of wisdom if not of valor, and indeed that there were some odds against their reaching any port at all, for news of the expedition had not only been carried to Matanzas, but it had somehow reached the Spanish ship Pizarro, and she was soon in hot pursuit of the Creole. This soon became a most serious situation; again and again it seemed as if the Creole were about to be overhauled, with the probable result that her men would be taken prisoners and executed, and she would be sunk, or taken to port a prize of war. Fate, however, intervened in favor of Lopez, for the pilot on board the Spanish vessel was in sympathy with the filibusters, and when, on nearing Key West, the Pizarro seemed about to overtake the Creole, at the peril of his own life he steered such an eccentric course that the Creole escaped, and made a landing at Key West, while the Spanish ship put out to sea once more.

Lopez and his men were welcomed at Key West with shouts of applause. Sympathizers with his expedition refused to consider it a failure. They declared that it had served to open the eyes of the Cubans to the fact that their deliverance was near, and that when Lopez once more set out with a larger force—as they assured him, with the assistance of the people of the south in the United States, he would—victory would be certain to spread her wings over his banner. So great was the popular clamor in favor of Lopez, that the United States authorities did not deem it prudent to arouse the ire of the mob, and therefore no attempts at arrest were then made. Indeed, little chance was given before debarkation, because in hardly more than ten minutes after the vessel had docked, the work of removing the wounded had been completed, and her decks were cleared of all men but seamen. The vessel was, however, seized by the authorities.

When news of Lopez's exploits reached Madrid, the government was thrown into a great state of indignation, and promptly urged upon the United States the punishment of the offenders, stating:

"If contrary to our expectations the authors of this last expedition should go unpunished, as did those who last year planned the Round Island expedition, the government of Her Majesty will find itself obliged to appeal to the sentiments of morality and good faith of the nations of Europe to oppose the entrance of a system of politics and of doctrines which would put an end to the foundations on which rests the peace of the civilized world. If Europe should sanction by her silence and acquiescence the scandalous state of affairs by which the citizens of the United States (or those of any power whatever) might freely make war from their territory against Spain, when the latter is at perfect peace officially with the Union; if it should be tolerated or looked on with indifference that the solemn stipulations which bind the two states should be with impunity made hollow by mobs and that the laws of nations and public morality should be violated without other motive than the selfishness of the aggressors, and with no other reliance than force, then civilized nations ought to renounce that peace which is based on the laws of nations and the terms of treaties and make ready for a new era in which might will be right, and in which popular passions of the worst kind will be substituted for the reason of states."

Even with the government in Washington practically controlled by the pro-slavery interests, and with feeling in that quarter running high in favor of the filibusters, the United States, for the sake of preservation of peaceable relations with Spain, could hardly afford to ignore this protest. Hence, Lopez was arrested at Savannah, whence he had gone immediately upon his arrival on American soil, and a number of the leaders of his expedition were apprehended.

Indictments were returned against Lopez, Theodore O'Hara, John F. Pickett, R. Hayden, Chatham R. Wheat, Thomas T. Hawkins, W. H. Bell, N. J. Bunce, Peter Smith, A. J. Gonzales, L. J. Sigur, Donahen Augusten, John Quitman, Cotesworth Pinckney Smith (a Judge of the Supreme Court of Mississippi), John Henderson (a former United States Senator), and J. L. O'Sullivan (a former editor of the Democratic Review, which had been loud in its support of the filibustering expeditions). But great difficulty was experienced in obtaining evidence against the prisoners. This might seem extraordinary, in the light of the fact that there could be no denial that the expedition had taken place, and that these men had been prominent in its organization. But at the trial all the witnesses by common agreement refused to answer any but the simplest and least important questions, on the ground that they might thus incriminate themselves. Three men were tried and three juries disagreed. The matter seemed so hopeless of solution that the indictments were allowed to languish without prosecution, and were finally dismissed and the prisoners released. Everywhere the filibusters were received with acclamations, and all the South joined in declaring Lopez a hero.