While these events were taking place in Cuba, Lopez, in the United States, was far from idle, and he was not lacking in friends who sought to aid him. Singularly enough those in the South who were numbered among his supporters seemed not to be disheartened by the failure of the Cardenas expedition, and, of course, the juntas were active in stirring up popular opinion in favor of filibustering, and in obtaining both moral and financial support for another enterprise. But with it all money was woefully lacking.
General Henderson, who had been a member of the first expedition, and had been one of those indicted and tried, at this time wrote to a friend:
"I need not tell you how much I desire to see him (Lopez) move again, and it is more useless to tell you how wholly unable I am to assist him to make this move. With my limited means, I am under the extremest burdens from my endeavors on the former occasion. Indeed I find my cash advanced for the first experience were over half the cash advanced to the enterprise, and all my present means and energies are exhausted in bringing up the arrearages. Yet I still believe in the importance, the morality and the probability of the enterprise; and I believe it is one the South should steadfastly cherish and promote. I feel it is more especially incumbent on us who have once failed to retrieve ourselves from so much of the opprobrium and reproach as the defeat has cast upon us. For we know that, could we succeed, we should win all those triumphs which success in such enterprises never fails to command. And would not such triumph be glorious! I believe you yield equal consideration to the importance of this subject as I do; and as a Southern question, I do not think, when properly viewed, its magnitude can be overestimated."
When a leader is able to enlist the sympathies, and drain the purse, of a man so intelligent and of such high standing as John Henderson, former Senator of the United States, and when he can bind such a man to him by even stronger ties in defeat than in victory, the personality of that leader must be one of extraordinary strength, courage and probity. It speaks well for Lopez that all through his career he gathered around him men of the finest families in the South, and indeed some of equally high standing from the North which was not particularly in favor of his venture, and those men fought for him and with him, and remained loyal until the greater portion of them paid the penalty of their lives for their devotion.
Now recruiting began in earnest. Everywhere in the South agents of Lopez were busy, but the headquarters of this new movement seem to have been at Savannah. Spain, of course, was not unaware of what was taking place and was on the alert. Spanish spies were everywhere watching the plotters against Spanish dominion in Cuba, and reporting their findings to the Spanish legation at Washington. The Spanish minister had in his employ a man who called himself at times Burtnett. (He had many aliases.) He was more clever than the rank and file of the Spanish agents, and by associating himself with the filibusters, he was able to learn their plans. Lopez's followers were not rash; they tried very hard to cover their activities; but in any undertaking in which a number of people are concerned, anything like complete secrecy is absolutely out of the question. Burtnett represented himself as a sympathizer; he joined the filibusters and wormed himself into the confidence of the leaders. He learned that the plan was to assemble on the coast of Florida, and from there to set sail for Cuba. The filibusters would themselves circulate rumors that the attack would be made on the south coast of Cuba, but Burtnett discovered that in reality the forces would be divided, and while the Spanish troops were mustered to repel an attack in the south, several small bands would land, organize the friendly Cubans, and give battle if necessary to what depleted Spanish forces might be located on the north coast. This would preclude the chance of such a disaster as the Cardenas expedition, and the Cubans, uncowed by the presence of large bodies of governmental soldiery, would hasten to the aid of Lopez. Even the Spanish troops, some of whom were supposed to be in sympathy with the revolution, might be hoped to mutiny and join the Cubans. Thus this time there could be no thought of failure.
Meanwhile Southern gentlemen of wealth and family were eagerly supplying funds to the enterprise. It is even said that some planters mortgaged their estates to obtain funds to give to the expedition, in the expectation that when rich Cuba was once acquired for the United States, they would receive back a reward far greater than the amount which they were contributing. Bonds of the proposed revolutionary government were printed, and sold; arms and ammunition were purchased and stored in readiness for the expedition. It was planned that the first consignment of arms was to be conveyed to the steamer Cleopatra, which had been purchased to carry the filibusters, by means of two small vessels, the sloop William Roe, and the steamer Nahantee, which were to steal respectively from the ports of New York and South Amboy, New Jersey, and meet the Cleopatra just beyond quarantine. When the details were completed, Burtnett revealed the whole plan to the Spanish minister, who lost no time in laying it before the United States government at Washington. Now no matter what the sympathies of this government might be, it could not be placed under the odium of giving its official sanction to such an enterprise; indeed that would probably have resulted in war with Spain. Its action was slightly delayed, and the expedition might even yet have gotten off without interference had it not been that the William Roe was detained on account of a flaw in her papers, and the Cleopatra, on which provisions were already stored, was delayed in putting to sea to wait for the William Roe and the Nahantee because at the last moment some of her crew went on shore and became intoxicated. This slight postponement of her sailing gave an opportunity for her attachment—at whose instigation it is not clear—for a writ for $3,000, to cover repairs made by a former owner, and for which the filibusters could hardly be held responsible. Nevertheless, they raised the money, but before its transfer could be completed and the Cleopatra cleared on April 26, 1851, the leaders were arrested.
Things looked black for Lopez and his followers, but they still had the influence of the South behind them, and for this reason or some equally effective one, again the courts failed to convict them, and to add to their good fortune the government did not confiscate the Cleopatra and the provisions with which she was loaded, and she was afterward sold and the proceeds used as a nest-egg toward financing another expedition.
Spain was now thoroughly aroused to her danger, and determined to put down the threatened revolution at any cost. Through her mouthpiece, the Captain-General of Cuba, she issued a proclamation to the Governors and Lieutenant Governors on the island:
"It has come to the knowledge of the Government that a new incursion of pirates is preparing, similar to the one which took place at Cardenas during the past year. It is proposed, without doubt, as it was then, to sack defenseless towns and to disturb the order which reigns in this beautiful part of the Spanish monarchy. But the loyalty of its inhabitants, the valor and discipline of the troops, and the measures taken by the government, are the surest guaranty that its destruction will follow immediately the news of its disembarkation. You must, then, above all else see to it that the news of this invasion produces no alarm in the district which you command.
"To exterminate the pirates, whatever be their number, it is not necessary to have recourse to extraordinary means; the ordinary means on which the government can count are enough and even more than enough. Any act, on the other hand, which is unusual would produce anxiety and uneasiness among the peaceful inhabitants; it might cause, perhaps, an interruption of business, and would thus occasion a real and important loss for public and private interests. It is necessary, therefore, to avoid any measures which may remove from the towns of that district the confidence and sense of security which the government inspires. The actual situation, however, imposes on the authorities the double duty to cause order to reign, and not to appear to obtain it by unaccustomed means which are only expedient when circumstances are really dangerous. And this double object will be achieved if that vigilance, activity and prudence are in evidence on which I should be able to count from you. But you must not forget that in these circumstances, one of the most important duties of the authorities is to quiet minds, and hush suspicions, to take care, finally, that in not a single instance there should be disturbed that harmony which now more than ever ought to reign among the inhabitants of the island. Working to this end, I have the most confidence that this event will end fortunately, making certain the peace which the island needs to continue on the path of prosperity which it has so far followed."