Nothing more happened for a fortnight. On October 4, wireless signals from the Scharnhorst were heard by Suva wireless station, and also at Wellington, New Zealand. From this it appeared that the two vessels were on the way between the Marquesas Islands and Easter Island. Evidently the South American plan was in their mind. We passed our information to Admiral Cradock with the following telegram:—
Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Cradock. (October 5.)
It appears from information received that Gneisenau and Scharnhorst are working across to South America. A Dresden may be scouting for them. You must be prepared to meet them in company. Canopus should accompany Glasgow, Monmouth and Otranto, and should search and protect trade in combination.
On the 8th (received 12th) Admiral Cradock replied as follows:—
‘Without alarming, respectfully suggest that, in event of the enemy’s heavy cruisers and others concentrating West Coast of South America, it is necessary to have a British force on each coast strong enough to bring them to action.
‘For, otherwise, should the concentrated British force sent from South-East Coast be evaded in the Pacific, which is not impossible, (? and) thereby (? get) behind the enemy, the latter could destroy Falkland, English Bank, and Abrolhos coaling bases in turn with little to stop them, and with British ships unable to follow up owing to want of coal, enemy might possibly reach West Indies.’
And on the same day (received 11th) he reported evidences of the presence of the Dresden in South American waters:—
Following intelligence re Scharnhorst and Gneisenau has been received. Evidence found by Good Hope revisiting Orange Bay on 7th October that Dresden had been there 11th September, and there are indications that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau may be joined by Nürnberg, Dresden, and Leipzig. I intend to concentrate at Falkland Islands and avoid division of forces. I have ordered Canopus to proceed there, and Monmouth, Glasgow, and Otranto not to go farther north than Valparaiso until German cruisers are located again....
With reference to Admiralty telegram No. 74, does Defence join my command?
This was an important telegram. It showed a strong probability that the enemy was concentrating with the intention to fight. In these circumstances we must clearly concentrate too. I now looked at the Staff telegram of 5th October, and thought it was not sufficiently explicit on the vital point, viz., concentration for battle. In order that there should be no mistake, I wrote across the back of Admiral Cradock’s telegram received on the 12th October the following minute:—