The world's leading conquerors

by Wilson Lloyd Bevan

The passage of the agrarian democratic measure, as it stood, was undertaken to fulfil engagements made with Pompeius, whose troops were especially concerned in this distribution of lands. Equally personal were the measures passed by the people to regularize the situation of the territories in the East, where Pompeius, after his conquests, had acted on his own initiative in making treaties, imposing taxation, and settling the terms of local administration. The personal relations between the two triumvirs were now drawn closer by the marriage of Cæsar’s daughter Julia to Pompeius; she was at this time twenty-two years old, and as long as she lived she prevented any open rupture between her husband and her father.

In another legislative enactment Cæsar attested his loyal interpretation of the triumvirate compact rather than his desire to forward the public interests of the state. Crassus desired that the farmers of the taxes in the province of Asia should be relieved from the contract which they had made with the government. It was a shady piece of business; even Cicero, who was not apt to be critical where capitalistic interests were involved, called the scheme of Crassus shameful. It was defeated in the Senate by the determined efforts of Cato. The measure was afterwards jammed through the popular assembly in a form which relieved the taxgatherers of one-third of their financial burden.

This was really a shrewd move to separate from the senatorial party the whole mercantile class, who normally acted solidly with them. They now looked upon the triumvirate combination as favorable to their interests, and so deprived the Senate of a solid support at a time when that body needed every element of the population in its unequal struggle with the triumvirs.

Much more worthy than this act of special legislation was a measure for dealing with extortion on the part of provincial administrators. The Roman governors and their subordinates treated the provinces as legitimate spoil, by which they could balance the large amounts spent at home in political corruption. This system offered the most unwholesome example of ring rule. Every man in public life had a good chance of ruling a province at some time in his career, and there was no inducement to touch a well-tried system which had proved profitable to all concerned.

Cæsar’s law was a blanket measure, evidently drawn with great intelligence and showing the familiarity of an ex-provincial official with the concrete needs of the situation. It extended the jurisdiction of existing courts for cases of provincial extortion, in regard to the definition of the crime, the persons liable, and the penalties to be imposed. All the methods of extortion were brought within the scope of this act. The governor and his official staff were held liable, and the punishment, hitherto chiefly imposed by damages, was increased to deprivation of the right to bequeath property, and in some cases expulsion from the Senate and exile were inflicted on offending officials.

Good as this legislation was, it contained a political element which prevented it from meeting the whole situation of provincial misrule. The triumvirate, we have seen, made a distinct bid for the favor of the mercantile classes when the previous bill was passed relieving the taxgatherers of Asia from the full extent of their contract. This new law only concerned the administration of senatorial officials; it did not put an end to extortion, nor did it stop the avenues of public corruption, because the financiers, the men who gathered about the official ruling class, were left to ply their nefarious trade unmolested.

But Cæsar’s consulship broke the power of the senatorial aristocracy, which had been on the decline ever since the death of Sulla. By his alliance with Pompeius and Crassus a continuity of policy was secured, under which the old republican principle that cessation of office meant also cessation of power came to an end. The main business at the close of his year of service as Consul was to arrange that the system he had started should continue to work smoothly. The two candidates for the consulship were pledged supporters of the triumvirate. An even more important tool was the active and unscrupulous Clodius, who had made himself notorious because of the Bona Dea scandal. He was made a Tribune, and as such became the local agent in Rome of the triumvirs’ interests. He signalized his entrance into office by abolishing the small payment still exacted on the state distribution of grain to the people, and he organized the masses into guilds, each under a district leader, so that the populace could be controlled and could be worked together either as a political machine or as a mob, whether to vote or to do deeds of violence according to the password of their leader.

The Senate, in arranging the assignment of provinces in B.C. 59, had tried to diminish Cæsar’s influence by giving him for his work as Proconsul the duty of attending to the internal condition of Italy. This meant that he would have no military force at his command, and that he would be expected to devote himself to the supervision of roads and public works. The senatorial arrangement for rendering their chief opponent innocuous was simply an invitation to him to treat it as non-existing. It was proposed to set the Senate’s action aside and to give Cisalpine Gaul and the adjoining province of Illyria to Cæsar for a period of five years.

When the new measure was before the popular assembly, the Senate, under pressure from Pompeius, voted that in addition to Cisalpine Gaul in the Celtic region on the Italian side of the Alps, the Gallic province, with an ample army and suitable staff, should be assigned to Cæsar. It was known that there was restlessness among the Gauls and the Germans, who were on the borders of the prosperous Roman province in southern Gaul along the lower Rhone. This was, of course, an opportunity for real proconsular duty, but probably no one who voted for the assignment realized the possibilities of the command which now fell into Cæsar’s hand.

But before setting out for his province (58 B.C.), Cæsar remained near at hand to supervise Clodius’ arrangements for muzzling the Senate; it was not safe for the new Proconsul to absent himself from Rome until affairs there had been brought so under control that there would be no chance of a senatorial reactionary movement. Clodius first abolished the use of indefinitely prolonged obstruction, a practice involved in the religious privilege of “watching the heavens” for evil omens, and a method of delay normally used to prevent the assemblies of the people from being held. The next step was to hinder the Censors from making a combination to remove from the Senate partisans of Cæsar. This purpose was secured by another law of Clodius that made it impossible for the Censor to strike from the roll of the Senate anyone, except on a formal accusation, and no member could be removed even then unless both Censors acted together.