‘I have received orders from Admiral Cradock to send Defence to Montevideo to coal, obtain charts, and to await further orders.
Submit I may be given two fast cruisers in place of Defence, as I do not consider force at my disposal sufficient....’
The Admiralty Staff had, however, already replied in accordance with all our decisions:—
Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Cradock.
(Sent October 28, 1914, 6.45 p.m.)
Defence is to remain on East Coast under orders of Stoddart.
This will leave sufficient force on each side in case the hostile cruisers appear there on the trade routes.
There is no ship available for the Cape Horn vicinity.
Japanese battleship Hizen shortly expected on North American coast; she will join with Japanese Idzumo and Newcastle and move south towards Galapagos.
But neither this nor any further message reached Admiral Cradock. He had taken his own decision. Without waiting for the Defence, even if we had been able to send her, and leaving the Canopus behind to guard the colliers, he was already steaming up the Chilean coast. But though he left the inexpugnable Canopus behind because she was too slow, he took with him the helpless armed merchant cruiser Otranto, which was scarcely any faster. He was thus ill-fitted either to fight or run.