Our thought is proceeding independently on the same lines. I propose, as a basis of discussion, that in addition to the 4 Schwab monitors, we prepare 8 more at a cost of not more than £700,000 apiece. These vessels should be armed either with 13·5–inch or 15–inch guns, two or four in each as convenient. Or, alternatively, they should be armed with four 18–inch howitzers in separate cupolas sunk low on their heavily-armoured turtle backs. They should draw 8 feet at most, and be propelled entirely by internal combustion at a speed not exceeding 10 knots; no funnels; three or four alternative telescopic masts for fire observation; strong crinolines 20 feet away all round to make them immune from mine or torpedo, etc....
W. S. C.
We soon embarked on an extensive scheme of monitor building.
Besides making four monitors to carry the American 14–inch gun turrets, we took two spare 15–inch gun turrets which had been prepared for two of the furthest-off new battleships (now converted into battle-cruisers), and eight 12–inch gun turrets out of four ‘Majestics,’ which we laid up; and with these and the American guns we armed no less than fourteen monitors, namely, two with two 15–inch guns, four with two 14–inch guns, and eight with two 12–inch guns apiece. Lord Fisher then went on and pulled the 9·2–inch guns out of the old ‘Edgars’ and mounted them in fourteen small monitors, drawing 6 feet 6 inches of water; and ten 6–inch guns[[95]] were mounted in still smaller monitors drawing 5 feet 11 inches. We also built later on twelve large river gunboats capable of being transported by rail for service on the Danube, if we ever got there, and twelve small river gunboats, or baby monitors, for service on the Tigris and the Euphrates. The bulk of the large monitors were constructed in Belfast with extraordinary celerity by Harland & Wolff and their sturdy ardent men. We also prepared 240 lighters with steel shields and internal combustion engines for landing troops under fire.
Thus in the autumn of 1914, under various programmes culminating in the great Fisher impetus, we set on foot the following enormous Fleet, all due to complete by the end of 1915:—
| Battleships and Battle cruisers of the greatest power | 7 | |
| Light cruisers | 12 | |
| Destroyers of the largest class and leaders | 65 | |
| Oversea submarines | 40 | |
| Coastal submarines | 22 | |
| Monitors— | ||
| Heavy | 18 | |
| Medium | 14 | |
| Light | 5 | |
| Sloops and smaller anti-submarine vessels | 107 | |
| Motor launches | 60 | |
| Ex-lighters with internal combustion engines | 240 | |
This tremendous new Navy, for it was nothing less, was a providential aid to the Admiralty when more than two years later the real German submarine attack began. Its creation on such a scale is one of the greatest services which the nation has owed to the genius and energy of Lord Fisher. Probably Fisher in all his long life never had a more joyous experience than this great effort of new construction. No man knew better than he how to put war thought into a ship. Shipbuilding had been the greatest passion of his life. Here were all the yards of Britain at his disposal and every Treasury barrier broken down.
Of the battle-cruisers Repulse and Renown, and still more of the light battle-cruisers Courageous, Furious and Glorious, to which I consented four months later in circumstances which will be narrated in their place, it must be said that they were an old man’s children. Although possessing many marvellous qualities never hitherto combined in a ship of war, they were light in the bone; and the Navy always considered them wanting in the structural strength and armour which the new conditions of war more than ever required. None the less, their parent loved them dearly and always rallied with the utmost vehemence when any slur was cast upon their qualities.
I presided over all this process in November and December with the greatest admiration for the First Sea Lord, but with some misgivings on the score of expense. I was not yet satisfied that the war would be prolonged beyond 1915, and I did not wish to draw away from the armies men or material which might be needed in their service. Not until April, 1915, when the failure of Russia as a decisive factor became final, did I authorise a further extension of view to December 31, 1916, and agree to plans for additional new construction being made within that limit. Meanwhile I endeavoured to satisfy Lord Fisher as best I could. I pointed out to him repeatedly that from some points of view a ship finished twelve months before the end of the war was worth twelve times as much as a ship finished one month before its end, and urged continuously that vessels nearest completion must in no way suffer. He was, however, very difficult to feed. In a day he would sketch the design of a capital ship. In a week he would devour a programme and come back asking for more. A tit-bit like an 18–inch experimental gun which I suggested he should make, was snapped up the moment it was mentioned. ‘I will put it in a light cruiser and drive her 40 knots,’ he cried. ‘Hit how you like, when you like, where you like.’ This was his theme; but what about his doctrine ‘Armour is vision’? However, I backed him up all I could. He was far more often right than wrong, and his drive and life-force made the Admiralty quiver like one of his great ships at its highest speed.