The detailed considerations into which we have entered respecting the situation of the Russians, the war in the Caucasus, and the political importance of that region, clearly indicate the differences between the conflict in the Caucasus and that which we have been carrying on for fourteen years in Algeria. The aggressive policy of Russia once admitted, and her possessions north, south, and east of the Caucasus not allowing of contestation, the submission of the mountaineers becomes for her a vital question, with which is connected, not only the fate of her Asiatic provinces, but also that of all the governments that lie between the Danube and the Caspian. In Algeria, on the contrary, we are not urged by any imperious motive to extend our conquests. Our political influence in Europe, and our real strength could at present gain nothing thereby; and it is probably reserved to another generation to derive a grand and useful result from our African conquests.

Of late years some public writers, taking the defeats of Russia for their text, have founded on them an argument against the establishment of French supremacy in Algeria. This reasoning appears to us unsound, and it is even at variance with historical facts. In Asia, Russia has had to deal with two very distinct regions; the trans-Caucasian provinces, and the Caucasus proper. The former, easy of access, and comprising Georgia, Imeritia, Mingrelia, and the other provinces taken from Persia and Turkey, were occupied by disorganised nations, at variance within themselves, and differing from each other in race, manners, and religion; accordingly the Muscovite sway was established over them without difficulty, and without any conflict worth mentioning with the inhabitants. The case has not been the same in that immense mountain barrier erected between Europe and Asia, the inaccessible retreats of which extend from Anapa to the shores of the Caspian. The dwellers in those regions present no analogy with the inhabitants south of the chain. There has never been a moment's pause in the obstinate strife between them and Russia; and all the sacrifices, and all the efforts of the tzars against them, have for sixty years been wholly in vain.

Our situation in Algeria is evidently very different. We have there had for our portion neither the bootless strife of the Caucasus, though having most warlike tribes for adversaries, nor the easy conquests of the trans-Caucasian provinces. It is but fourteen years since our troops landed in Africa, and we possess, not only all the towns of the seaboard, but likewise all those of the interior; numerous bodies of natives share actively in our operations; we are masters of all the lines of communication; our forces command the country to a great distance from the coasts: and in the opinion of all well-informed officers the pacification of the regency of Algiers would, perhaps, have by this time been accomplished, if the government had set its face against the passion for bulletins, and the too martial humour of most of our generals, and tried to pacify the tribes, not by arms and violence, but numerously ramified commercial relations which should call into play the natural cupidity of the Arabs.

Nor can the topographical difficulties of Algeria be compared with those that defend the country of the Lesghis, the Tchetchenzes, and the Tcherkesses. Intersected by vast plateaux, numerous rich and fertile valleys, and parallel mountain ranges, almost everywhere passable and flanked by long lines of coast of which we possess the principal points, and which present at Algiers, Oran, Philippeville, and Bona, wide openings affording admission into the interior, our possessions afford free course to our armies, and nowhere exhibit that strange and singular conformation in which has consisted from time immemorial the safety of the Caucasian tribes.

There are other circumstances likewise that facilitate our progress in Africa, and enable us to exercise a direct influence over all the tribes south of the Tel of Algiers. As has been very ably demonstrated by M. Carrette, captain of engineers, it is enough to occupy the extreme limits of the cultivated lands, and the markets in which the inhabitants of the oases exchange their produce for the corn and other indispensable commodities of the north, to oblige all the populations of the Sahara, fixed or nomade, immediately to acknowledge the sovereignty of France.

It is only in case our government, impelled by ill-directed vanity, should decide on the absolute conquest of the mountains of the Kabyles, that we might encounter in the country, and in the political constitution of those mountaineers, some of the obstacles that characterise the Caucasian regions. And again, what comparison can there be between Kabylia, the two portions of which east and west of Algiers comprise but 1000 or 1200 square leagues of surface, and the great chain of the Caucasus which extends with a mean breadth of fifty or sixty leagues, over a length of more than 250 leagues?

We say nothing of the superiority of our armies and our military system. It is enough to recall what we have said as to the deplorable situation of the troops in the Caucasus, to be aware how much France has the advantage over Russia in this respect.

The diseases and the frightful mortality incident to our armies have been also dwelt on; but here again all the statistical returns are in favour of France. Out of a force of 75,000 men, our mean annual loss is 7000 or 8000. In 1840, indeed, the most fatal year, it appears to have risen to 12,000; but in that same year, and likewise in the following year, Russia lost more than 17,000 on the coasts of Circassia alone. Thus physically, as well as politically, there is a total difference between the war in the Caucasus and that in Algeria; and instead of suffering ourselves to be disheartened by fourteen years of unproductive occupation, and despairing before hand, because the actual results do not keep pace with our unreasonable impatience, we ought to take example by that indefatigable perseverance with which Russia, in spite of her disasters and the fruitlessness of her efforts, has gone on in the pursuit of her purpose for upwards of half a century.

FOOTNOTES:

[61] M. Hommaire says he has copied the bulletin exactly as it appeared in French in the Russian papers.