In the formal treaty, the result of the meeting, there was incorporated a proposition of peace with England on the basis of the status quo—i.e., Finland and the Danubian principalities for Russia and the deposition of the Bourbons in Spain. Alexander would go no further as regards Austria than the prospect of armed coöperation, if Austria went to war against France. Among the subjects proposed was the marriage of Napoleon with a Russian princess. He had been considering for some time a divorce from Josephine, a plan now resolved upon after the birth of an illegitimate son had convinced him that there was the possibility of a direct heir. Alexander, encouraged by Talleyrand’s advice, refused to make a frank engagement to forward this scheme, saying that to his mother alone belonged the disposition of his sisters’ marriage arrangements.
After the meeting at Erfurt, Napoleon hastened to Spain, where, fighting several successful battles, he restored his brother to his capital at Madrid, and forced an English army under Moore to retreat towards the sea coast. This was in January, 1809. Then Napoleon was obliged to withdraw from Spain because of the threatening attitude of Austria, now firmly resolved on opening hostilities with France. There were also evidences brought him of a plot in Paris, the responsibility for which rested on Talleyrand and Fouché, both long in service under him. It was arranged between them that in case of a reverse or a successful attempt on Napoleon’s life, they were to take charge of the government, giving it a figurehead in the person of Murat, Napoleon’s brother-in-law. Long before he was expected, Napoleon appeared suddenly in Paris, having ridden from the north of Spain in six days. For a while Talleyrand was in disgrace, but acts of personal revenge were forgotten in the preparation for crushing Austria. It was a most distasteful task, for he feared to break up his friendship with Alexander, the necessary result of dismembering the Austrian Empire. He therefore tried to secure the intervention of Russia, but Alexander refused to act at all vigorously.
Hostilities broke out in April, 1809. There was no longer a question of purely dynastic interests in this armed protest of Austria against the Napoleonic system; the army of 310,000 men represented a general patriotic movement of self-defense that had penetrated all classes of society in the Hapsburg dominions. It stood ready to resist the power that was crushing out racial and territorial distinctions; it spoke for a nation in arms conscious of its national right to exist. At home the French Emperor had to deal now with a population that was weary of warfare and satiated with military glory. To meet, on Austrian territory, this massive attack of the Fifth Coalition, which was made up of England, Spain, and Austria, there was no longer the material at hand that had secured for the conqueror the brilliant achievements at Austerlitz and Marengo. His latest army consisted of new recruits and old soldiers from France and of levies from dependent states.
Napoleon thoroughly appreciated the dangers of his position, as his correspondence with his agent at the Russian court shows. He was most urgent in inviting Alexander to play the part of an effective ally by sending troops to Hungary and Galicia, a movement which would have taken Austria between two fires. There were no longer vague promises of reward held out, but specific engagements were offered as an inducement for the Czar to act. “The three crowns of Austria could be separated. When these last-mentioned states have been thus divided, we can diminish the number of our troops, substitute for these general enlistments of troops, which are tending to call even the women under arms, a small number of regular troops and so change to the system of small armies, as introduced by the late King of Prussia (Frederick II). Our barracks can become poor-houses and the conscripts can stick to their tillage. Even if it is wished after the conquest to guarantee the integrity of the monarchy, I will agree to it provided there is a complete disarmament.”
Alexander showed a lack of interest in these proposals; on the other hand, he let the Austrian government know that he hoped they would be successful, promising at the same time that his alliance with the French would be interpreted so formally, that the Austrians would have nothing to fear from Russian armies. Yet in spite of these diplomatic discouragements Napoleon lost none of his technical skill in the campaign that followed. In five days (April 19-23, 1809) with an army of 120,000 men, though the main Austrian army consisted of 175,000, he took 40,000 prisoners and 100 pieces of artillery. He divided the enemy’s forces into separate divisions, both of which were defeated, and so he opened up the road to Vienna. But the close of the campaign was obstinately contested by the Austrian commander, the Archduke Charles. In the neighborhood of the Austrian capital there were desperate engagements at Aspern and Essling (May 21-22). For a time Napoleon’s lieutenants, Masséna and Lannes, were hard pressed near the island of Lobau in the Danube. The French advance was checked thirteen times; Essling was taken and retaken, and, according to general opinion, the primary result of this serious contest was only a repetition of Eylau.
Reinforcements were summoned from all sides; Lobau was transformed into a strong citadel with impregnable redoubts to insure the passage of the river. In July, Napoleon had under him 150,000 men and 450 cannon. On the 5th and 6th of the month a decisive battle was fought at Wagram, according to a carefully planned program. The Austrians were first of all outnumbered; the whole French army was so dispersed and concentrated over a distance of not more than four miles that it could be directly under the Emperor’s eyes. On the other hand, the Austrians were scattered, had no reserves at hand, and orders had to be given in writing. Successful as was Napoleon’s strategy, which contained his favorite expedient of breaking the enemy’s center by an overwhelmingly strong concentrated attack on the weakest point, it was plain to him that there was no longer in his army the cohesive action that had made the earlier victories so complete. The battle cost from 20,000 to 25,000 men on each side. “These are no longer the soldiers of Austerlitz,” he explained; and he showed his lack of confidence by giving up bayonet charges and trusting to artillery fire to break up his opponents’ lines.
The Austrian archduke withdrew from the field in good order, but Napoleon had no desire to pursue and force another engagement in the interior of the country. He trusted to the general influence abroad of the success at Wagram, and was glad to sign a treaty of peace at Vienna on the 14th of October, 1809, by which Austria was denuded of large sections of territory, that were taken to reward the fidelity of the Bavarians and Poles to their French allies. Under this reorganization Austria occupied a territory smaller than that of pre-revolutionary France. She was required to reduce her army to 150,000 men and to pay an indemnity of $17,000,000. Russia’s share of the spoil was measured by her apathetic position as an ally. There was an addition of territory containing a population of 400,000, but this was a small gain that by no means outweighed the favor shown to the Poles by the annexation of western Galicia to the grand duchy of Warsaw. Annexed to the French Empire were Fiume, Trieste, Croatia, Carniola, and a part of Carinthia, so that Napoleon’s eastern dominions extended practically without a break in their eastern border from the mouth of the Cattaro to Dantzic. Austria seemed to have become as much a satellite of Napoleon’s empire as Holland or Italy.
VII
THE BEGINNING OF THE END
During the course of the contest with Austria, the war in the Iberian peninsula went on in a prolonged series of obstinate campaigns between Napoleon’s marshals and an allied force composed of English, Portuguese, and Spanish contingents. Even after the victory of Wagram the Spaniards held on in the face of several disasters; and helped by the English fleet they managed to retain a foothold in Cadiz. The temper of the population was judged to be so hostile that the French army of occupation was raised to the enormous number of 270,000 and the whole country was placed under martial law. The King, Napoleon’s brother Joseph, was only the nominal executive; he aptly called himself the porter of the Madrid hospitals. As the country was harassed with guerrilla warfare, and as the Cortes refused to recognize Joseph as their sovereign, Napoleon threatened to annex the whole kingdom to France.
In Portugal, a French army under Masséna failed to win a decisive victory. It was met by an Anglo-Portuguese force under Wellington, who so strongly intrenched himself at Torres Vedras that Masséna finally withdrew, followed by the English. In his retreat the French general was unable to change his fortune, and the effort to occupy Portugal failed. Masséna was then superseded in his command. Later on the French cause was much injured by the mutual jealousies of the commanders of the various army corps, who, if they had zealously coöperated, might, with the superior forces at their command, have driven Wellington back to the sea coast. By the year 1812, the French armies were stale, and although there were 230,000 French soldiers in the peninsula, Wellington was allowed to invade Spain with an army of only 60,000 men.