Yes.
5. That any expedition arriving at a port must expect to encounter resistance from whatever forces or defences are on the spot after three hours’ alarm notice; but that no one place can be considered more certain than another, and that only the ordinary preparations prescribed under our existing mobilisation arrangements have been made at each particular place.
Yes.
6. That any German expedition seeking to seize a port defended or otherwise must be provided with an escort sufficient to overcome the local defences and to beat off the British torpedo craft or cruisers known to be in the vicinity.
Assuming that some kind of diplomatic discussion had preceded the Declaration of War it is to be hoped that Admiralty will have begun concentrating, but we cannot be sure.
7. That the moment chosen will be one when the British Battle Fleet is on the south-west or west coasts of Great Britain or Ireland.
Our own flotillas should be able to clear the road.
8. That the return of the Battle Fleet to the North Sea will be obstructed by mines and submarines, and at night by flotilla attacks.
Attempt may be made, but in the case of Harwich (the most probable) there will be 2nd Fleet ships from Nore, also Nore Flotilla, besides patrol vessels to deal with.
9. That pending the return of the Battle Fleet the German Navy will have the command of the North Sea, and that so long as it holds the command of the North Sea it can continue, though at considerable risk, to pass individual vessels, in addition to the original 20,000 men, into the defended harbour which has been seized. The maximum time which in the most unfavourable circumstances would elapse before the return of the British Fleet to the North Sea and consequent resumption of British naval superiority is therefore a vital matter, |The time-table given in your “Bolt from the Blue” is quite sufficient, and cannot be varied to any appreciable extent.| and should be worked out in as many variants as possible by the staff.