The History of Cuba, vol. 4

by Willis Fletcher Johnson

In the United States there was a great outburst of grief and rage. Even the most restrained and conservative could not help a degree of suspicion of foul play, though of course not on the part of the Spanish government. A semi-criminal faction, in the "yellow" press, clamored furiously for war, charging Spaniards, even the Spanish government, with direct and malicious responsibility for the tragedy, and even publishing the grossest of falsehoods for the sake of inflaming popular sentiment. Too large a proportion of the nation was swayed by these latter sordid and sinister influences. But at least the government kept its head, and acted with admirable discretion; though for so doing the President incurred the virulent animosity of the chief clamorer for war, an animosity which was persistently maintained until it culminated in the incitement of a criminal Anarchist to assassinate the President.

When the explosion occurred, and Blanco learned what it was, it is said that he shed tears and exclaimed, "This is the beginning of the end!" Despite his message to his government, he probably feared that there had been foul play, and he realized what effect, in any case, the incident would have upon Spanish-American[{100}] relations. As for the Cuban revolutionists, both in Cuba and in the United States, they were almost stunned by two emotions. The hideous atrocity of the thing was overwhelming, and they grieved at the loss of the American sailors as though they themselves had been Americans. At the same time they could not be blind nor insensible to the almost certain sequel. They felt that, as Blanco said, it was the beginning of the end, and that now American intervention was practically assured.

The Spanish government proposed a joint investigation into the disaster, but the United States government declined and conducted a thorough investigation of its own, through a board of eminent official experts. The report was that the loss of the ship was not due to any accident or to any negligence on the part of the officers and crew. The first explosion was external to the hull, as if caused by a torpedo or mine, and it caused the second explosion, which was that of the ship's magazines. The Spanish government then conducted an investigation of its own, resulting in a report that both explosions were within the ship and were presumably purely accidental. It may be added that a final examination in after years, when a cofferdam was built about the hulk and it was floated and then taken out to sea and sunk in deep water, fully confirmed the report of the American investigating board.

It is to be recalled that Ramon O. Williams, who had only a little while before retired from the office of American Consul-General at Havana, and was particularly well informed and judicious, earnestly warned the United States government against sending a ship to Havana, because the harbor was very elaborately mined, and there was a bitter and truculent feeling among the Spaniards against the United States; wherefore the danger of some[{101}] untoward occurrence was too great to be incurred without a more pressing necessity than was then apparent. But despite his warning the Maine was sent. She was conducted by a Spanish official pilot to her anchorage at a buoy between Regla and the old custom house. Whether a mine was attached to that buoy or not is unknown, though Mr. Williams was confident that one was. His theory was that some malignant Spanish officer, who had access to the keyboard of the mines, perhaps through connivance with some other fanatic, watched to see the tide swing the ship directly over the mine and then touched the key and caused the explosion. That would account for the enormous hole which was blown in the side of the ship, and which could not have been caused by any little mine or torpedo which might have been floated to the side of the ship, but must have been produced by a very large mine planted deep beneath the hull.

The findings of the American board of investigation were reported officially to the Spanish government, and the President in a message to Congress expressed confidence that Spain would act in the matter according to the dictates of justice, honor and friendship. The Spanish government replied that it would certainly do so, and it presently proposed to submit the whole subject to investigation by impartial experts, and to determination by arbitration. But this proposal was not made until April 10, when so much else had occurred to strain relations between the two countries that it could not be entertained by the United States.

Meantime the Autonomist government in Cuba, with a devotion that was pathetic to behold, persisted in its efforts to justify its existence. An electoral census was taken, though of course it could not cover more than a[{102}] small fraction of the island, and on March 27 an "election" of Cuban Deputies to the Cortes was held. In fact there was no popular voting at all. A list was prepared of eligible candidates, twenty of them being Autonomists and Reformists, or supporters of the government, and ten representing the Constitutionalist opposition. The list was submitted to the Governor-General and approved by him, and the candidates were declared to have been duly elected. Jose Maria Galvez, the president of the Autonomist cabinet, reported to the President of the United States that the new government was satisfactorily performing its functions, and entreated him to give no encouragement to the revolutionists which would militate against its success. In April there was another "election" for members of the two houses of the Insular Legislature. On May 4 that Legislature met, chose Fernando del Casco as President of the Assembly, and confirmed the Autonomist cabinet in its place; and it continued patiently and valiantly to hold sessions, make laws, and act as though it were a real government, exercising real authority over the island, all through the period of the American war with Spain and the practical siege of the island by the American navy. When the Spanish forces yielded and a protocol for peace was signed, on August 12, the Legislature held its last meeting, and was declared dissolved by Blanco in October. The Autonomist Cabinet continued to exercise its functions, at least nominally, until the end of Spanish sovereignty in Cuba.[{103}]

CHAPTER VII

There could be no greater mistake than that which has been too often and too persistently made, in regarding the destruction of the Maine as the cause of American, intervention in Cuba. The declarations of policy which we have already quoted from the messages of President Cleveland and President McKinley, the former fourteen months and the latter two months before that vessel went to Havana, are ample indications of the purpose of the American government to intervene unless there were a satisfactory amelioration of Cuban affairs. But there was no such amelioration, and therefore war was declared. It unquestionably would have been declared just the same, perhaps at a later and perhaps at an earlier date, if there had been no Maine at all.

Beginning before the destruction of the Maine, and accelerated after that event, both sides were preparing for war. Nevertheless diplomatic negotiations continued, chiefly conducted by the American Minister, Stewart L. Woodford, at Madrid. In order to facilitate such negotiations, President McKinley withheld the report on the Maine from Congress for a time. Spain asked that the pacification of Cuba, which the United States was urging, be left to the Autonomist Legislature, which was to meet on May 4. The United States, declaring that it did not want Cuba but did want peace in Cuba, proposed an armistice to begin at once and to last until October 1, itself meantime to act as mediator between the Cubans and Spain. Spain replied that an[{104}] armistice would be granted, to last at the pleasure of the Spanish commander, if the Cubans would ask for it themselves; and that already General Blanco had abandoned the "concentration" system. This was of course regarded as entirely unsatisfactory to the United States, but the peace-loving President McKinley hesitated to report to Congress his dissatisfaction with it.

Meantime the Pope semi-officially expressed to both governments his earnest desire for the maintenance of peace; but to no effect. The German government, strongly sympathizing with Spain and seeking to foment ill-feeling between the United States and Great Britain, had its Ambassador at Washington, Dr. Von Holleben, form a cabal of the chief members of the Diplomatic Corps, to call on the President with what amounted to a suggestion of mediation, maliciously persuading the British Ambassador to act as spokesman of the delegation, in order that any resentment or odium should fall upon him and his country; but the President with admirable temper and resolution declined with thanks all foreign meddling in a controversy which concerned only the United States and Spain. The Spanish government proclaimed on April 10 a suspension of hostilities, in deference to the wishes of the Pope and of the great European powers. It was reported officially to the United States government that this armistice was granted without conditions, though General Blanco's proclamation declared that it was to continue only at the pleasure of the Spanish commanders. The Cuban government, through Maximo Gomez, replied that it had not sought the armistice and would not accept it unless Spain agreed to evacuate Cuba.