Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.
Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.: September 15, 1886.
Dear Lord Salisbury,—Another desperate night in the H. of C. You may imagine how bad was the Irish conduct when Beach’s last words to me were: ‘I am now all for a strong Clôture.’ ...
M. de Staal has just been to see me. He declaimed against White.... I said that in view of our occupation of Egypt it was necessary that we should have a representative at Constantinople of character and resolution. He said the Bulgarians had done something or other rude to the Emperor’s portrait at Sofia. He spoke of the great difficulty Russia had in coming to an understanding with Austria on account of the Hungarians, who thought of nothing but ‘49.’ He tried to ascertain my views as to our interests in the Balkan territories; my reply was (speaking only for myself) that our chief interests were Egypt and India, and that anything which affected our interests in those countries would necessitate very strong action on our part. Speaking generally, I said that with Ireland on our hands, our foreign policy, except under great pressure, would naturally be pacific. He asked about the position of the Government. I told him that Gladstone was hopelessly out of it, and was no longer young enough to get into it again; that his principal supporters were hopelessly discredited and divided; that Hartington possessed great balancing influence, but could not look to forming a Government himself; that whether this particular Government lasted or no, power was with the Conservative party, whose political organisation and strength were increasing and improving every day; that such a fact as London returning forty-three Conservatives against four Gladstonians ought to have great weight with him in appreciating the Conservative position.
Finally, I hinted at an understanding with Russia by which she should give us real support in Egypt, abandon her pressure upon Afghanistan, in which case she might settle the Balkan matters as she would—or, rather, as she could!
Yours most sincerely,
Randolph S. Churchill.
A few days later Lord Salisbury was able to retire to his villa near Dieppe, although the situation still continued critical and obscure. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, delighted by Lord Salisbury’s proposal to change the British Agent at Sofia, seems to have made great efforts to bring his opinions nearer to those of his chief. On the 23rd he reports an interview with Count Hatzfeldt. ‘I told him that I had been thinking much over what had passed between us about the East of Europe, and that I had come to this conclusion as a member of the House of Commons and from a House of Commons point of view: Any anti-Russian policy which involved England taking the lead ostensibly on the side of Turkey, either about Bulgaria or even Constantinople, would probably place the Unionist party in great peril, might fail to receive the support of the constituencies, and would be savagely assaulted. An anti-Russian policy, however, in which Austria took the lead supported by Germany, we could, I thought, well fall in with, and hold our own easily in the House of Commons. He said: ‘That is all very well; but what will be wanting, will be Germany’s support of Austria. Our eyes are riveted on France.’ I said, if that was really so, of course we could not play; but that it occurred to me that it was not impossible that if Germany and Austria took the lead against Russian advance and in defence of Bulgarian independence, and we followed and joined loyally and thoroughly, I thought that would seem to entail logically action on our part, diplomatic or otherwise, against France if she tried to be nasty. He seemed much interested by this, and I impressed upon him at parting not to forget that it must be to Germany’s interest that the Unionist party and the Government should endure and remain strong; that foreign policy on our part which followed the lead of Germany and Austria would not try that strength too high, and might be carried far; but that foreign policy against Russia in the East of Europe which left the initiative to England would be a policy too dangerous, seeing the other great interests we had to defend, for us to contemplate. I told him these were mere House of Commons views, for his own private information for whatever they were worth, and that he was not to consider them in any other light.
‘I don’t know whether you will think this expression shows any change of views from what I have expressed to you recently. I do not think it does really....’
‘If Russia attacked Constantinople,’ wrote the Prime Minister in a letter approving generally of this discourse, ‘and all the other Powers refused to intervene, I am rather disposed to the idea that we should have to act in the Dardanelles; but I hope the contingency is too improbable to require us to trouble about it.’ The Chancellor of the Exchequer replied meekly that he would be quite agreeable to ‘a piratical seizure of Gallipoli.’ ‘There is,’ he adds, ‘a practical flavour about such a step which would commend it to the most Radical and peace-loving House of Commons.’ Lord Salisbury detected a flavour of levity in this answer.
‘You are naturally sarcastic,’ he wrote on the 28th, ‘on my Dardanelles, and I hope the matter will not come up in our time. But the possession by Russia of Constantinople will be an awkward piece of news for the Minister who receives it. The prestige effect on the Asiatic populations will be enormous, and I pity the English party that has this item on their record. They will share the fate of Lord North’s party.