I have been all along the line but the ground is so flat and the buildings so numerous that it is impossible to see much of the infantry work. I have this moment got a wire from the 1st Corps that they have captured 350 prisoners this afternoon....
He ended by some very friendly expressions about Kitchener and my part in clearing up misunderstandings; also with some kind words about Antwerp.
26/10/14.
Mr. Churchill to Sir John French.
(Private and Secret.)
I am touched and honoured by the kindness of your letter written from the field of Armentières. It was a disappointment to have to give up my visit but the press of events here was decisive.
Antwerp was a bitter blow to me, and some aspects of it have given a handle to my enemies, and perhaps for a time reduced my power to be useful. From minute to minute one does not know that some fine ship will not be blown up by mine or submarine.[[74]] Great good fortune has attended us so far. Out of twenty-five submarine attacks only five have been effective, and only on ships of no value. But every reconnaissance ordered, carries with it the risk of a disproportionate loss. And if an atmosphere of distrust and malice is created—as is deliberately and laboriously being done—an unlucky incident might produce a most unpleasant state of feeling.... However, I am resolved not to be drawn by any impatience from those carefully considered plans of the naval war which I revealed to you in July, which are the result of three years’ study, and with which Jellicoe is in the fullest accord. These plans will not produce any feat of éclat, but they will keep England safe and prosperous, and enable her in good time to put in the field an army which will definitely and finally turn the scale.
Kitchener is strangely alarmed about invasion, and on the C.I.D. we have witnessed an absolute reversal of rôles—the W.O.[[75]] declaring the country not safe and an invasion of 250,000 a possibility, and the Admiralty reassuring them, or trying to. You know how carefully I have examined that position, and how I have never minimised the risks. But now that we are face to face with realities, I am not alarmed, and my policy is that you should be reinforced by any effective division that can be formed and maintained; and that the Navy will prevent any invasion of a serious character. The Prime Minister is solid as a rock; but waves of nervousness pass over others, and may result in some retardation of your reinforcements.
We are making extraordinary efforts to grapple with the submarine menace which tends to drive our great ships so far away, and during November we shall, I believe, have got the better of it, and have secured all our anchorages by network and other means. Then we shall be able to give a greater assurance to those who need it.
But my dear friend, I do trust you realise how damnable it will be if the enemy settles down for the winter along lines which comprise Calais, Dunkirk or Ostend. There will be continual alarms and greatly added difficulties. We must have him off the Belgian Coast, even if we cannot recover Antwerp.