A rapid glance over the series of animals will show us also, that in some of them the phenomena, which arise from sensation predominate over those which have their origin in the passions; in others we shall see the latter superior in power to the former, and in others again, a balance established between the two. These circumstances, which we remark in the long chain of animated beings, we may remark in the human species when considered individually. In one man the passions are the great principle of motion; the influence of his animal life is continually surpassed by that of his organic life, and incessantly induces him to act in a way to which the will is almost a stranger, and which often entails upon him the bitterest regret, when his animal life resumes its empire. In another man, the animal life is the stronger of the two. In such case, the understanding seems to be augmented at the expense of the passions, the latter remaining in that silence, to which the organization of the individual has condemned them.
That man enjoys the happiest constitution in whom the two lives are balanced, in whom the cerebral and epigastric centres exercise the one upon the other an equal action, whose intellect is warmed, exalted, and animated by the passions, but whose judgment makes him at all times master of their influence.
It is this influence of the passions over the actions of the animal life, which composes what is named the character. Character as well as Temperament depends upon the organic life; possesses all its attributes, and is a stranger to the will in all its emanations; for our exterior actions form a picture of which the ground and design do indeed belong to the animal life, but upon which the organic life extends the shading and colouring of the passions. The character of the individual is constituted by such shades and colours.
The alternate predominance of the two lives has been remarked by almost all philosophers. Plato, Marcus Aurelius, Bacon, St. Augustine, St. Paul, Leibnitz, Van Helmont, Buffon and many others, have recognized in man two principles, by one of which we become the masters of all our moral actions, by the other the contrary. We have nothing to do with the nature of these principles. Our business is with their phenomena; we shall analyze the relations by which they are united.
FOOTNOTES:
[15] Bichat, in this paragraph, seems to say that the perceptions, which produce in us the passions, go directly and without the intervention of the brain, from the senses to the organs which he supposes to be affected by them. We cannot believe that such was his idea. The paragraph which follows must aid us in understanding it, and we shall endeavour to elucidate it by means of an example.
A certain event happens; a man is informed of it by means of his senses; he examines the event in itself, and its relations with antecedent and future events; his judgment weighs the various consequences of it, and shows them to be very disadvantageous to him. Here, as Bichat calls it, is a cold series of intellectual phenomena, which would take place in the individual, whoever the man may be who is affected by the event to which he has given his attention. It is found that the man who is injured is himself; then, from a knowledge of this only, his heart is sympathetically affected; its motions become more rapid and stronger, they send to the brain a greater quantity of blood, and this increase of habitual excitement in the organ of thought, produces a kind of mental attention in relation to the event that has taken place.
Thus, without the part that the heart has taken in it, this man would have seen with the most perfect indifference an event most disastrous to himself; for without even supposing anger, the least sentiment of sadness being a passion, we cannot believe that he is affected with it, if his liver, stomach or spleen are not at the moment in a particular state. But does not every thing on the contrary lead us to believe that anger exists before the agitation of the heart, and that this is the effect of it and not the cause? This agitation of the heart without doubt, by sending to the brain a greater quantity of blood than usual, contributes in its turn to develop and support the kind of alienation which accompanies anger; but it is necessary that the passion should already exist, since a favourable event, by producing as rapid motions of the heart, will produce nothing similar.
[16] There is no proof that the sense of stricture which is felt in the epigastric region, is connected with the stomach; and if it were proved that it was so, it would not follow from it that this organ was primarily affected from fear. The same passion sometimes acts differently in different individuals; there are some who do not feel this stricture in the epigastric region, but who are deprived of the use of their legs; must it be said that in these individuals the seat of fear is in the extensor muscles of the legs? If the introduction of a warm drink into the stomach produces an increase of cutaneous exhalation, should we conclude from analogy, that it is by acting primarily upon this organ that fear causes that cold sweat which sometimes accompanies it?
[17] Note by the Author.—This nervous network, going principally from the semi-lunar ganglion, belongs to almost the whole abdominal vascular system, whose various ramifications it follows. It is, according to the usual manner of considering it, one of the divisions of the great sympathetic; but it seems to me that the ideas of anatomists respecting this important nerve are not conformable to nature.