The position in the Pacific was also complicated.
When I went to the Admiralty at the end of 1911, arrangements were made to form the China squadron of the Defence, the Minotaur, and an armoured cruiser of the County class. These two first-named ships were in themselves a very satisfactory disposition against the powerful German armoured cruisers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. They were approximately equal to the Germans in modernity, size and speed, but of heavier metal, firing a broadside of 2,520 pounds as against 1,725 pounds of their rivals.
But as time passed and the pressure upon us grew more severe, we had in 1913 to bring one of these ships (Defence) back to the Mediterranean. In order to fill the gap with the least possible inroad upon our home strength, Prince Louis being First Sea Lord, we devised a frugal scheme by which the Triumph—one of the two battleships which had been built for and bought from Chili to prevent their falling into Russian hands at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War—was made to serve as a depot ship manned on mobilisation from the crews of the river gunboats on the Yangtse and the West River. Her sister (the Swiftsure) shortly afterwards became the flagship in the East Indies. These two ships had the good speed for battleships of their date of 20·1 knots. They carried four 10–inch and no less than fourteen 7·5–inch guns. They were not heavily armoured, and according to our ideas they were a compromise between the battleship and the armoured cruiser. Differing in conception at many points from the standard types of the Royal Navy, these vessels did not fit homogeneously into any of our battle squadrons, and were conveniently employed on special duties. Without the Triumph Admiral Jerram’s squadron (Minotaur and Hampshire with the light cruiser Yarmouth) would on the outbreak of war have had little or no margin, though the Minotaur was the strongest of all our armoured cruisers. But once the Triumph was mobilised, our superiority, except in speed, was overwhelming, and we could afford to see how greater matters went at home before deciding whether to reinforce the China station or not.
In the first hours of the crisis, my thoughts had turned to the China station. As early as the 28th July I proposed to the First Sea Lord the discreet mobilisation of the Triumph and the concentration of the China squadron upon her; and this was accordingly effected in good time. Five thousand miles to the southward was the Australian squadron, consisting of the battle-cruiser Australia, and the two excellent modern light cruisers Sydney and Melbourne. The Australia by herself could, of course, defeat the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, though by running different ways one of the pair could have escaped destruction. Our last look round the oceans before the fateful signal, left us therefore in no immediate anxiety about the Pacific.
On the outbreak of war the French armoured cruisers Montcalm and Dupleix and the Russian light cruisers Askold and Zemchug, in the Far East, were placed under British command, thus sensibly increasing our predominance. A few days later an event of the greatest importance occurred. The attitude of Japan towards Germany suddenly became one of fierce menace. No clause in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty entitled us to invoke the assistance of Japan. But it became evident before the war had lasted a week that the Japanese nation had not forgotten the circumstances and influences under which they had been forced, at the end of the Chinese War, to quit Port Arthur. They now showed themselves resolved to extirpate all German authority and interests in the Far East. On the 15th, Japan addressed an ultimatum to Germany demanding within seven days the unconditional surrender of the German naval base Tsing Tau [Kiaochau], couching this demand in the very phrases in which nineteen years before they had been summoned to leave Port Arthur at the instance of Germany. In reply the German Emperor commanded his servants to resist to the end; and here, as almost in every other place where Germans found themselves isolated in the face of overwhelming force, he was obeyed with constancy.
The advent of Japan into the war enabled us to use our China squadron to better advantage in other theatres. The Newcastle was ordered across the Pacific, where our two old sloops (the Algerine and Shearwater) were in jeopardy from the German light cruiser Leipzig. The Triumph was sent to participate with a small British contingent in the Japanese attack upon the fortress of Tsing Tau. General arrangements were made by the British and Japanese Admiralties whereby responsibility for the whole of the Northern Pacific, except the Canadian Coast, was assumed by Japan.
The table following sets forth the rival forces in the western Pacific at the outbreak of war. Even without the ships employed by Japan or the great Japanese reserves which lay behind them, the superior strength of the Allies was overwhelming. But the game the two sides had to play was by no means as unequal as it looked. It was indeed the old game of Fox and Geese. The two powerful German cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, with their two light cruisers, formed a modern squadron fast and formidable in character. Our battle-cruiser Australia could catch them and could fight them single-handed. The Minotaur and the Hampshire could just catch them and, as we held, could fight them with good prospects of success; but it would be a hard fought action. If the Triumph were added to Minotaur and Hampshire, there was no risk at all in the fight but almost insuperable difficulty in bringing the enemy to action. Among the light cruisers, the Yarmouth, Melbourne, Sydney and the Japanese Chikuma could both catch and kill Emden or Nürnberg. Of our older light cruisers Fox and Encounter could have fought Emden or Nürnberg with a chance of killing or at least of crippling them before being killed: but neither was fast enough to catch them. Our remaining cruisers could only be used in combination with stronger vessels. With our forces aided by two French and two Russian ships and by the Japanese to the extent which will be described, the Admiralty had to protect all the expeditions, convoys and trade in the Pacific. To wit—
| WARSHIPS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC[[55]] | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| August to October, 1914 | |||||
| German. | British. | Japanese.[[56]] | French. | Russian. | |
| Battle-cruisers | Australia | Ibuki | |||
 |  | ||||
| Battleships | Triumph | ||||
 | |||||
| Armoured Cruisers | Scharnhorst | Minotaur | Montcalm | ||
 |  |  | |||
| Gneisenau | Hampshire | Dupleix | |||
 |  |  | |||
| Fast Light Cruiser | Emden | Yarmouth | Chikuma | ||
| Nürnberg | Melbourne | ||||
| Sydney | |||||
| Philomel | |||||
| Older Light Cruisers | Encounter | Askold | |||
| Pioneer | Zemchug | ||||
| Pyramus | |||||
| Psyche | |||||
| Ships on fixed patrolling beats not available for offensive action:-- | |||||
| Armed Merchant Cruisers | Prince Eitel | Empress of Asia | |||
| Friedrich | Empress of Japan | ||||
| Cormoran | Empress of Russia | ||||
| Himalaya | |||||
| Gunboats | Geier | Cadmus | Kersaint | ||
| Clio | Zélée | ||||
The New Zealand convoy to Australia.
The Australian and New Zealand convoy from Australia to Europe.