My dear Randolph,—I did not get your note of yesterday till I got to town in the afternoon—and then it was too late to catch you. I saw Beach, however, and ... led him to tell me what had passed with Ritchie. It appears that the latter has abandoned the ground plan which he told me in September he was fully resolved on—namely, that if owners are to have half the taxation they should have half the representation too. This, as you remember, was a principle for which Beach contended vigorously last winter—and which was generally accepted by the then Cabinet. Beach thinks the abandonment of it would have specially injurious influences in Ireland.
For the rest, I fully see all the difficulties of our position. The Tory party is composed of very varying elements, and there is merely trouble and vexation of spirit in trying to make them work together. I think the ‘classes and the dependents of class’ are the strongest ingredients in our composition, but we have so to conduct our legislation that we shall give some satisfaction to both classes and masses. This is specially difficult with the classes—because all legislation is rather unwelcome to them, as tending to disturb a state of things with which they are satisfied. It is evident, therefore, that we must work at less speed and at a lower temperature than our opponents. Our Bills must be tentative and cautious, not sweeping and dramatic. But I believe that with patience, feeling our way as we go, we may get the one element to concede and the other to forbear. The opposite course is to produce drastic, symmetrical measures, hitting the ‘classes’ hard, and consequently dispensing with their support, but trusting to public meetings and the democratic forces generally to carry you through. I think such a policy will fail. I do not mean that the ‘classes’ will join issue with you on one of the measures which hits them hard, and beat you on that. That is not the way they fight. They will select some other matter on which they can appeal to prejudice, and on which they think the masses will be indifferent; and on that they will upset you. My counsel therefore is strongly against this alternative; and it would be the same if I had no interest in the matter, and was merely an observer outside the Ministry advising you. Your rôle should be rather that of a diplomatist trying to bring the opposed sections of the party together, and not that of a whip trying to keep the slugs up to the collar....
Yours very truly,
Salisbury.
Yet the first session of a Parliament and the first year of an Administration are the most critical. Men are not really bound together in a Government until they have made mistakes in common and defended each other’s failures; and it is possible that, unless definite and urgent disagreements had arisen, the evil hour might have been long averted. But Lord Randolph Churchill was not only responsible for the House of Commons; he was responsible for national finance. And from the Treasury a second set of questions necessarily involving sharp differences with his colleagues now began to arrive.
The reader will not fail to recognise how vital a definite economy was to the character and success of Lord Randolph Churchill’s Budget. The reduction of the Sinking Fund and of taxation generally could only be defended in association with a lower expenditure. Circumstances now within our knowledge seem to show that the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s margin was larger than he had dared to expect. But so many novel sources of revenue, tapped for the first time, introduced uncertain factors into his calculations. His public declarations before the general election had been unmistakable. He was pledged to the hilt in the cause of economy, and the actual conditions fortified his sentiments. Even before the Bradford meeting, the tension was apparent.
Mr. Smith to Lord Randolph Churchill.
Confidential.
Greenlands, Henley-on-Thames: October 24.
My dear R. C.,—I shall probably see you in Arlington Street to-morrow, but I may not have an opportunity of begging you not to indicate too precisely at Bradford the results you may anticipate from economies in army administration. I shall do everything I can in that direction, but I am anxious, as you must be, as to the aspect of affairs, and I think the policy you are anxious to carry out is best supported by the organisation of the strength we possess than by allowing the present unready condition to continue.
As to this I must have a serious talk with you when you come back from Bradford. I contemplate method, management, arrangement—rather than large present expenditure; but, unless you see your way through the difficulties in Turkey and as to Egypt easily and peaceably, it would be unwise, I think, to announce reductions in military Budgets which would be interpreted, as the Paris Temps suggests, as presaging a withdrawal of England from the positions she has taken up. It may be necessary to take such a course, but it can only be done after the most grave deliberation: it almost involves a recognition of the fact that we are no longer one of the Great Powers.