A cause of difference, however, soon arose between us. The First Sea Lord was displeased with Sir Doveton Sturdee for not having succeeded in destroying the German light cruiser Dresden with the rest, and he searchingly criticised that Admiral’s dispositions after the action. He wished to leave Admiral Sturdee in South American waters till the Dresden was hunted down. As it was imperative that the Invincible and Inflexible should come home at once, such a decision would have entailed transferring Admiral Sturdee’s flag to the Carnarvon, and leaving him with a command scarcely suited to his rank and standing, and woefully out of harmony with his recent achievement. I was obliged to veto this proposal, and Lord Fisher was for some time much vexed at my decision.
The First Sea Lord also made the disquieting suggestion that the Germans might slip a battle cruiser like the Derfflinger through our blockade in the long winter nights and fall upon the returning Invincible and Inflexible, who had fired away three-quarters of their ammunition. I was greatly disturbed at this, and hastened to the Chief of the Staff. But Admiral Oliver was not often found improvident. He had already several weeks before sent the battleship Vengeance with a quarter outfit for both vessels to St. Vincent, where it awaited them.
In spite of their anxieties, November and December were months of rapidly growing power to the Navy. The variety and scope of Admiralty business extended continually, and the number of important directions to be given increased every week. The reader who is further interested should study in the Appendix the selection of First Lord’s Minutes which I have thought it worth while to print.[[94]] From these original documents, conceived under the pressure of events, a truer idea can be formed of what was passing than from much description.
In no part of our work did Lord Fisher and I act together in greater harmony than in the realm of new construction.
The first task of the Admiralty in naval construction on the outbreak of war was to accelerate the completion of all the warships which were building in Great Britain, and according to the schemes we had had prepared before the war, extreme priority was to be assigned to vessels which could be finished within six months. On this basis we proceeded during the first three months. When it became clear that the war would not be ended one way or the other by the first main decisions on land, and that the sea battle was indefinitely deferred, I extended this original period, and we adopted the principle ‘Everything that can be finished in 1915, and nothing that can’t.’
This brought very large numbers of vessels into the accelerated class and, of course, opened the way for a considerable new construction of submarines, destroyers and even light cruisers. There had already been ordered when Lord Fisher arrived at the Admiralty a score of new destroyers and submarines, in addition to all the pre-war vessels under accelerated construction.
The yards were therefore full of work, and care was needed not to impede current construction by new orders. Lord Fisher, however, brought a very great surge of impulse to this sphere of our activities. It was a moment when megalomania was a virtue. Some progress had already been made on two of the British battleships of the programme of 1914–15. The First Sea Lord at once demanded to make them into battle-cruisers, sacrificing two more guns in each in order to get the immense speed for which he thirsted. I agreed to this, although it involved some delay; and the Repulse and the Renown were redesigned accordingly.
The construction of submarines was more urgent. I was not alarmed about the immediate position, although all sorts of rumours were afoot.
Naval Intelligence Division.