| BATTLESHIPS | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Consecutive No. | Ship. | Launched. | Displacement. | Speed (designed). | Armour belt (max.) | Armament (excluding guns below 12 prs.) | Weight of broadside, primary guns. |
| tons. | knots. | in. | lb. | ||||
| 1 | Nassau | 1908 | 18,600 | 19 | 11·81 | 12—11 in., 12—5·9 in., 16—3·4 in. | 5,376 |
| 2 | Westfalen | 1908 | |||||
| 3 | Rheinland | 1908 | |||||
| 4 | Posen | 1908 | |||||
| 5 | Ostfriesland | 1909 | 22,400 | 20·5 | 11·81 | 12—12 in., 14—5·9 in., 14—3·4 in. | 7,232 |
| 6 | Heligoland | 1909 | |||||
| 7 | Thuringen | 1909 | |||||
| 8 | Oldenburg | 1910 | |||||
| 9 | Kaiser | 1911 | 24,310 | 21 | 13·78 | 10—12 in., 14—5·9 in., 12—3·4 in., 4—13 prs. | 9,040 |
| 10 | Friedrich der Grosse | 1911 | |||||
| 11 | Kaiserin | 1911 | |||||
| 12 | Prinzregent Luitpold | 1912 | |||||
| 13 | König Albert | 1912 | |||||
| 14 | Grosser Kurfürst | 1913 | 25,390 | 22 ? | ? | 10—12 in., 14—5·9 in., 12—3·4 in., 4—13 prs. | 9,040 |
| 15 | König | 1913 | |||||
| 16 | Markgraf | 1913 | |||||
| BUILDING | |||||||
| 17 | Kronprinz | 1914 | 25,390 | 22 ? | ? | 10—12 in., 14—5·9 in., 12—3·4 in., 4—13 prs. | 9,040 |
| 18 | Ersatz Wörth | 28,050 ? | 22 ? | ? | 8—15 in., 16—5·9 in. | 15,360 ? | |
| 19 | T | ||||||
| 20 | Ersatz Kaiser Friedrich III | ||||||
| BATTLE CRUISERS | |||||||
| 1 | Blücher | 1908 | 15,550 | 25 | 6 | 12—8·2 in., 8—5·9 in., 16—3·4 in. | 2,204 |
| 2 | von der Tann | 1909 | 18,700 | 25 | 6 | 8—11 in., 10—5·9 in., 16—3·4 in. | 5,376 |
| 3 | Moltke | 1910 | 22,640 | 27 | 11 | 10—11 in., 12—5·9 in., 12—3·4 in. | 6,720 |
| 4 | Goeben | 1911 | |||||
| 5 | Seydlitz | 1912 | 24,640 | 27 | 11 | 10—11 in., 12—5·9 in., 12—3·4 in. | 6,720 |
| 6 | Derfflinger | 1913 | 28,000 | 27 | 7 | 8—12 in., 12—5·9 in., 12—3·4 in. | 7,232 |
| BUILDING | |||||||
| 7 | Lützow | 1913 | 28,000 | 27 | 7 | 8—12 in., 12—5·9 in., 12—3·4 in. | 7,232 |
| 8 | Ersatz Hertha | Bdg. | |||||
BRITISH AND GERMAN FLEETS IN HOME WATERS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
| BRITISH. | GERMAN. | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Grand Fleet. | High Seas Fleet. | ||
| Iron Duke (10–3·5 inch), Fleet Flagship. | Friedrich der Grosse (10–12 inch), Fleet Flagship. | ||
| 1st Battle Squadron. | 1st Battle Squadron. | ||
| 1 Iron Duke (10–13·5 inch). | |||
| 2 Colossus | 10–12 inch. | 4 Heligolands (12–12 inch). | |
| 1 Neptune | 4 Nassaus (12–11 inch). | ||
| 3 St. Vincents | |||
| 1 Bellerophon | |||
| 2nd Battle Squadron. | 2nd Battle Squadron. | ||
| 4 King George V | 10–13·5 inch. | 10 Preussens (4–11 inch). | |
| 4 Orions | |||
| 3rd Battle Squadron. | 3rd Battle Squadron. | ||
| 8 King Edward VII (4–12 inch; 4–9·2 inch). | 4 Kaisers (10–12 inch). | ||
| 4th Battle Squadron. | |||
| 1 Dreadnought | 10–12 inch. | ||
| 2 Bellerophons | |||
| 1 Agincourt (14–12 inch). | |||
| (One Light Cruiser attached to each Battle Squadron). | |||
| 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. | Cruiser Squadron. | ||
| 3 Lions (8–13·5 inch). | Battle Cruisers. | ||
| 1 New Zealand (8–12 inch). | 2 Moltke (10–11 inch). | ||
| 1 von der Tann (8–11 inch). | |||
| 2nd Cruiser Squadron. | 1 Derfflinger (8–12 inch). | ||
| 1 Shannon (4–9·2 inch; 10–7·5 inch). | 1 Blücher (12–8·2 inch). | ||
| 3 Achilles (6–9·2 inch; 4–7·5 inch). | |||
| 3rd Cruiser Squadron. | Light Cruisers. | ||
| 4 Antrims (4–7·5 inch; 6–6 inch). | 1 Rostock | 12–4·1 inch. | |
| 2 Strassburgs | |||
| 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. | 3 Mainz. | ||
| 3 Birminghams (9–6 inch). | |||
| 1 Southampton | 8–6 inch. | ||
| 1 Falmouth | |||
| 1 Bristol (2–6 inch; 10–4 inch). | |||
| Destroyer Flotillas. | Destroyer Flotillas. | ||
| 2 Flotillas, each of 20 vessels, with Light Cruiser Active and Flotilla Leader Swift. | 7 Flotillas, each of 11 vessels. | ||
| Harwich Force. | |||
| 1 Amethyst (12–4 inch). | |||
| 2 Amphions (10–4 inch). | |||
| 35 Destroyers. | |||
| Channel Fleet. | Other Vessels in Home Waters. | ||
| 5th Battle Squadron. | Battleships. | ||
| 8 Formidables (4–12 inch). | 5 Wittelsbachs. | ||
| 5 Kaiser Class (old) (5–9·4 inch). | |||
| 6th Battle Squadron. | 2 Brandenburgs (6–11 inch). | ||
| 2 Lord Nelsons (4–12 inch; 10–9·2 inch). | |||
| 5 Duncans | 4–12 inch. | ||
| 1 Glory | |||
| 7th Battle Squadron. | |||
| 4 Majestics (4–12 inch). | |||
| 8th Battle Squadron. | |||
| 1 Majestic (4–12 inch). | |||
| 5 Glory. | |||
| 4 Light Cruisers were attached to the Battle Squadrons. | |||
| 7th Cruiser Squadron. | Cruisers. | ||
| 5 Cressys (2–9·2 inch; 12–6 inch). | 2 Roons (4–8·2 inch; 10–5·9 inch). | ||
| 2 Prinz Adalbert (4–8·2 inch; 10–5·9 inch). | |||
| 12th Cruiser Squadron. | |||
| 3 Talbots (11–6 inch). | 1 Prinz Heinrich (2–9·4 inch; 10–5·9 inch). | ||
| 1 Charybdis (2–6 inch; 8–4·7 inch) (patrolling west end of Channel). | |||
| Dover Patrol. | Light Cruisers. | ||
| 2 Light Cruisers. | 12 Vessels, with armaments of 10 or 12–4·1 inch guns. | ||
| 22 Destroyers. | |||
| 11th Cruiser Squadron. | |||
| 5 Talbots (11–6 inch) (on the coast of Ireland). | |||
| 10th Cruiser Squadron. | |||
| 8 Crescents (Northern Patrol). | |||
| Patrol Flotillas on East Coast. | Destroyers. | ||
| 3 Light Cruisers. | 67 available for coast patrol, service in Baltic, etc. | ||
| 48 Destroyers. | |||
| 24 Torpedo Boats. | |||
| Submarines. | Submarines. | ||
| 65, organised in 8 Flotillas, 7 Flotillas for Coast Defence, 1 for Overseas operations. | 27 serviceable. | ||
APPENDIX C
MEMORANDUM BY THE FIRST LORD ON TRADE PROTECTION ON AND AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
Written August 23, 1913, Revised April, 1914
1. The first security for British merchant ships must be the superiority of the British Navy which should enable us to cover in peace, and hunt down and bring to battle in war, every enemy’s warship which attempts to keep the seas. A policy of vigorous offence against the enemy’s warships wherever stationed, will give immediately far greater protection to British traders than large numbers of vessels scattered sparsely about in an attitude of weak and defensive expectancy. This should be enjoined as the first duty of all British warships. Enemy’s cruisers cannot live in the oceans for any length of time. They cannot coal at sea with any certainty. They cannot make many prizes without much steaming; and in these days of W. T. their whereabouts will be constantly reported. If British cruisers of superior speed are hunting them, they cannot do much harm before they are brought to action. Very few German Town Class cruisers are assigned to foreign stations for this work. If others are detached from the North Sea, and get out safely, we shall be able to detach a larger proportion of the similar British cruisers which have been hitherto opposing them there. They cannot afford to send away many without crippling their battle fleet.
2. As for enemy’s armed merchantmen or merchantmen converted into cruisers for commerce destruction, the only answer to that is to have an equal number of British merchant vessels plying on the trade routes armed and commissioned to engage them when met with. The whole of this threat is very shadowy. Whether the German vessels have their guns on board is extremely doubtful. Not a scrap of evidence has been forthcoming during the last year and a half in spite of every effort to procure it. How are they to be converted on the high seas? Where are they to get rid of their passengers? Are they to take hundreds of non-combatants with them on what the stronger naval Power may well treat as a piratical enterprise? Where are they to coal? To say that we have to maintain a large cruiser fleet to deal with this danger appears extravagant in the highest degree. All that is needed is to arm a similar number of British merchant vessels of the right speed and make arrangements to commission these for their own defence and that of other British ships in their neighbourhood and on their route. The presence of these vessels plying always in considerable numbers along the regular trade routes will from the very outset of the war, and however suddenly it may begin, provide a constant and immediate counter to enemy armed merchantmen, and probably deter them from any injurious action.
3. But the best safeguard for the maintenance of British trade in war is the large number of merchant ships engaged in trading, and the immense number of harbours in the United Kingdom they can approach by ocean routes. This makes any serious interruption by enemy’s commerce destroyers impossible. We must rely on numbers and averages. Provided that we can induce all these ships to put to sea and carry on their business boldly, and provided that they are warned in time and encouraged to leave the regular trade routes and travel wide of them, very few captures will be made even in the early days of the war.
4. It is no use distributing isolated cruisers about the vast ocean spaces. To produce any result from such a method would require hundreds of cruisers. The ocean is itself the best protection. We must recognise that we cannot specifically protect trade routes; we can only protect confluences. The only safe trade routes in war are those which the enemy has not discovered and those upon which he has been exterminated. There are areas where the trade necessarily converges and narrow channels through which it must pass; and these defiles or terminals of the trade routes should be made too dangerous for enemy’s commerce destroyers to approach, by employing our older cruisers in adequate force so as to create an effective sanctuary, control or catchment for our trading ships. These areas should be judiciously selected so as to husband our resources, and not with a view to finding employment for as many old cruisers as possible. It may be taken for certain that no enemy’s armed merchantman unless possessed of exceptional speed will dare to approach the area where he may encounter a British cruiser. Many of our old cruisers steam 19 knots. The number of German merchantmen which steam more is not large. As for the enemy’s warships and his few exceptionally fast vessels, they must be marked down and hunted by fast modern vessels which are concerned with nothing else but to bring them to action.
5. British attacks on the German trade are a comparatively unimportant feature in our operations, and British cruisers should not engage in them to the prejudice of other duties. Economic pressure will be put on Germany by the distant blockade of her shores which will cut off her trade, both export and import, as a whole. If this is effectively done it is of very little consequence to us whether individual German vessels are captured as prizes, or whether they take refuge in neutral harbours till the end of the war. It is reasonable to suppose that German merchant ships, other than those armed and commissioned for warlike purposes, will run for neutral harbours as soon as war breaks out, and that very few will attempt under the German flag to return home running the gauntlet of the numerous British fleets operating in the North Sea.