Admiral Cradock was an experienced and fearless officer, and we are of opinion that feeling that he could not bring the enemy immediately to action as long as he kept with the Canopus, he decided to attack them with his fast ships alone, in the belief that even if he himself were destroyed in the action, he would inflict damage upon them which in the circumstances would be irreparable, and lead to their certain subsequent destruction. This was not an unreasonable hope; and though the Admiralty have no responsibility for Admiral Cradock’s decision they consider that it was inspired by the highest devotion, and in harmony with the spirit and traditions of the British Navy.
We had now to meet the new situation. Our combinations, such as they were, were completely ruptured, and Admiral von Spee, now in temporary command of South American waters, possessed a wide choice of alternatives. He might turn back into the Pacific, and repeat the mystery tactics which had been so baffling to us. He might steam northward up the West Coast of South America and make for the Panama Canal. In this case he would run a chance of being brought to battle by the Anglo-Japanese Squadron which was moving southward. But of course he might not fall in with them, or, if he did, he could avoid battle owing to his superior speed. He might come round to the East Coast and interrupt the main trade route. If he did this he must be prepared to fight Admiral Stoddart; but this would be a very even and hazardous combat. Admiral Stoddart had against the two armoured German ships three armoured ships, of which the Defence, a later and a better ship than either of the Germans, mounted four 9·2–inch and ten 7·5–inch guns, and was one of our most powerful armoured-cruiser class. Lastly, he might cross the Atlantic, possibly raiding the Falkland Islands on his way, and arrive unexpectedly on the South African coast. Here he would find the Union Government’s expedition against the German colony in full progress and his arrival would have been most unwelcome. General Botha and General Smuts, having suppressed the rebellion, were about to resume in a critical atmosphere their attack upon German South-West Africa, and a stream of transports would soon be flowing with the expedition and its supplies from Cape Town to Luderitz Bay. Subsequently or alternatively to this intrusion, Admiral von Spee might steam up the African coast and strike at the whole of the shipping of the expedition to the Cameroons, which was quite without means of defending itself against him.
All these unpleasant possibilities had to be faced by us. We had to prepare again at each of many points against a sudden blow; and, great as were our resources, the strain upon them became enormous. The first step was to restore the situation in South American waters. This would certainly take a month. My minute of inquiry to the Chief of the Staff, written an hour after I had read the first news of the disaster, will show the possibilities which existed. It will be seen that in this grave need my mind immediately turned to wresting a battle-cruiser from the Grand Fleet which, joined with the Defence, Carnarvon, Cornwall and Kent, would give Admiral Stoddart an overwhelming superiority.
4/11/14.
Director of Operations Division.
1. How far is it, and how long would it take Dartmouth and Weymouth to reach Punta Arenas, Rio, or Abrolhos respectively, if they started this afternoon with all dispatch?
2. How long would it take—
(a) Kent to reach Rio and Abrolhos?
(b) Australia (1) without, and (2) with Montcalm to reach Galapagos via Makada Islands, and also Idzumo and Newcastle to reach them?
(c) The Japanese 2nd Southern Squadron to replace Australia at Fiji?