Austria, at first, instead of aiding the allies, allowed the Poles[16] to range themselves beneath the standard of Napoleon, whom she overwhelmed with protestations of friendship, which served to mask her real intentions, and meanwhile gave her time to arm herself to the teeth and to make the allies sensible of the fact of their utter impotency against Napoleon unless aided by her. The interests of Austria favored her alliance with France, but Napoleon, instead of confidence, inspired mistrust. Austria, notwithstanding the marriage between him and Maria Louisa, was, as had been shown at the congress of Dresden, merely treated as a tributary to France, and Napoleon's ambition offered no guarantee to the ancient imperial dynasty. There was no security that the provinces bestowed in momentary reward for her alliance must not, on the first occasion, be restored. Nor was public opinion entirely without weight.[17] Napoleon's star was on the wane, whole nations stood like to a dark and ominous cloud threatening on the horizon, and Count Metternich prudently chose rather to attempt to guide the storm ere it burst than trust to a falling star. Austria had, as early as the 27th of June, 1813, signed a treaty, at Reichenbach in Silesia, with Russia and Prussia, by which she bound herself to declare war against France, in case Napoleon had not, before the 20th of July, accepted the terms of peace about to be proposed to him. Already had the sovereigns and generals of Russia and Prussia sketched, during a conference held with the crown prince of Sweden, the 11th July, at Trachenberg, the plan for the approaching campaign, and, with the permission of Austria, assigned to her the part she was to take as one of the allies against Napoleon, when Metternich again visited Dresden in person for the purpose of repeating his assurances of amity, for the armistice had but just commenced, to Napoleon. The French emperor had an indistinct idea of the transactions then passing, and bluntly said to the Count, "As you wish to mediate, you are no longer on my side." He hoped partly to win Austria over by redoubling his promises, partly to terrify her by the dread of the future ascendency of Russia, but, perceiving how Metternich evaded him by his artful diplomacy, he suddenly asked him, "Well, Metternich, how much has England given you in order to engage you to play this part toward me?" This trait of insolence toward an antagonist of whose superiority he felt conscious, and of the most deadly hatred masked by contempt, was peculiarly characteristic of the Corsican, who, besides the qualities of the lion, fully possessed those of the cat. Napoleon let his hat drop in order to see whether Metternich would raise it. He did not, and war was resolved upon. A pretended congress for the conclusion of peace was again arranged by both sides; by Napoleon, in order to elude the reproach cast upon him of an insurmountable and eternal desire for war, and by the allies, in order to prove to the whole world their desire for peace. Each side was, however, fully aware that the palm of peace was alone to be found on the other side of the battle-field. Napoleon was generous in his concessions, but delayed granting full powers to his envoy, an opportune circumstance for the allies, who were by this means able to charge him with the whole blame of procrastination. Napoleon, in all his concessions, merely included Russia and Austria to the exclusion of Prussia.[18] But neither Russia nor Austria trusted to his promises, and the negotiations were broken off on the termination of the armistice, when Napoleon sent full powers to his plenipotentiary. Now, was it said, it is too late. The art with which Metternich passed from the alliance with Napoleon to neutrality, to mediation, and finally to the coalition against him, will, in every age, be acknowledged a master-piece of diplomacy. Austria, while coalescing with Russia and Prussia, in a certain degree assumed a rank conventionally superior to both. The whole of the allied armies was placed under the command of an Austrian general, Prince von Schwarzenberg, and if the proclamation published at Calisch had merely summoned the people of Germany to assert their independence, the manifesto of Count Metternich spoke already in the tone of the future regulator of the affairs of Europe.[19] Austria declared herself on the 12th of August, 1813, two days after the termination of the armistice.
[Footnote 1: Literally, the general levy of the people.—Trans.]
[Footnote 2: The exasperation of the people had risen to the utmost pitch. The French rascals in office, especially the custom-house officers, set no bounds to their tyranny and license. No woman of whatever rank was allowed to pass the gates without being subjected to the most indecent inquisition. Goods that had long been redeemed were continually taken from the tradesmen's shops and confiscated. The arbitrary enrolment of a number of young men as conscripts at length produced an insurrection, in which the guard-houses, etc., were destroyed. It was, however, quelled by General St. Cyr, and six of the citizens were executed. On the approach of the Russians, St. Cyr fled with the whole of his troops. The bookseller Perthes, Prell, and von Hess, formed a civic guard.—Von Hess's Agonies.]
[Footnote 3: The people rose en masse at Ronsdorf, Solingen, and Barmen, and marched tumultuously to Elberfeld, the great manufacturing town, but were dispersed by the French troops. The French authorities afterward declared that the sole object of the revolt was to smuggle in English goods, and, under this pretext, seized all the foreign goods in Elberfeld.]
[Footnote 4: Kutusow had, just at that conjuncture, expired at
Bautzen.]
[Footnote 5: The nature of the ground rendered a night march impossible. The Russian, Michaelofski Danilefski, however, throws the blame upon an officer in Blucher's headquarters, who laid the important orders committed to his charge under his pillow and overslept himself.]
[Footnote 6: It may here be mentioned as a remarkable characteristic of those times that Goethe, Ernest Maurice Arndt, and Theodore Körner at that period met at Dresden. The youthful Körner, a volunteer Jæger, was the Tyrtæus of those days: his military songs were universally sung: his father also expressed great enthusiasm. Goethe said almost angrily, "Well, well, shake your chains, the man (Napoleon) is too strong for you, you will not break them!"—E. M. Arndt's Reminiscences.]
[Footnote 7: "Unfortunately there were German princes who, even this time, again sent their troops to swell the ranks of the oppressor; Austria had, unfortunately, not yet concluded her preparations; consequently, it was only possible to clog the advance of the conqueror by a gallant resistance."—Clausewitz. The Bavarians stood under Raglowich, the Würtembergers under Franquemont, the Saxons under Reynier. There was also a contingent of Westphalians and Badeners.]
[Footnote 8: Blücher exclaimed on this occasion: "He's a rascally fellow that dares to say we fly." Even Fain, the Frenchman, confesses in his manuscript of 1813, in which he certainly does not favor the Germans: "The best Marshals, as it were, killed by spent balls. Great victories without trophies. All the villages on our route in flames which obstructed our advance. 'What a war! We shall all fall victims to it!' are the disgraceful expressions uttered by many, for the iron hearts of the warriors of France are rust-grown." Napoleon exclaimed after the battle, "How! no result after such a massacre? No prisoners? They leave me not even a nail!" Duroc's death added to the catastrophe. Napoleon was so struck that for the first time in his life he could give no orders, but deferred everything until the morrow.]
[Footnote 9: But they merely encamped in the streets, showed themselves more anxious than threatening, and were seized with a terrible panic on a sudden conflagration breaking out during the night, which they mistook for a signal to bring the Landsturm upon them. And yet there were thirty thousand French in the city. How different to their spirit in 1807!]