It was through the effect of such measures as these that Astrakhan lost all trace of its former greatness. In 1839 it contained only forty-eight merchants of the first guild, including women and children, and had but forty-eight vessels belonging to its port. Of these forty-eight vessels, having a total tonnage of about nine millions of kilogrammes, eleven belonged to the crown, twenty-five were the property of private individuals, and were employed as government transports; there remained, therefore, for trade only twelve vessels, one-third of which were unemployed. The vessels belonging to the other ports of the Caspian in connexion with Astrakhan, such as Baku and Salian, were eight in number, with a tonnage of 387,000 kilogrammes, besides about sixty coasters, tonnage unknown. Such is the deplorable condition to which the trade and navigation of the Caspian have been reduced by an exclusive government, which would never consent to understand the reciprocal nature of traffic, but foolishly hoped to preserve its commercial intercourse with nations whose productions it rejects, and to which it refuses even the transit of the foreign goods they require. Do what she will, Russia will never succeed in adequately replacing for the Mussulmans of the south of the empire the manufactures of Asia, which are peculiarly adapted to their habits and their wants, or in inducing the Transcaucasian countries to adopt her own sorry manufactures. The spread of English commerce, moreover, in the western regions of Asia is now a historical fact, and Russia cannot possibly check it unless she become mistress, some time or other, of Constantinople. It is true she may compete in some hardware goods with the higher-priced productions of England; but the Asiatics are excellent judges of such matters; they are seldom tempted by mere cheapness; on the contrary, experience proves that they prefer the English goods, the soundness and high finish of which they fully appreciate. But even though the Russian goods were as well made as the English, the prohibitive system of the empire, and the refusal of transit to European merchandise, would still be sufficient to deprive the country of all export trade in the Caspian; for the people of Asia will always give the preference to those commercial relations which afford them opportunities for exchanges suitable to their wants, along with the advantages of a more extensive demand.
The trade of the two Russian ports of the Caspian in 1835, was as follows:—
| Exports. rubles. | Imports. rubles. | Duties rubles. | |
| Astrakhan | 2,235,514 | 2,235,514 | 127,241 |
| Baku | 556,016 | 1,564,924 | 81,735 |
| 2,791,530 | 3,800,438 | 208,976 |
Which gives for the whole Caspian a general circulation of about 6,500,000 rubles. The trade has still continued to decline since 1835. We find it stated in the journal of the ministry of the interior, that the whole exports of the Russian Transcaucasian provinces, by the Black Sea, the Caspian, and overland, amounted in 1839, to but 3,889,707 rubles,[23] whilst the imports by the Caspian, did not exceed 2,896,008 rubles, nearly a million less than in 1835. In the same year Persia supplied, by the overland route, goods to the amount of 8,545,035 rubles to the Caucasian provinces. Now these goods consisted, according to the documents of the government itself, not of raw materials, but almost entirely in silk and cotton fabrics. The fact is, that notwithstanding the high duties of the imperial tariff, the people of Asia, who know nothing of the fantastic changes of fashion, always prefer the durable productions of the Persian looms to the flimsy tissues which Russia offers them, at very high prices, in consequence of the great remoteness of Moscow, the only seat of manufactures in the empire. Again, the Persians, finding that Russia can supply them with but few articles suited to them, keep all the raw materials produced in their country, and those which reach them from Central Asia, to exchange them for the European goods, which are now briskly and abundantly supplied in Trebisond and Tauris. Thus the Ghilan[24] silks, the Mazanderan cottons, the gall-nuts of Kurdistan, the tobaccoes of Shiraz, the gums, dye-stuffs, saffron, &c., have completely deserted the Caspian, and the route from Tiflis to Redout-Kaleh, for that by way of Erzeroum and Trebisond. Another circumstance in favour of this new line is the low rate of carriage and duties in Turkey; the latter never exceed three per cent. for Europeans, and four per cent. for Persians; but in reality merchants seldom pay more than half that amount. Altogether the transit from Constantinople does not augment the first cost of goods by more than ten per cent. Hence it is easy to infer how difficult it is for Russia, whose manufacturing power is still so inconsiderable, to contend with the other European states in the markets of Persia, and how grossly it blundered when it voluntarily annihilated all transit trade through its dominions, in the vain hope of forcing its own productions on the Transcaucasian countries.
One of the most curious things connected with the destruction of all these elements of wealth is the petty artifices practised by the ministry to make Europe, and the head of the government, believe that the extension of commerce is nowhere more sedulously pursued than in Russia. For instance, the fort of Alexandrof has been built on the north-east coast of the Caspian, under the pretence of providing a receptacle for the imaginary caravans from Khiva and Bokhara. Unfortunately, the locality affords neither fresh water nor wood, nor any one necessary; accordingly, as might have been foreseen, it has not been visited by a single caravan. The garrison consists of 600 men, and requires to be constantly renewed in consequence of its suffering by scurvy; the commandant is obliged to procure fresh water from the mouths of the Ural, which is conveyed to him in packet-boats. The fort has not even proved of use for the protection of the fishery which is carried on not far from its site. The soldiers cannot venture from their redoubts without incurring the risk of being carried off by the Khirghis. More than eighty Russian fishermen were made prisoners in 1839 by those nomades, and sold in Khiva and Bokhara.
It is well known what hopes Peter the Great built on the Black Sea, the Caspian, and the countries situated beyond the Caucasus. It remains for us briefly to discuss the question, whether it will ever be possible for Russia to make the Indian trade return to its old route.
Now that navigation has made such amazing progress, now that the establishment of steamboats on the Euphrates and the Red Sea, is a solved problem, and the cost of freight by sea is exceedingly reduced, we think there is no longer a chance for Russia to divert the course of the Indian trade, and make it pass through her own dominions. Russia is conterminous with the Chinese empire, and has long enjoyed certain and regular communication with it; and yet the English find it very profitable to sell in Odessa, and all the south of Russia, tea brought them by ships that double the Cape of Good Hope. It is evident that Russia is in a still worse position with regard to India than to China. Should the Russians ever become masters of the Sea of Azof, they might, perhaps, penetrate to Bokhara and Samarkand by way of the rivers Sir Daria (Iaxartes) and Amore Daria (Oxus). This was one of Peter the Great's grand conceptions. But the reiterated attempts that have been made in Khiva, always to no purpose, prove plainly that conquests are not easily to be made in those regions, and that such armies as those of our day are not fitted to traverse the steppes of the Khirghis and Turcomans. And how were it possible, besides, to establish as regular and cheap communications with India, by way of Persia or Bokhara, as those which now exist by sea? It seems, therefore, evident that Peter the Great's projects are become chimerical at this day, and that all the efforts Russia can ever make by herself, will be unable to change the course of the Indian trade. It is only in case of a long maritime war that she could hope to bring the productions of Central Asia to the Black Sea, thence to be distributed over continental Europe. But apart from this trade, there was still a vast field to be wrought: in like manner as the East Indies are become, commercially speaking, dependencies of Great Britain, so Persia and Turcomania might have become tributaries to Russia, had not the latter, blinded by her vanity and jealous ambition, to adopt her deplorable system of prohibition, and destroyed the whole European transit trade which was establishing itself by way of the ports she possesses on the Black Sea.
Our facts and figures have clearly proved that the decay of the navigation of the Caspian has accompanied that of the Asiatic trade; it is important, however, to give some notion of the nature and employment of the vessels actually in use on the Caspian and the Volga. These vessels are divided into five classes, according to the character of their build. The first comprises ships that visit all the ports of the Caspian indiscriminately; the second, those that ply only in the neighbourhood of Astrakhan; the third, those that confine themselves to the mouths of the Volga from Astrakhan to the sea; the fourth, the river boats that never quit the Volga; and the fifth, those belonging to the Persian provinces.
The ships that visit the ports of the Caspian are called shkooutes, and their hulls are not unlike those of Dutch vessels. They are built of bad timber, and in defiance of all rules. Their number, though greatly exceeding the demands of commerce, is not above eighty; they gauge from 1000 to 2000 hectolitres. Shipowners generally buy old hulls in Nijni Novgorod, and turn them into shkooutes, without ever reflecting that their craziness and want of regularity makes them exceedingly dangerous as sea-going vessels. And then the command of them is given to ignorant pilots, who fill the office of captains in all but the name. The crews consist of from ten to sixteen, and these being chosen by the sole test of cheapness, the result is that the navigation of the squally and formidable Caspian is in very bad repute among merchants, and will inevitably be abandoned altogether.
The shkooutes are employed in conveying Russian and Persian goods, and the workmen, materials, provisions, and produce, belonging to the fisheries situated between Salian,[25] Siphitourinsk, Akhrabat, and Astrabad,[26] and in carrying victuals and stores to the garrisons in the eastern parts of the Caucasus.