It would be superfluous to dwell upon the causes which led Cuba thus promptly and heartily to commit herself to the side of the Allies in the war. They were largely identical with those which impelled other nations to the same course. There was a resolution to vindicate the sanctity of treaties and the majesty of international law. There was an abhorrence of the infamous practices of the German government and the German army. There was resentment against the gross violation of neutral rights of which Germany had been guilty. There was recognition of the grave menace to popular governments the world over which was presented by the voracious and unscrupulous ambitions of Prussian militarism. There was a feeling that as the war had first been directed against two small nations, on the principle that small states had no rights that large ones were bound to respect, it was incumbent upon other small states to protest against that arrogant attitude. There was a desire to show that Cuba, youngest and one of the smallest of the nations, was ready to take her full part as a nation among nations, in war as well as in peace. There was, also, no doubt a legitimate feeling that in this matter it[{349}] would be appropriate for Cuba—though of course under no compulsion—to align herself with the great northern neighbor with whom she sustained such close relations.

At the same time, backed undoubtedly by German money, and as a part of the German propaganda, financial interests, banks and houses of long standing in Cuba, all of which were eventually placed on a black list, exerted a very strong influence among their customers and through their connections, commercial, social and political, in favor of Germany. They did succeed in influencing and directing the editorial policy of some prominent newspapers, but the chief result of their pernicious activities was to get themselves and their sympathizers into trouble. One of the foremost bankers of Havana, where he had lived for many years and was personally much liked and esteemed in society, while not openly espousing the cause of Germany, after Cuba had declared war, was known to be thoroughly in sympathy with Germany. He with over a hundred other Germans was interned, or kept incommunicado, and in his house documents were found demonstrating that he was not only an agent in distributing German propaganda, but also a distributor of funds intended to promote the cause of Germany in Cuba and the West Indies.

Another very strong influence that was exerted in Cuba against the attitude of President Menocal and his government was that of many of the clergy of the Roman Catholic church, who openly spoke to their congregations in favor of Germany and against the cause of the Allies. Nor was the Liberal party by any means as loyal to the Allies as the unanimous vote in Congress might seem to suggest. Many of its members either openly or secretly gave their sympathy and influence to the German side. This was partly because of their inveterate[{350}] opposition to anything advocated by the Conservative government; and partly because of the aid which German interests in Cuba had given, morally, politically and pecuniarily, to the insurrection of José Miguel Gomez in 1917. It was proved in trials in the courts of Cuba, which were held in consequence of the damages wrought by that uprising, that Germans and men of German parentage had conspired to give information to the rebels and to supply them with munitions, and in other ways strove to aid that movement in overthrowing the government. But these seditious and disloyal elements in Cuba were probably no stronger in Cuba than in the United States or other countries.

Cuba did not suffer from incendiarism and similar German outrages as did the United States. On the other hand, the Cuban government was fully as strict as that of the United States in taking possession of German property, and in blacklisting all firms and individuals known to be in sympathy with Germany. All trading of any kind with such parties was forbidden; an arrangement being made by which open accounts with them could be closed. A Custodian of Alien Property was also appointed.

Even before the declaration of war the Cuban government took strenuous means to prevent violations of neutrality. A few weeks before the declaration of war German agents fitted up a steamer in Havana harbor as a commerce-destroying cruiser, and watched for an opportunity to take her out to the high seas. Learning of these plans, the Cuban government stationed a cruiser alongside that vessel, with guns trained upon her, to prevent the purposed escape. Immediately upon the declaration of war the four German ships which were lying interned in Havana harbor were seized by the[{351}] Cuban government. It was found that the German crews had seriously damaged the machinery of the vessels, as they did at New York and elsewhere; but the Cuban government had repairs made and then turned the vessels over to the United States.

In what we may call the non-military activities of the war, Cuba was notably energetic and efficient. There was close cooperation with the United States government in the matter of food conservation and supply. Cuba was naturally looked to for an increased supply of sugar, for which there was great need; and as a result of inquiries by Mr. Hoover, the United States Food Commissioner, as to what the island could do in that respect, the Cuban Department of Agriculture sent the chief of its Bureau of Information, Captain George Reno, to Washington to confer with Mr. Hoover and to formulate plans for the exercise of the most efficient cooperation possible between Cuba and the United States. Recognizing the desirability if not the necessity that Cuba should not only be able to feed herself during the war but should also export as much food as possible, the insular government took steps at once for the increase of food production to the highest attainable degree, and also for the practice of thrift and economy. In consequence Cuba endured cheerfully the same system of wheatless days and meatless days and rationing in various articles of food that prevailed in the United States; with excellent results.

President Menocal also made preparations, at the suggestion of and in conjunction with the United States War Department, for the provision of a detachment of troops for service either in Europe or in any part of the world that the Department at Washington might deem expedient. The best officers of the Cuban army accepted[{352}] an invitation from the military authorities of the United States to receive instruction in modern military tactics, which had been brought out by the war, and Senator Manuel Coronado patriotically gave a sum sufficient for the building of a number of airplanes, to be used by Cuban aviators. Volunteers for this division were easily secured and the instruction began under the direction of Cuban aviators who had been in the service of France. The War Department of the United States notified the Republic of Cuba that owing to the severe exposure of the men to the freezing water and mud of the trenches of Belgium and France, it was doubtful whether soldiers of tropical countries could withstand the strain upon their health necessarily endured during the winter campaign in Europe, intimating that their services would be far more useful in taking the place of other troops stationed in warmer climates, as the Porto Ricans were taking the place of the marines that were stationed in the Panama Canal Zone. This was a rather severe disappointment to General Pujol and the other officers, who were very anxious to take their places in the line of fire.

Noteworthy and most admirable were the achievements of Cuba in the financial operations of the war. Subscriptions were eagerly made to every one of the Liberty Loans, and to the final Victory Loan, with the result that in every case the amount allotted to Cuba was far exceeded. The quota for the third loan was subscribed twice over within five days. In this work not only did banks and commercial houses take part, as a matter of business, but also many private citizens volunteered as canvassers; though indeed the eagerness of people to subscribe made canvassing perfunctory and urging superfluous.

SEÑORA MENOCAL

It is not alone through the felicitous circumstance of her being the wife of President Mario G. Menocal that Señora Marienita Seva de Menocal is entitled to the distinction—never more appropriate than in her case—of being the "first lady of the land." Her title rests equally upon personal charm, the graces of social hospitality, and womanly leadership of the most efficient kind in philanthropic and patriotic endeavor for the advancement of the public welfare and the confirmation of the integrity and promotion of the prosperity of the Republic; while her indefatigable labors in the great war invested her name with affectionate and grateful distinction in the camps and among the peoples of the Allied nations.