Dalesvoe (Shetlands), Fort Ross, Firth of Forth, North Shields, Grimsby, and Yarmouth are the bases of the patrol flotillas, and a force of fourteen or fifteen vessels would, on the average, be available for each. It is upon this disposition that the Admiralty rely to interrupt the disembarkation of any considerable force. It is of vital importance that the watching of the coast-line from the shore should be taken up from the earliest moment and in advance of general mobilisation. The effectiveness of the work of the patrol flotillas and consequently the restriction of possible landings depend upon early information being received of any disembarkation. The size of any raiding party that could be landed will, of course, be accurately proportionate to the delay. It would no doubt be impossible or undesirable to put the whole system of coast watches into operation in the precautionary period. No doubt the arrangements made after war had actually begun would be much more thorough, and larger numbers of cyclists and watchers would be available. But a system of watching likely landing-places ought to be devised which could be brought silently into operation as soon as the precautionary period is declared or, if necessary, immediately before, just in the same way as the watch over the magazines and other vital points can unostentatiously be improved.
It may well be, therefore, that the coast watch should be set up in two stages: the first secret, and the second open. For the first the police and selected cyclists from the Territorial Force would appear to be the only resources. It ought to be possible to organise a pretty effective watch with these, and to make arrangements which could be actually rehearsed in time of peace in connection with the work of the patrol flotillas. It is not so much armed force which is required as vigilant watching by persons who know what to look for and where to report their information. Aerial squadrons along the coast-line or airships would appear to be of the greatest value. The new naval aeroplane stations which are being constructed will be of service for this purpose. After war has been declared, or general mobilisation ordered, the full arrangements devised by the War Office could come into force in their entirety, but it is imperative that the precautionary period in advance of mobilisation should be provided for.
March 29, 1913.
NOTES BY THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY
(Address to the Admiralty War Staff)
The problem of oversea attack requires to be examined under three heads:—
(1.) Absolute surprise to-morrow (19th April): everything going on as usual—Bolt from the Blue.
Objectives of raiders—to prevent the Expeditionary Force being sent to help France, and incidentally, if possible, to damage naval arsenals and dockyards.
(2.) The whole expeditionary army has gone to India or some other distant theatre of war. The war has been going on some time: the Territorials have been embodied, but great numbers have been allowed to proceed on leave. The Second Fleet has been completed to full strength by the closing of the schools. The Immediate Reserve has been called out; and the whole of the First and Second Fleets are in those harbours which enable them to reach their actual war stations as quickly as possible. The patrol flotillas are mobilised in their war stations. The forts are manned, and the coastal look-out is active. But this has been going on for several months while complete peace continues in Europe. The tension has begun to be somewhat relaxed, and we have settled down to our ordinary way of life, while at the same time taking special precautions and having our forces so disposed that they are easily and readily available on the slightest sign of danger. This may be called “Bolt from the Grey.” The only adequate objective of the enemy in this case would be invasion in such force as to overcome the comparatively feeble military establishment on foot in the United Kingdom.
(3.) War with Germany has begun. All the fleets are fully mobilised and in active operation against the enemy according to the war plans of the Admiralty. The objectives open to the enemy would be minor raids to destroy naval arsenals and dockyards: the seizure of bases for flotilla action (this last may occur also in 1 and 2), and threats or attempts to invade in force to distract or divide the British fleet simultaneously with bringing about a great fleet action.
All these three situations with their variants deserve patient examination.