9. The three monitors are to be held in readiness, with steam up, to cover a re-embarkation at Ostend or Zeebrugge, should it become necessary. General Rawlinson is to be told to telephone or telegraph if at any time he thinks such naval protection will be required.
10. The Transport Department will provide whatever ships are necessary to carry the stores, ammunition, and matériel of the Belgian field army. The transports standing by for the 7th Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division are a prior claim on our resources. But as there is no doubt that we can meet the two, the Transport Department is to get into direct telephonic communication with the Belgian authorities and arrange forthwith for the beginning of the embarkation of these stores. For the embarkation of stores, as apart from troops, Zeebrugge may be used equally with Ostend.
11. 8,000 to 10,000 Belgian wounded are to be evacuated from Ostend to England as speedily as possible. The Transport Department is to make proposals and preparations for their movement, while at the same time the necessary arrangements for their reception in this country are being concerted by the medical authorities.
12. All motor transports of the R.N. Division, excluding armed and other motor-cars under Commander Samson actually employed, are to be collected at Dunkirk under Colonel Dumble, who is to reorganise them as quickly as possible, and will receive further instructions on that subject.
W. S. C.
It was with a feeling of relief and of admiration that I saw all these immense demands smoothly and punctually complied with.
While in Antwerp I had been in constant communication with Sir John French both through Colonel Bridges and by aeroplane. On October 5 he had written, ‘Thank you so much for writing so fully and clearly to me from Antwerp. If the place is to be saved you have saved it by your prompt action. As a matter of principle I hate putting mobile troops inside a fortress, but in this case it is very likely that the appearance of a large force inside the place may have a great moral effect. But the situation ought to be most carefully watched....’ The Field Marshal proceeded to complain of the exclusion by Lord Kitchener of the forces under General Rawlinson from the main British army. What would happen if and when he joined up with them? Other points of difference arose between the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State. ‘I shall do the best I can,’ the former continued, ‘to bring relief to the place at the earliest possible moment and am arranging to concentrate in the North as quickly as circumstances will allow. The Germans are pushing out their flank defence towards the West and South-West....’ He expressed a wish that we could meet.
I replied to this on October 11 when the fate of Antwerp was already decided. Using my old and intimate friendship with the Field Marshal I laboured as always to smooth the differences between him and Lord Kitchener.
I consider that Kitchener has been thoroughly loyal to you, and has done and is doing everything in human power to support you. It would be disastrous to the cause and ruinous to all if there were any breakdown in true comradeship between you and Kitchener. Military staffs always tend to make mischief between principals, and try to set their caps at each other.
The fall of Antwerp was a great and untimely injury to the Allied cause. I do not agree with the policy which abandoned it[[72]]; and I fear you will now have the army which was before Antwerp to meet almost immediately. But I care for nothing but the future in war. I clear my heart of all useless reflections and sterile controversies. It is vain to look backwards, and I turn my gaze with hope to the re-entry of the British army into the decisive centre of the struggle and pray for the victory.