One of his battle cruisers, the Indomitable, had to coal. He sent her to Biserta. This was an important decision. Considering that he believed that the Goeben was at Messina, and that he intended himself to watch to the Northward with two battle cruisers, some authorities have held that it would have been a sensible precaution to let this third ship coal at Malta, where facilities were certain and instant, and whence she could so easily move to close the Southern exit from Messina, or join Rear-Admiral Troubridge in the mouth of the Adriatic, as that officer had been led to expect.[[38]] By sending the Indomitable to coal at Malta, he could have placed two battle cruisers watching the Northern exit and one at the Southern. But the Commander-in-Chief decided to keep all three battle cruisers together in his own hand and to patrol off the Western end of Sicily between Sardinia and Biserta. The Southern exit was therefore left completely open to the Goeben: and a severe action was reserved for Rear-Admiral Troubridge if, as seemed likely, she ran up the Adriatic.
At 5 p.m. on the 5th Sir Berkeley Milne received the signal sent by the Gloucester at 3.35 p.m. reporting the presence of the Goeben at Messina. Here was certain confirmation of his belief. He was at this moment about 100 miles West of Sicily. He continued however to cruise with his two ships between Sicily and Sardinia, and as late as the evening of August 6, his orders to the Indomitable were still to join him thereabouts. He did this because he considered that placing all three battle cruisers in this position was his surest way of carrying out the instructions of the Admiralty telegram of July 30 about aiding the French in the transport of their African army. That it was one method of carrying out these orders cannot be disputed, and the Admiral has set out in his book the reasons which led him to adopt it. The superior speed of the Goeben made it necessary, he states, if he were to intercept her, that he should stand a long way off and have timely notice of her approach. To place his whole force in this way between her and the French transports was, he argues, the best chance of catching the Goeben if she tried to attack them. He reported his intended dispositions late on the 4th to the Admiralty, whose only comment upon them was, ‘Watch over the Adriatic should be maintained for the double purpose of preventing the Austrians from coming out or the Germans from entering.’ The exceedingly prompt manner in which the Goeben had been found, although in the open sea, on the 4th had given the Admiralty the feeling that the Admiral on the spot had a grip of the situation and needed no further directions.
Sir Berkeley Milne had not, however, succeeded in communicating with the French Admiral, although he had made repeated attempts by wireless and had sent the Dublin to Biserta with a letter. He did not know where the French Fleet or the French transports were. He did not tell the Admiralty this. The Admiralty for their part, after the general telegram of August 4 enjoining immediate consultation with the French, assumed that the two Commanders-in-Chief in the Mediterranean were acting in concert. They did not therefore ask the French for any information, nor was any volunteered by the French Admiralty. Any inquiry addressed to Paris would have elicited the fact that the French had changed their plans and that no transports were yet at sea. All parties were on this point to some extent in fault.
Meanwhile the British Ambassador in Rome was endeavouring to tell the Admiralty as soon as the pressure on the wires allowed that the Goeben was at Messina. The news did not reach London till 6 p.m. on August 5. The Admiralty passed it without comment, though with some delay, to Sir Berkeley Milne, who already knew from other sources. It is a fair criticism on the Admiralty that they did not immediately they knew the Goeben was at Messina authorise the British ships to follow her into the Straits. The point was not put to me either by the First Sea Lord or the Chief of the Staff, and as I had not myself been concerned in initiating or drafting the telegram about rigidly respecting Italian neutrality, it was not specially in my mind. Had it been put to me I should at once have consented. This was no petty incident and the prize was well worth the risk of vexing the Italians. In fact, permission to chase through the Straits was given by the Admiralty unasked to Sir Berkeley Milne, as soon as it was realised that the Goeben was escaping unblocked to the Southward. It was then too late.
In pursuance of the orders he had received from Germany, Admiral Souchon with the Goeben and Breslau, having at length completed coaling and made his will, steamed out of Messina harbour at 5 p.m. on August 6, cleared for action and with his bands playing. He no doubt expected to encounter at least one and possibly two of the British battle cruisers as soon as he was outside territorial waters. In view of the fact that, as he was aware, his position must have been accurately known to the British Commander-in-Chief for many hours, this assumption was not unreasonable. Unhappily, as has been described, every one of the three British battle cruisers was otherwise engaged. Thus when the German Admiral rounded the Southern point of Italy and turned Eastward, the only three antagonists whose combination of power and speed he had to dread were already far astern.
Still there was the British armoured cruiser squadron watching the Adriatic. This squadron consisted of four good ships, viz. Defence, Warrior, Duke of Edinburgh and Black Prince. It was commanded by Rear-Admiral Troubridge, who had also under his orders eight destroyers, and was being joined by the light cruiser Dublin and two more destroyers from Malta. It is necessary to restate the facts of this officer’s action.
On the assumption—which was dominant—that the Goeben would make for Pola, Admiral Troubridge was well placed for meeting her. It was not until he heard from the Gloucester that she had turned South and was persistently steering on a South-Easterly course that any new decision was required from him. He received no orders to quit his station from Sir Berkeley Milne. He was in constant hope of receiving a battle cruiser. But Admiral Troubridge decided to act on his own responsibility. Eight minutes after midnight of August 6 (i.e. 0.08, August 7) he gave orders to his four cruisers and his eight destroyers to steam Southward at full speed for the purpose of intercepting the Goeben. He also signalled to the Dublin (Captain John Kelly) at that moment coming from Malta to join him with the two extra destroyers, to head her off. He reported his decision to the Commander-in-Chief. Thus at midnight August 6–7 sixteen British vessels were converging upon the Goeben and Breslau and were in positions from which they could hardly fail to intercept the enemy shortly after daylight. At 3.50 a.m., however, after further reflection and having received no orders or reply from Sir Berkeley Milne, Admiral Troubridge became convinced that he could not hope to engage the Goeben under the advantageous conditions of the half light of dawn, and that in an action fought in broad waters in full daylight, his four ships would be sunk one after another by the Goeben, who all the time would keep outside the range—16,000 yards—of the British 9.2–inch guns. This is thought by some naval officers to be an extreme view. The limited ammunition of the Goeben would have had to have been wonderfully employed to have sunk all four British armoured cruisers seriatim at this long range.[[39]] Moreover, if the Goeben and Breslau had become involved in an action, it is hard to believe that none of the sixteen British cruisers and destroyers which were available could have closed in upon them and attacked them with gun or torpedo. All the destroyers were capable of reaching the enemy and could have found their opportunity to attack. It would have been indeed a prodigious feat on the part of the Germans to dispose of so many antagonists at once. However, the Admiral came to the conclusion that the Goeben was ‘a superior force’ which by his instructions, passed to him by the Commander-in-Chief, he was not to engage. And in this conclusion he has been sustained by a British naval court-martial.
He thereupon desisted from his attempt to intercept the Goeben, turned his ships and destroyers and entered the harbour of Zante about 10 a.m. preparatory to resuming his watch in the Adriatic. The Dublin and her two destroyers having asked and been refused permission to make a daylight attack, had attempted to intercept the Goeben before dawn, but did not succeed in finding her in the darkness.
By 6 o’clock therefore on the morning of August 7 the Goeben, already the fastest capital unit in the Mediterranean, was steaming on an unobstructed course for the Dardanelles, carrying with her for the peoples of the East and Middle East more slaughter, more misery and more ruin than has ever before been borne within the compass of a ship.
Thus of all the British vessels which were or could have been brought within effective distance, none did anything useful excepting only the two light cruisers Dublin and Gloucester, commanded, as it happened, by two brothers. The Dublin (Captain John Kelly) as we have seen did all in her power to place herself athwart the enemy’s course and to fight him by night or day; and the Gloucester (Captain W. A. Howard Kelly) hung on to the heels of the Goeben till late in the afternoon, in extreme danger and with the utmost tenacity, and only relinquished the chase under the direct orders of the Commander-in-Chief.