Before the time for the consular elections the extreme wing of the popular party appeared to have got out of hand. They selected for their candidate Catiline, a leading spirit among the criminal and corrupt order of Roman society, who had contested the election before and had been defeated. Cæsar had already energetically supported Catiline, but in the latter’s second attempt to be elected Consul, it seems clear that Cæsar’s support was at best half-hearted. Cæsar had come to know the reckless nature of Catiline’s program, with its appeal for a general canceling of debts and its general attack on all capitalistic interests. The scheme, however, did win the approval of the discontented classes, and the occasion for carrying it through was favorable, because Pompeius, the only man with a military force adequate to act forcibly on behalf of the senatorial oligarchy, was absent still in the East. It was understood that Catiline, if he obtained office, would use it to inaugurate a social revolution; if he were defeated, it was planned that violent methods should be used to force a change of government on the oligarchy. An army was to be collected in Italy, the city was to be set on fire, and in the confusion the reins of government would be taken by Catiline and his followers.
The plot was shrewdly defeated by Cicero, who was given by the Senate unlimited powers, after a state of siege had been proclaimed. Catiline escaped from the city, taking refuge with his army, which had been collected near Florence; but several of the other conspirators were taken prisoners in Rome, and the question of their fate was brought up before the Senate. Cæsar had by report been implicated in the conspiracy, but Cicero refused to follow up these suspicions. Accordingly, in the senatorial debate, Cæsar appeared rather in the light of a cross bench statesman than as a firm supporter of the revolutionary leader.
It must be remembered that the Senate had no right to condemn a man to death or to banishment. A general in the field could inflict the death sentence without appeal, but no magistrate within the precincts of the city could do so; there was an appeal from his decision to the people legally assembled. Cicero wished to get from the Senate an authoritative opinion, as to whether under their previous decree of martial law he could exercise in the city the summary rights allowed to a general in the field. Cæsar spoke after the consular members of the Senate, all of whom had declared for the administration of the extreme penalty. He opposed it in a careful and statesmanlike speech, using his opportunity for putting himself on record as the upholder of the democratic view of the constitution.
As no verbal report of any other of Cæsar’s speeches has come down to us, it is interesting to give an extract from Sallust’s version, which may be taken as an accurate outline, for, owing to Cicero’s personal interest in the matter, the whole proceedings of the Senate during this crucial debate were taken down in shorthand. After deprecating the use of rhetoric as likely to prejudice the judgment, and remarking that eloquent pictures of the horrors of war and rebellion were alien to the matter in hand, Cæsar’s words were: “And indeed, for the crimes we have to deal with, no penalty is in itself too cruel; death at least cannot be so, for it puts an end to the misery of this life and brings no torment in another. But the penalty will be looked on as cruel, simply because it is unconstitutional. It has been over and over again forbidden by express legislation to scourge or kill a citizen without trial. You do not propose to scourge these men, presumably because the law forbids it. Why, then, do you propose to put them to death? Both penalties are equally illegal. I must remind you also of the precedent your action will create. Once place such a power as you claim in the hands of a government and you cannot put a limit on its use; it may be and will be used against good and bad alike, as it was by the Thirty at Athens and in our own recollection by Sulla. I do not fear this now or with Cicero as Consul; but I will not answer for the power of the sword in the hands of future Consuls. Let us abide by the law and not seek in a panic to overrule it. My advice is, not indeed that we let these men go, and thus increase the resources of Catiline, but that we commit them for life to close custody in the largest Italian towns, securing them by holding over each town the heaviest possible penalty in case they should escape. And I further propose that we pass a decree embodying our opinion that no proposal touching them shall be made henceforth either in Senate or assembly; and that disregard of the decree shall be treated by the Senate as high treason against the state.”
The hint of a reaction was not an oratorical commonplace; it was suggested by the recent history of Rome itself, and proved most effective, for even Cicero’s own brother, Quintus, who followed Cæsar, expressed his agreement with him. Cicero himself, in his reply, took a rather wavering position, paying special attention to the practical proposals of Cæsar, which so many modern historians have decided to be weak and specious. But these have forgotten that, even if Cæsar’s plans for keeping the prisoners as perpetual ticket-of-leave men in various Italian communities offered no effective guarantee that they would not escape, there was no especial reason for fearing their presence again in Rome after Catiline and his army had been destroyed. None of the conspirators was a man of first-rate ability, and besides, the experience of unsuccessful conspiracy has almost as strong an educational effect as imprisonment. Many Paris communards settled down as peaceful citizens.
Cicero made an unfortunate experiment at this juncture. The Senate listened readily to the summary appeals for justice to traitors made by Cato, but Cicero’s execution of the Catilinarians was stored up against him in the popular mind, and much of the good he might have done in his political career was frustrated by his weakness in identifying himself with the blind passion of the reactionary party. For the moment, however, Cicero carried the people with him; they lost their heads, alarmed by the wild tales of conflagration and massacre. Cæsar’s life was in danger, because he had pleaded for a policy of moderation, and it must be allowed that the words of his speech did not represent a pose. The principles he stood for in 63 he adhered to after the civil wars were over, when a word from him might have initiated a proscription after the Sullan model.
II
ALLIANCE WITH POMPEIUS AND CRASSUS
The year following the suppression of the Catiline conspiracy was one of uncertainty. Pompeius was returning home after his six years’ stay in the East. The question was whether he would play the rôle of a new Sulla. It seems generally to have been expected that he would. There was no army in Italy strong enough to resist his will; certainly the force which had overcome Catiline near Fiesole was quite unequal to such a work. The question was, who were to be his friends and what policy would he pursue. One of the general’s emissaries appeared in Rome, and made it clear that Pompeius could not be used as a mere tool of the senatorial party. Cicero made tactless overtures to secure his favor, and met with a cold reception.
Cæsar showed more diplomacy, paying the general the compliment of requesting him to finish the Capitoline temple, one of the chief shrines of the civic religion of Rome. This duty came within Cæsar’s province as Pontifex Maximus, and besides as Prætor for this year he held a position which made his influence useful to the returning general. Both the scheme for the restoration of the temple and a measure for recalling Pompeius to the city, which was supported by Cæsar, were opposed by the Senate, and the discussion led to such violence that the Senate suspended Cæsar from his functions as magistrate, and only restored him when he had personally intervened to quiet the passions of the mob.
Though Cæsar’s year of office was over (61 B.C.), and the time had come for him to administer Spain as Proprætor, that being the province assigned him, he delayed his departure. There were many grounds for this course. Pompeius had been keeping his own counsel as to his future plans, and required watching. Cæsar had difficulties with his creditors; he had long been heavily in debt, and his year of office, with its sensational political activities, must have severely drained his resources.