Very little, however, turned out as had been planned. Owing to a mischance, arising primarily from a fault in Admiralty staff work, the message apprising Commodores Keyes and Tyrwhitt of the presence of Admiral Beatty with his additional battle cruisers and light cruisers, did not reach them in time; nor was Admiral Beatty aware of the areas in which the British submarines were working. Several awkward embarrassments followed from this and might easily have led to disastrous mistakes. However, fortune was steady, and the initial surprise together with the resolute offensive carried us safely through. The German light cruisers precipitately proceeding to the assistance of their flotillas and animated by the hopes of cutting off our own, ran into the British battle-cruisers. Admiral Beatty, in spite not only of the risk of mines and submarines, but also—for all he could know—of meeting superior forces, had with extraordinary audacity led his squadron far into the Bight. Two enemy cruisers (the Ariadne and the Köln) were smashed to pieces by the enormous shells of the Lion and the Princess Royal: a third (the Mainz) was sunk by the light cruisers and destroyers. Three others (the Frauenlob, Strassburg and the Stettin) limped home with many casualties. One German destroyer was sunk. The rest in the confusion and light mist escaped, though several were injured.
The good news trickled into the Admiralty during the day, but for some time we were very anxious about the Arethusa. A feed-pipe had been smashed by a shell and her steaming power was reduced to seven or eight knots. However, she returned unmolested to the Thames.
Not a single British ship was sunk or, indeed, seriously injured; and our casualties did not exceed thirty-five killed and about forty wounded, in spite of the fact that, in the words of the German Lieutenant Tholens, ‘The English ships made the greatest efforts to pick up the survivors.’[[59]] Two hundred and twenty-four Germans, many desperately wounded, were rescued in circumstances of much danger by Commodore Keyes on the destroyer Lurcher, and brought to England. Considerably more than a thousand Germans, including the Flotilla Admiral and the Destroyer Commodore, perished. A son of Admiral von Tirpitz was among the prisoners. Much more important, however, than these material gains was the effect produced upon the morale of the enemy. The Germans knew nothing of our defective Staff work and of the risks we had run. All they saw was that the British did not hesitate to hazard their greatest vessels as well as their light craft in the most daring offensive action and had escaped apparently unscathed. They felt as we should have felt had German destroyers broken into the Solent and their battle-cruisers penetrated as far as the Nab. The results of this action were far-reaching. Henceforward the weight of British naval prestige lay heavy across all German sea enterprise. Upon the Emperor the impression produced was decisive. Thus Scheer (p. 57): ‘The restrictions imposed on the Battle Fleet were adhered to.’ And still more explicit, von Tirpitz (p. 357): ‘... August 28th, a day fateful, both in its after effects and incidental results, for the work of our navy.... The Emperor did not want losses of this sort.... Orders were issued by the Emperor ... after an audience to Pohl, to which I as usual was not summoned, to restrict the initiative of the Commander-in-Chief of the North Sea Fleet: the loss of ships was to be avoided, fleet sallies and any greater undertakings must be approved by His Majesty in advance,’ etc. On von Tirpitz protesting against ‘this muzzling policy’ ... ‘there sprang up from that day forth an estrangement between the Emperor and myself, which steadily increased.’
The German Navy was indeed ‘muzzled.’ Except for furtive movements by individual submarines and minelayers not a dog stirred from August till November. Meanwhile our strength, both offensive afloat and defensive in our harbours, was steadily and rapidly increasing.
The news of this naval action reached the French and British armies in the dark hour before the dawn of victory and was everywhere published to the retreating troops.[[60]]
As the German armies pressed forward towards Paris they turned the back of their right shoulder increasingly towards the sea. The Belgian Army making a sortie from Antwerp struck towards the German lines of communication and endeavoured to hamper and delay the great advance. In order to help the Belgians and to take some pressure off our own hard-pressed Army, the Admiralty, in consultation with Lord Kitchener, attempted to make a diversion. A brigade of Marines was disembarked, covered by warships (Aug. 26), at Ostend in the hopes that it would attract the attention of the enemy and give him the impression that larger forces would follow from the sea.
Telegram to Belgian Government.
25. 8. 14.
‘In order to delay southward German advance and to create diversion favourable to the forward movement of the Belgian Army, Admiralty wish to send a brigade of Marines, 3,000 strong, to Ostend at daylight, 26th, covered by battleships and cruisers accompanied by an aeroplane squadron. This brigade will push out reconnaissances to Bruges, Thourout, and Dixmude, and will remain at Ostend to cover the disembarkation of a larger force should circumstances render that desirable. Do you agree? If so, please send the necessary instructions to your local authorities. Publicity is useful in this case. The impression to be produced is that a considerable British army is landing.’