[Footnote 6: Beamisch, History of the Legion.]
[Footnote 7: Several regiments sacrificed themselves in order to cover the retreat of the rest. Napoleon ordered a twelve-pounder to be loaded and twice directed the gun with his own hand upon the crown prince.—Campaigns of the Würterribergers.]
[Footnote 8: Blücher's conduct simply proceeded from his impatience to obtain by force of arms the most honorable terms of peace for Prussia, while the other allied powers, who were far more indulgently disposed toward France and who began to view the victories gained by Prussia with an apprehension which was further strengthened by the increasing popularity of that power throughout Germany, were more inclined to diplomatize than to fight. Blücher was well aware of these reasons for diplomacy and more than once cut the negotiations short with his sabre. A well-known diplomatist attempting on one occasion to prove to him that Napoleon must, even without the war being continued, "descend from his throne," a league having been formed within France herself for the restoration of the Bourbons—he answered him to his face, "The rascality of the French is no revenge for us. It is we who must pull him down—we. You will no doubt do wonders in your wisdom!—Patience! You will be led as usual by the nose, and will still go on fawning and diplomatizing until we have the nation again upon us, and the storm bursts over our heads." He went so far as to set the diplomatists actually at defiance. On being, to Napoleon's extreme delight, ordered to retreat, he treated the order with contempt and instantly advanced.—Rauschnick's Life of Blücher. "This second disjunction on Blücher's part," observes Clausewitz, the Prussian general, the best commentator on this war, "was of infinite consequence, for it checked and gave a fresh turn to the whole course of political affairs.">[
[Footnote 9: Görres said in the Rhenish Mercury, "It is easy to see how all are inclined to conceal beneath the wide mantle of love the horrors there perpetrated. The Germans have from time immemorial been subjected to this sort of treatment, because ever ready to forgive and forget the past." Davoust was arrested merely for form's sake and then honorably released. He was allowed to retain the booty he had seized. The citizens of Hamburg vainly implored the re-establishment of their bank.]
[Footnote 10: Blücher took no part in these affairs. "I have," said he to the diplomatists, "done my duty, now do yours! You will be responsible both to God and man should your work be done in vain and have to be done over again. I have nothing further to do with the business!"—Experience had, however, taught him not to expect much good from "quill-drivers.">[
[Footnote 11: The Rhenish Mercury more than all. It was opposed by the Messenger of the Tyrol, which declared that the victory was gained, not by the "people," as they were termed, but by the princes and their armies.—July, 1814.]
CCLXIII. The Congress of Vienna—Napoleon's Return and End
From Paris the sovereigns of Prussia[1] and Russia and the victorious field-marshals proceeded, in June, to London, where they, Blucher most particularly, were received with every demonstration of delight and respect by the English, their oldest and most faithful allies.[2] Toward autumn, a great European congress, to which the settlement of every point in dispute and the restoration of order throughout Europe were to be committed, was convoked at Vienna. At this congress, which, in the November of 1814, was opened at Vienna, the emperors of Austria and Russia, the kings of Prussia, Denmark, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and the greater part of the petty princes of Germany, were present in person; the other powers were represented by ambassadors extraordinary. The greatest statesmen of that period were here assembled; among others, Metternich, the Austrian minister, Hardenberg and Humboldt, the Prussian ministers, Castlereagh, the English plenipotentiary, Nesselrode, the Russian envoy, Talleyrand and Dalberg, Gagern, Bernstorff, and Wrede, the ambassadors of France, Holland, Denmark, and Bavaria, etc. The negotiations were of the utmost importance, for, although one of the most difficult points, the new regulation of affairs in France, was already settled, many extremely difficult questions still remained to be solved. Talleyrand, who had served under every government, under the republic, under the usurper, Napoleon; who had retaken office under the Bourbons and the Jesuits who had returned in their train, and who, on this occasion, was the representative of the criminal and humbled French nation, ventured, nevertheless, to offer his perfidious advice to the victors, and, with diabolical art, to sow the seed of discord among them. This conduct was the more striking on account of its glaring incongruity with the proclamation of Calisch, which expressly declared that the internal affairs of Germany were wholly and solely to be arranged by the princes and nations of Germany, without foreign, and naturally, least of all, without French interference.[3] Talleyrand's first object was to suppress the popular spirit of liberty throughout Germany, and to rouse against it the jealous apprehensions of the princes. He therefore said, "You wish for constitutions; guard against them. In France, desire for a constitution produced a revolution, and the same will happen to you." He it was who gave to the congress that catchword, legitimacy. The object of the past struggle was not the restoration of the liberties of the people but that of the ancient legitimate dynasties and their absolute sovereignty. The war had been directed, not against Napoleon, but against the Revolution, against the usurpation of the people. By means of this legitimacy the king of Saxony was to be re-established on his throne, and Prussia was on no account to be permitted to incorporate Saxony with her dominions. Prussia appealed to her services toward Germany, to her enormous sacrifices, to the support given to her by public opinion; but the power of public opinion was itself questioned. The seeds of discord quickly sprang up, and, on the 3d of January, 1815, a secret league against Prussia was already formed for the purpose of again humbling the state that had sacrificed all for the honor of Germany, of frustrating her schemes of aggrandizement, and of quenching the patriotic spirit of German idealists and enthusiasts.[4]
The want of unanimity amid the members of the congress had at the same time a bad effect upon the ancient Rhenish confederated states. In Nassau, the Landwehr was, on its return home after the campaign, received with marks of dissatisfaction. In Baden and Hesse, many of the officers belonging to the army openly espoused Napoleon's cause. In Baden, the volunteer corps was deprived of its horses and sent home on foot.[5] In Wurtemberg, King Frederick refused to allow the foreign troops and convoys a passage along the highroad through Cannstadt and Ludwigsburg, and forbade the attendance of civil surgeons upon the wounded belonging to the allied army. In Wurtemberg and Bavaria, the Rhenish Mercury was suppressed on account of its patriotic and German tendency. At Stuttgard, the festival in commemoration of the battle of Leipzig was disallowed; and in Frankfort on the Maine, the editor of a French journal ventured, unreprimanded, to turn this festival into ridicule.
Switzerland was in a high state of ferment. The people of the Grisons, who had taken possession of the Valtelline, and the people of Uri, who had seized the Livinenthal, had been respectively driven out of those territories by the Austrians. The Valais, Geneva, Neufchatel, and Pruntrut were, on the other hand, desirous of joining the confederation. The democratic peasantry were almost everywhere at war with the aristocratic burghers. Berne revived her claim upon Vaud and Aargau, which armed in self-defence.[6] Reinhard of Zurich, the Swiss Landammann, went, meanwhile, at the head of an embassy to Vienna, for the purpose of settling in the congress the future destinies of Switzerland by means of the intervention of the great powers. Talleyrand, with unparalleled impudence, also interfered in this affair, threatened to refuse his recognition to every measure passed without his concurrence, and compelled the Swiss to entreat him to honor the deliberations with his presence. On Austria's demanding a right of conscription in the Grisons alone, France having enjoyed that right throughout the whole of Switzerland at an earlier period, Talleyrand advised the Swiss to make a most violent opposition against an attempt that placed their independence at stake. "Cry out," he exclaimed, "cry out, as loud as you can!"[7]