It must again be repeated:—
1. That the coast, with its cyclists, signal stations, and watchers, is the line of observation, and the only line of observation, which can certainly report the arrival of an enemy;
2. That the patrol flotillas, both of submarines and destroyers, instead of being frittered away on useless cordon and patrolling duties, should be kept concentrated and ready for action at selected sally-ports along the coast, ready to proceed in force to any point where shore information shows that an enemy is attempting to land;
3. That there is to be nothing like routine or sentry-go patrolling, except at the mouths of harbours, and that from time to time occasional good bold reconnaissances 60, 70, and 80 miles out to seaward should be pushed from each sallyport by the whole of the boats available, varied occasionally by the prying scouting of a single destroyer;
4. That the prevention of mine-laying can only be done by trawlers, who must summon help from the nearest patrol centre if necessary.
It must be recognised that nothing in our dispositions prevents an enemy from approaching the British coasts with transports, and beginning a landing there, but that if the flotillas are properly handled he should be attacked within a few hours by submarines and destroyers, and that the numbers and strength of the forces against him should continually increase until long before any considerable force can be landed the enemy’s transports and escort would be overwhelmed, and those who are landed hopelessly cut off. The only alternative to this policy of letting the enemy begin to land and then attacking him while his landing is in progress is the close blockade of the Heligoland Bight. There is much to be said for and against both courses, but the intermediate course of ‘distributing’ a weak and thin cordon of patrols at a short distance from the coast in the hopes of putting up some defensive shield or screen is utterly futile.
The policy at present approved is to concentrate the flotillas at fixed points and keep them strong and fresh and fit for action, while relying upon the coast watch to give early and accurate information of any attack by the enemy. If this policy be adhered to strictly and simply it will not be found impossible to spare the 12 destroyers which the Commander-in-Chief needs. It is, however, to be considered whether they could not better be taken from the two 1st Fleet Flotillas at Harwich.
W. S. C.
November 7, 1914.